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ABSTRACT 
Internet-based new media—social media platforms in particular—have profoundly 
altered the boundaries and contours of civic and political life by offering new opportunities 
for participation and challenge, as well as new perils of communal competition, surveillance, 
counter-influence and disruption.  Additionally, new media technologies have shown 
unprecedented capabilities for political communication to cross national boundaries.  This 
project considers the complex factors that impact participation by members of a diaspora in 
the politics of the homeland—in this case Indian immigrants in the United States.  A 
combined approach of historical inquiry and applied survey research attempts to 
disaggregate the influence of the digital media ecosystem (social networking platforms in 
particular), as well as core dynamics of personal identity and the dislocation associated with 
geographic migration.  The tested hypotheses examine whether respondents are more or less 
likely to consider future political participation based on indexed independent variables 
related to identity, geographic migration and social media platform usage.  Additionally, 
respondents’ sensitivity to exposure to certain types of news information is also considered 
through an experiment using hypothetical news stories that vary in content, geography and 
actor identity.  These approaches reflect on the existing scholarship, but more importantly, 
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builds new lines of questioning that span across previously disconnected streams of research, 
offering a more holistic appraisal that more accurately reflects the large, complex, varied 
mediascape in which migrants see, share and respond to many different forms of online 
information, communication and interactivity.  Online recruitment of resident Indian and 
Non-Resident Indian (NRI) survey respondents provided two population samples that 
allows for comparative examination prior and subsequent to the event of migration.  The 
survey questions themselves encompassed of a broad range of questions addressing 
socioeconomic status, prior civic activity, social media usage, perceptions about political 
institutions and expectations of future participation in the form of voting.  The implications 
for this research may yield insights into the shape of possible future transnational 
phenomena, most notably the prospect of absentee voting in the near future.  The specific 
questions and influences on diasporic participation are considered in this context, and 
recommendations for follow-up research are provided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“It takes only the merest acquaintance with the facts of the modern world to note that it is now an 
interactive system in a sense that is strikingly new.”1 
 
 Internet-based new media—social media in particular—have profoundly altered the 
boundaries and contours of civic and political life by offering new opportunities for 
participation and challenge, as well as new perils of communal competition, surveillance, 
counter-influence and disruption.  Additionally, new media technologies have shown 
unprecedented capabilities for political communication to cross national boundaries.  This 
communication is a central feature of a transnational space in which individuals, formal and 
informal associational groups, state institutions, political parties, lobbying groups, financiers, 
corporate entities, opposition groups, trade unions, and still more actors compete for 
prominence, influence, visibility and mobilization within the political life of a national 
society.2  Originally conceptualized by Appadurai in the context of informative and 
commercial stimuli, the framework of a “mediascape” has unique applicability to the study 
of diasporic populations.  Dispersed emigrant populations, including professionals, laborers, 
refugees and exiles have basic opportunities as expatriates to participate, at some level, in the 
political life of their home societies.  Furthermore, native populations, through increasingly 
facile communications with diasporic communities, have unprecedented opportunities for 
exposure to the realm of outside influences that can color their own views of their domestic 
political systems.   
                                                                                       
1 Appadurai, A. (1990), “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Theory, Culture & 
Society, 7(2), 295. 
2 Bennett, 2004; Cammaerts & Van Audenhove, 2005; Cunningham, 2001; Gamlen, 2008; Schiller, et al, 
1995; Smith & Wiest, 2005 
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Whereas much attention has focused on broader theories of the importance of new 
media, this study examines the participation of a diaspora in homeland politics, considering 
the deeper patterns by which individuals and groups within a society engage new media for 
political communication.  This study addresses several critical questions about how different 
communities use new media for political communication.  How do immigrant communities 
participate in the political life of their homelands?  How do citizens abroad engage in 
political dialogue with their counterparts back home?  How do emigrant populations 
navigate the terrain of multiple systems of government, civil society and social life to 
articulate their needs, preferences and demands in their respective political environs?  
Utilizing a combination of historical inquiry, survey research on pre and post-migratory 
populations and a designed experiment to gauge the impact of news information on political 
engagement, this study works towards developing an understanding of future political 
participation by the diaspora is influenced by: 
1) the enduring contours of identity 
2) the impact of geographic dislocation; and 
3) navigation of the complex contemporary mediascape through measurement of 
social media engagement, expectations of future usage, and the impact of and the 
effects of different types of political news information on transnational 
engagement.   
 Through a comparison of Indian immigrants in the United States and their 
analogous demographic counterparts in India, the parallel approach of surveys and 
experimental scenario questionnaires will examine the complex dynamics of the enabling and 
  3 
obstructing factors presented by issues of class, caste, professional background, gender, 
religious affiliation, and prior civic activities and communication on associational bonds and 
new media engagement as filters in the broader processes of how migration impacts political 
participation.    The implications for this research are important: it can yield valuable insights 
into the shape of possible future transnational phenomena such as absentee voting, 
remittances, lobbying and the adoption of bilateral foreign policy stances on both sides of 
the US-India migration pathway.  The prospect of absentee voting is examined in specific 
detail.  
 The opening chapter provides relevant historical background on Indian diaspora, 
with respect to both outmigration in the global context, as well as the specific evolution of 
migration to the United States.  It is instructive to understand the vastly different 
socioeconomic and geopolitical context in which earlier and later waves of immigration can 
be contrasted.  The contemporary diasporic community in the United States is situated in the 
legacy of decades of evolution across political, social, economic and legal dimensions—
evolution in which previous generations of the community played influential roles, as 
illustrated through specific vignettes on diasporic participation in homeland politics. 
 Chapter 2 presents the theoretical lens through which the essential research 
questions of this study can be understood, framed and approached.  The concept of a 
“mediascape,” originally articulated by Appadurai, that is simultaneously updated with 
respect to technology and cognizant of its interdisciplinary is intended to scaffold the unique 
contours of new media platforms amidst the complex interwoven dynamics of migration and 
  4 
transnational existence.3  A number of helpful works are referenced, each of which 
contribute individually valuable elements that help inform the overall conceptualization of a 
contemporary mediascape environment through which to understand the subject diaspora 
members whose immersions, experiences and reactions are critical to the problem 
structuring and approaches within. 
 Chapter 3 considers a broad array of illustrative studies across the literature that 
addresses new media platforms.  Effort has been made to highlight the literature that is most 
pertinent to research that considers the impact of emergent digital technologies on mediated 
communication behaviors, mobilization, individual and group identity and social capital, 
given their importance to this study’s subjects and questions. 
 Chapter 4 specifically proceeds into further depth on prior studies that connect the 
body of emerging communication platforms with diasporic populations, specifically.  While 
this study is the first to connect several divergent research areas as well as certain empirical 
approaches with questions traditionally addressed through ethnographic research, there is 
nevertheless a vibrant body of helpful prior work that offers specific insights into how 
diasporic users interact with media platforms, what their motivations are, and how concepts 
of identity, community and social capital might manifest themselves. 
 Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of the study design.  Two sample 
populations, one inside India and another composed of Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), were 
subjected to anonymous online surveys.  The results of these surveys were subjected to 
                                                                                       
3 Appadurai, A. (1990), “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” Theory, Culture & 
Society, 7(2): 295-310 
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linear regression analysis and statistical tests to understand the impact of key variables such 
as socioeconomic status, civic values, social media immersion and the act of migration and 
dislocation itself.  Embedded in the surveys were separate experiments that tested 
respondents’ reactions to news stories—these stories varied in the “hard” or “soft” nature of 
their content, the location of their events, and the actors involved. 
 Chapter 6 presents the results of the regression analysis and statistical tests.  A 
number of significantly influential variables are identified.  While the variables influencing 
participation largely overlap across both native and NRI populations, the news sensitivity 
results are highly divergent.  The interpretation and discussion of these results considers the 
outcomes in the context of field literature and the mediascape model introduced in Chapter 
2. 
 Chapter 7 considers the results of this study in the context of the India’s 2014 
General Election.  This campaign was the subject of extensive coverage with respect to the 
use of digital networking platforms by the candidates, parties and voters, as well as the 
relationship between the leading candidates and the diaspora.  The results of this study offer 
some insights into the possibilities and limits of diasporic engagement in advance of the 
2019 General Election cycle, particularly if plans to allow absentee voting ultimately develop.  
Additionally, the potential considerations of absentee voting, in light of the study results, on 
bilateral relations, remittances and future campaign finance activities are considered.  As part 
of this chapter, a brief, additional analysis is presented, which examines the Twitter feeds of 
the two leading party figures over a two-year period to identify the presence of content that 
speaks directly to the diaspora. 
  6 
 Lastly, Chapter 8 provides recommendations for additional research.  The 
framework of this study is replicable across the number of dimensions.  Its methods could 
be applied towards understanding NRI communication dynamics in other host countries, or 
even (with appropriate adjustments) towards other diasporic populations. 
  
  7 
CH 1: COOLIES, CABBIES & THE C-SUITE: THE INDIAN 
DIASPORA ACROSS TIME, SPACE AND GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
 The migration of Indian nationals out of the Subcontinent to the far reaches of Asia, 
Oceania, East Africa, Europe and the Americas represents one of the richer and longer 
running out-migration movements over the past several centuries and is the subject of a rich 
and diverse body of literature across the social sciences.  Understanding the ever-evolving 
shape of this global community reveals a complex, dynamic sphere that parallels the 
complexities of the media-focused questions of this entire project.  Identity and migration 
are deeply interlaced with the social, political and geopolitical contexts of source and 
destination countries.  Moreover, an examination of several historical events demonstrates 
that participation in the politics of the homeland has been a present feature in the life of the 
Indian diaspora for at least a century, long prior to the advent of any potentially enabling 
media technologies.  This speaks to the importance of including identity and migration-
centered considerations in the design of this study (outlined in detail in Chapter 5).  
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, certain disparities in the study outcomes with respect to 
Native and NRI subjects suggests that alongside the evolution of media technologies (and 
the mediascape itself), the very nature of diasporic identity and the impact of the event of 
migration have also changed significantly across time. 
  8 
Segmenting a Global Diaspora 
 
 Defining the true scope of the Indian diaspora is a challenging—and highly 
subjective—task. The global Indian diaspora is estimated at approximately 25 million.4  It is 
also estimated to be dispersed across approximately 110 different countries.5  The largest 
individual country destination is the United States, followed by Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Sri Lanka.  These rankings are detailed in Table 1-A, below. 
Table 1-A: The Global Indian Diaspora, Populations in Leading Destination 
Countries6  
DESTINATION COUNTRY APPROX. POPULATION 
United States 2,250,000 
Malaysia 1,910,000 
Saudi Arabia 1,790,000 
United Arab Emirates 1,700,000 
Sri Lanka 1,600,000 
United Kingdom 1,500,000 
South Africa 1,220,000 
Canada 1,000,000 
Mauritius 880,000 
Nepal 600,000 
                                                                                       
4 Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, annual Report: 2014-15, available at: 
https://www.mea.gov.in/images/pdf/annual-report-2014-15.pdf, p. 4 
5 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, “High-Level Committee Report on Indian 
Diaspora,” pg. xii, published Dec. 2001, available at: http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm  
6 The Economist, “Mapping Migration,” Nov 17, 2011, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/11/diasporas  
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Collectively, in the Gulf monarchies, approximately 5.48 million Indian-born people reside, 
almost entirely as “guest workers.”  Their experiences, trajectories and outlooks as (what are 
often) indentured workers no doubt contrast sharply with the roughly 4.75 million Indian 
emigrants living and working the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.  Further 
illustrating the dynamic diversity of the diaspora and the unique facets of its collective 
experiences, approximately 2.17 million Indian-born residents are scattered across Trinidad, 
Guyana, Mauritius and Fiji—in all four of these countries, the recent arrivals join 
communities with over a century of established roots, majority (or near-majority) 
demographic footprints, and electoral competitiveness as a mainstream block.7     For the 
purposes of this project, the emigrant sample of interest is drawn from Indian-born residents 
of the United States.  This research framework is limited to first-generation populations, as 
considering second-generation or beyond would introduce a large number of complicating 
variables.8  Ultimately, for this research, viewing the activities and perceptions of native-born 
citizens of the United States from the lens of immigration and foreign nationality would 
introduce a vast landscape of complications that obscure the target goals of this project—
namely, the dislocated engagements of true immigrants.  Restricting the generational scope 
in a formulation of the diaspora also avoids the challenges associated with more distant eras 
of outmigration.  A deeper look reveals emigration from India throughout the 18th and 19th 
                                                                                       
7 See. e.g., Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1971), “Political Entrepreneurship and Patterns of Democratic 
Instability in Plural societies,” Race, 12(4), 461-476; Reynolds, A., Reilly, B. (1999), Electoral Systems and 
Conflict in Divided Societies, (Washington: National Academies Press)  
8 Among these complicating variables are the realities of U.S. citizenship, as well as regional, institutional 
and professional community influences on conceptions of identity.  Additionally, second-generation 
Indian Americans are highly unlikely to have experienced any form of geographic migration akin to that 
of their parents.  Lastly, any immersion across two societies and media environment would likely exist 
under completely different endogenous and exogenous conceptual framing. 
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Centuries as British colonial management shifted labor and resources across the 
transnational web of subject territories.  This management of both voluntary and indentured 
labor scattered Indian populations across areas as diverse as East Africa, South America, 
Singapore and the South Pacific.  Even deeper conceptualizations of the Indian diaspora 
could explore the Roma migration to Europe during the European Middle Ages, or from the 
Subcontinent to Southeast Asia, when emigrant populations settled in present-day Thailand, 
Cambodia and Indonesia, carrying with them elements of religion, language and culture that 
are visible in those countries today.  Again, while these broader visions of the Indian 
diaspora could be useful for historical inquiry, they would complicate attempts to understand 
the context—and actual lifespan—in which any meaningful frameworks of communication, 
interaction and participation would apply.  Perhaps Claude Markovitz summarizes the 
conundrum of sensibly bounding and defining the contours of such a complex 
phenomenon: 
“We are therefore faced with a kind of paradox: the more fragmented and 
diverse the actual Indian or south Asian diaspora tends to become, 
encompassing experiences and trajectories which appear largely 
incommensurable to each other, the more inclusive the discourse about 
diaspora tends to become, either because of a kind of nationalist 
appropriation or because it becomes enclosed within a more general 
discourse of globalisation.”9 
Attempting to attain some basic grasp of the nature, extent and features of the global 
Indian diaspora is worthwhile, not only because it yields insights into the populations 
themselves, but because diasporic populations occasionally impacted Indian politics from 
                                                                                       
9 Markovitz, C. (2007), “Afterward: Stray Thoughts of a Historian on ‘Indian’ or ‘South Asian,’” in Oonk, 
G, (Ed.), (2007), Global Indian Diasporas: Exploring Trajectories of Migration and Theory, Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, p. 269. 
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abroad long before the advent of communication-enabling technologies and platforms.  It is 
notable that Gandhi’s first satyagraha mobilization, in 1906, took place in Johannesburg, 
South Africa.  
For the purposes of this research, several key pieces of scholarship offer helpful 
insights into the broader puzzle at the center of this project.  Sharma posits that the Indian 
diaspora can be characterized by three persistent patterns: the recreation of Indian social 
structures in adoptive countries, the resilience of native cultural patterns and a distinct 
preference for economic advancement and integration over cultural assimilation.10  Sharma’s 
second point is echoed by Atal, and his third point is earlier pressed by Gordon, Saran, and 
Mahajani and Kunzru.11  Fisher (1980) argues that NRI populations are subject to inherent 
difficulties in seizing on organizational capabilities and associational bonds.12   
 Specifically examining the adaptive identities of different NRI sub-communities in 
the United Kingdom, Shils  argues that separation is a more challenging process for 
intellectual-class immigrants than it is for working-class immigrants.13  Regarding sub-level 
socioeconomic factors, Jain argues that caste is not part of the determinant framework of 
                                                                                       
10 Sharma, S.L. (1989), “Perspectives on Indians Abroad,” in Jayaram, N. (Ed.) (2004), The Indian Diaspora: 
Dynamics of Migration, Mumbai: Sage Publications 
11 Atal, Y., (2004), "Outsiders as Insiders: The Phenomenon of Sandwich Culture—Prefatorial to a 
Possible Theory," The Indian Diaspora: Dynamics of Migration 4: 200; Gordon, M.M. (1964), Assimilation in 
American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins, New York: Oxford University Press; Saran, P. 
(1985), The Asian Indian Experience in the United States, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company; 
Mahajani, U., and Kunzru, H.N. (1960), The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
12 Fisher, M.P. (1980), The Indians of New York City: A Study of Immigrants from India, Heritage: New Delhi 
13 Shils, E. "The Immigrant Intellectual,” in Parekh, B. (Ed.) (1974), Colour, Culture and Consciousness. 
Immigrant Intellectuals in Britain, London: G. Allen & Unwin; Shils develops this argument with 
ethnographic case study showing that much of an intellectual-class immigrant’s culture of identity is 
already formed by the host country prior to immigration, and that reconciliation of identity in the 
adoptive country is made more challenging after encountering barriers to professional advancement and 
exclusivity due to salient ethnic differences. (204-218) 
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identity formation or assimilation among NRIs in Malaysia.14  Conducting a study in 
Mauritius, Mehta argues that race is the primary determining factor for inclusiveness among 
migrants in Mauritius.15  Gajjala delves into how the contours of new media platforms help 
navigate identity in online fora among female NRIs, arguing that extant definitions of 
“otherness” prompt migrants to redefine themselves in frames more acceptable to members 
of the host society.16  Concerning migration and hybridized identity among NRIs, Sunaina 
examines Muslim youth in one community, arguing that they embody a “cultural citizenship” 
that is more fluid and expansive than traditional notions of “legal citizenship.”17 (141)   
An Overview of the United States-Based Diaspora 
 
 At present, the Indian diaspora in the United States consists of approximately 2.04 
million Indian-born residents.18  This population, while representing less than 1% of the total 
U.S. population, represents almost 5% of the total foreign-born population as of 2013, and is 
the second-largest segment of foreign arrivals after immigrants from Mexico.  Prior to the 
liberalizations of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Indian immigrants numbered 
roughly 12,000.19  That number increased to 200,000 by 1980, and has expanded by roughly 
                                                                                       
14 Jain, R.K. (1989), “Race Relations, Ethnicity, Class and Culture: A Comparison of Indians in Trinidad 
and Malaysia,” Sociological Bulletin 38(1): 57-69 
15 Mehta, S.R. (1989), “The Uneven ‘Inclusion’of Indian Immigrants in Mauritius,” Sociological Bulletin 
38(1): 141-53 
16 Gajjala, R. (2002), “An Interrupted Postcolonial/Feminist Cyberethnography: Complicity and 
Resistance in the ‘Cyberfield,’” Feminist Media Studies 2(2): 177-193 
17 Sunaina, M. (2008), “Citizenship and Dissent in Diaspora: Indian Immigrant Youth in the United States 
after 9/11,” in Raghuram, P., Sahoo, A.K., Maharaj, B., and Sangha, D. (2008), Tracing an Indian Diaspora: 
Contexts, Memories, Representations, Mumbai: Sage Publications, p. 141 
18 Migration Policy Institute, “Indian Immigrants in the United States,” May 6, 2015, available at: 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-immigrants-united-states.  The broader population of 
Indian origin in the United States, including the second-generation with at least one Indian-born parent, is 
estimated at approximately 3.8 million.  
19 1960 estimate, cited by Migration Policy Institute (2015) 
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10 times since.  This trajectory is illustrated in Figure 1.1, below. 
Figure 1.1: Indian Immigration to the United States, 1980-201320  
 
The Indian population in the United States is frequently heralded as evidence of successful 
Indian patterns of work ethic, parenting and norms concerning education, family and 
community.  It is also frequently cited as emblematic of American values of inclusion, 
tolerance, diversity and opportunity.  It is difficult to dispute these characterizations on the 
face of data related to income, education, remittances and institutional presence in 
professional and social communities.  As illustrated in Figure 1.2, below, Indian Americans 
display higher median incomes and education levels than both the naïve-born American 
population and all immigrants in aggregate, and their gap in English language proficiency is 
                                                                                       
20 Migration Policy Institute (2015) 
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far narrower than the immigrant median21.   
Figure 1.2:  Comparative Measurements of Income, Education and English 
Language Skills22 
 
 
 
These disparities also extend to comparisons on measures of poverty and means-tested 
assistance.23   
                                                                                       
21 See Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), “Immigrants in the United States: A Profile of America's 
Foreign-Born Population,” available at http://cis.org/node/3876, for information on educational 
attainment and language proficiency.  The results presented by CIS are based on data originally collected 
in the Current Population Survey of March, 2011.  See http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/indian-
immigrants-united-states for figures on median household income. 
22 For source data, see Desai, M. A., Kapur, D., McHale, J., & Rogers, K. (2009), “The fiscal impact of 
high-skilled emigration: Flows of Indians to the US,” Journal of Development Economics, 88(1), 32-44.   
23 Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), “Immigrants in the United States: A Profile of America's 
Foreign-Born Population,” available at http://cis.org/node/3876.   
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As illustrated in Figure 1.3, below, Indian immigrants are significantly less likely to be 
classified as in or near poverty, or to receive some form of means-tested public assistance.24  
Figure 1.3:  Comparative Measurements of Poverty and Means-Tested Assistance 
  
While accurate, these selected data comparisons mask two things.  First, it masks the fact 
that the Indian diaspora’s collective experience in the United States is one segment of a 
much broader global phenomenon.  Second, it masks the fact that such optimistic framing 
of a connected, integrated community thriving in a tolerant democracy rests on a complex 
and, at times, ugly history of prejudice and discrimination.   
                                                                                       
24 CIS’ definition of means-tested program includes four categories: cash assistance (TANF, SSI and 
general state assistance); food assistance (SNAP, WIC, free/reduced lunch); subsidized housing (both via 
vouchers or direct government-owned housing); and, Medicaid. 
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Emigration to the United States 
 
 A brief overview of Indian migration to the United States provides a helpful 
contextual backdrop to some of the underlying dynamics at issue in this study.  Moreover, it 
illustrates that come of the key inquiries of this study, particularly those concerning identity, 
communication and diasporic engagement, have relevant historical precedents despite the 
comparatively archaic modes of communication and engagement available in earlier time 
periods. 
A “Tide of Turbans” 
 
“True, the Hindu is not a desirable citizen.  He is not adaptable; he does not fit 
in.  He is a stranger in a foreign land.  He is a poor workman, and he lives in 
dirt and filth.  But he is an Aryan, not a black as frequently characterized in the 
press.  When he abandons the turban and assumes American garb, which he is in 
no haste to do, he is a sort of nondescript and might pass for a Portuguese or 
Spaniard.”25 
“It is claimed that the Hindu is an undesirable immigrant.  I would like to ask 
what kind of immigrant American legislators would consider to be desirable?”26 
The first wave of Indian immigrants arrived in the 1890s and 1900s, primarily from 
Punjab, and primarily with destinations in the Western American states and Canadian 
Provinces.27  Arrivals in the Western United States increased following Canada’s enactment 
                                                                                       
25 Dodd, Werter D., “The Hindu in the Northwest,” The World Today, Vol. 13, (Nov., 1907), p. 1160.  
26 Chandra, Ram, “Exclusion of Hindus Due to British Influence,” San Francisco: Hindustan Gadar, 
1916, p. 3. 
27 Situated in the San Francisco Bay, Angel Island served as the primary gateway for immigrant arrivals.  
See, Wallace, S. I. (2016), Not Fit to Stay: Public Health Panics and South Asian Exclusion, Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, pp. 89-90.  Wallace explains that unlike their counterparts at Ellis 
Island, Angel Island’s inspection staff had long taken a much more proactive role in actively screening 
arrivals, rather than the more high-volume—and decidedly less rigorous—processing that would have 
been typically observed in New York Harbor. (“Like other PHS examiners at Pacific coast ports, 
inspectors at San Francisco had long abandoned the ‘line inspection’ used at Ellis Island, where inspectors 
superficially examined large numbers of Europeans by observing them as a group.  Instead, medical 
officers at Angel Island subjected South Asians, along with all other Asian arrivals, to thorough, hands-on 
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of coordinated exclusion policies by 1909.28  Indian communities in Washington, drawn by 
opportunities in the lumber industry and in auxiliary professions, quickly faced similar 
patterns of organized exclusion, discrimination and hostility.29  On September 4 and 5, 1907, 
following weeks of rhetorical escalation in the local press, a white mob of approximately 500 
raided the encampment of Punjabi saw mill workers in Bellingham, WA.  With the 
complicity of local law enforcement, the immigrant mill workers were assaulted, rounded up 
and herded into the local jail.  Ultimately, the entire Indian population was expelled from 
Bellingham, departing for either Oregon, California or British Columbia.30  Two months 
later, the Indian laborers of nearby Everett, WA were similarly driven out.31  Despite the 
absence of substantial numbers, economic agency or meaningful access to civic or political 
                                                                                       
inspections.  At Angel Island, physicians used their ‘medical gaze’ to examine naked or nearly naked 
Asians for easy recognizable medical conditions, used stethoscopes to listen to their heart, inverted eyelids 
to look for trachoma, tested saliva for traces of beriberi, and, with increasing frequency by 1910, 
conducted bacteriological tests for parasitic infection…Physicians tasked with inspecting Europeans at 
Ellis Island spent less time with each immigrant, used less technology, and overall had ‘few resources 
dedicated to exclusion.’”) 
28See Hess, Gary R. "The Forgotten Asian Americans: The East Indian Community in the United States." 
The Pacific Historical Review (1974): 576-596.  Hess explains how the opportunistic promotional campaigns 
of Canadian railroad and lumber operations belied underlying social and institutional resistance.  
Ultimately, the Canadian government utilized “continuous voyage” rules, reprimands of businesses that 
promoted opportunities to prospective immigrants and financial requirements to curtail most Indian 
immigration by the close of the first decade of the 20th Century.  This blockade resulted in a net diversion 
of Indian arrivals towards ports of entry in the United States, in Washington and California in particular. 
(578, 579) 
29 See Shah, Nayan, Stranger Intimacy: Contesting Race, Sexuality and the Law in the North American West, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), Ch. 1, p. 4.  The lumber industry in Washington was both 
robust and short on labor—the San Francisco earthquake of 1906 spurred intense demand for lumber 
related to the city’s ongoing construction efforts.  Alongside diverted entries prompted by the 
aforementioned Canadian restrictions on immigration into British Columbian ports, construction 
throughout California served as an attractive alternative to the timber mills of the Pacific Northwest. 
30 For a detailed account of the riot, its origins, aftermath and related contemporaneous press coverage, 
see Englesberg, Paul, "The 1907 Anti-Punjabi Hostilities in Washington State: Prelude to the Ghadar 
Movement," in Interpreting Ghadar: Echoes of Voices Past, Bains, S.K., Ed., (Centre for Indo Canadian 
Studies: Abbotsford, 2013), Ch. 3. 
31 Wynne, Robert E. "American Labor Leaders and the Vancouver Anti-Oriental Riot." The Pacific 
Northwest Quarterly 57, no. 4 (1966): 174-177. 
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life, the Indians of the West Coast faced increasing discriminatory pressure as the decade 
wore on.  The chief antagonists of the Indian community were present in the leadership of 
the Asiatic Exclusion League (an organization originally founded in 1905 as the Japanese and 
Korean Exclusion League, changing its name in 1907 to extend the coverage of nativist 
targeting to Indians and Chinese).32 
While states and localities, whether coerced or self-motivated, extended exclusionary 
laws that were originally aimed at Chinese and Japanese immigrants concerning land 
ownership, citizenship pathways and judicial access, many Indian immigrants were able to 
partially circumvent the structures of exclusion owing to their status as British subjects.33  
Ironically, the colonial rule that prompted much outmigration in the late 19th and early 20th 
Centuries also provided a protective mechanism that sometime enabled routes to land 
ownership and, in rarer instances, pathways to citizenship.34  However, the combination of 
exclusionary land laws, restrictions on citizenship, barriers to transferring property and the 
pervasive reality of endemic discrimination in American society severely diminished the 
ability of Indian immigrants to assimilate and mobilize across many axes of political 
participation.  Interwoven throughout this early period of Indian arrivals are persistent 
challenges stemming from questions of identity.  Nativist perceptions clung to the belief that 
Indians would not and could not assimilate into American culture—the magnitude of their 
exoticism being simply insurmountable.  As Sheffauer pontificates in the original “Tide of 
Turbans” editorial:   
                                                                                       
32 Chang, Kornel S., Pacific Connections: The Making of the US-Canadian Borderlands., (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012), p. 104-105. 
33 “The Hindu Question,” The Marysville Appeal, April 28, 1912, p. 4 
34 Sheffauer, H., “The Tide of Turbans,” Forum, June 1910, Vol. 43, p. 618 
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“Always the turban remains, the badge and symbol of their native land, their 
native customs and religion.  Whether repairing tracks on the long stretches 
of the Canadian or Northern Pacific railways, feeding logs into the screaming 
rotary saws of the lumber-mills, picking fruit in the luxuriant orchards or 
sunny hillsides of California, the twisted turban shows white or brilliant, a 
strange, exotic thing in the western landscape.”35 
Scheffauer suggests that irreconcilable cultural differences lie at the heart of 
mainstream American attitudes towards Indian immigrants.  He explains:  
“The American, far removed from the globe, finds it difficult to accept the 
Hindoo as a brother of blood.  Between him and this dark, mystic race lies a 
pit almost as profound as that which he has dug between himself and the 
negro.  The racial equality of the East Indian he acknowledges, but a closer 
affinity he unconsciously denies.  The two civilizations will not mix.  Hence 
the citizens of the Pacific States look askance upon the strange new 
immigrants the steamers bring to them from over the Pacific.”36 
 
This quote illustrates how white attitudes presented an inconsistent paradigm for 
Indians to contextualize their presence, identity and potential pathways forward.  
While certain white sentiments differentiated Indians as culturally, rather, than 
racially, Indians were also subject to casting as part of a larger Asian invasion.37  This 
                                                                                       
35 Scheffauer, H. “Tide of Turbans,” Forum, June 1910, Vol. 43, p. 618 
36 Scheffauer, H. “Tide of Turbans,” Forum, June 1910, Vol. 43, p. 616 
37 See Hess, p. 583 for more specific discussion of this amalgamated anti-Orientalist outlook. (“The 
continual concern with the "Hindus," despite their numerical insignificance, underscored the 
pervasiveness of the anti-Oriental sentiment in California. As evidenced in the reports of the Exclusion 
League and the popular press, East Indians were commonly seen as but part of an Asiatic horde moving 
across the Pacific; they were not distinguished from the more numerous groups. Labor organizations 
accepted without question that Asians had to be excluded.”)  See Proceedings of the Asiatic Exclusion League, 
April, 1910, p. 8 (quoted in Hess, p. 581) for a deeper contemporary illustration of this phenomenon. 
(“Students of ethnological subjects all agree that the Hindus are members of the same family that we are, 
and consequently all legislation based upon racial distinction might fail so far as keeping them out of the 
United States is concerned. As a matter of fact, we, the people of the United States, are cousins, far 
removed, of the Hindus of the northwest provinces, but our forefathers pressed to the west, in the 
everlasting march of conquest, progress, and civilization. The forefathers of the Hindus went east and 
became enslaved, effeminate, caste-ridden and degraded, until today we have the spectacle of the Western 
Aryan, the "Lords of Creation," if we may use the simile, while on the other hand the East Aryans have 
become the "slaves of Creation" to carry the comparison to its logical conclusion.  And now we the 
people of the United States are asked to receive these members of a degraded race on terms of equality. 
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presented Indian immigrants with a conundrum: emphasize their differences with 
respect to other Asian groups, or seek solidarity with other Asian groups against the 
common threat of systemic discrimination.  Complicating the inconsistencies of 
white attitudes about the culture and race of the Indian was a field of widely held 
factual misunderstandings.  A typically errant profiling would be the common white 
perception of an Indian immigrant, who was a Sikh, but referred to as a “Hindoo,” 
and understood to be a Muslim.38  Sikh, Hindu and Muslim were, and still are, nearly 
always mutually exclusive descriptors.  Nevertheless, they have frequently formed the 
logically compromised contours of how white society has constructed its own 
understanding of Indian identity.  The conundrum of how to navigate the pressures 
towards differentiation, assimilation or solidarity, as illustrated later in this chapter, 
persists from the early 20th Century to the present day, despite the vast differences in 
geopolitical context. 
Several examples illustrate that even early on, amidst arguably more challenging 
social milieus, the diaspora was on occasion able to mobilize and engage politically, even if 
not always successfully.  And, as can be seen in these examples, the intermingled 
complexities of identity, communication and engagement were always of consequence to the 
events that unfolded. 
                                                                                       
Or if they came under the law they may become citizens, and what would be the condition in California if 
this horde of fanatics should be received in our midst.”) 
38 See Joshi, K. Y. (2006). The racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United States. Equity 
& Excellence in Education, 39(3), 219 (“By 1910 there were between 5,000 and 10,000 South Asians in the 
United States. The majority were Sikh and about a third were Muslim, but they were all called Hindus (or 
‘Hindoos’) by both the media and by federal and state agencies.”), citing Jensen, J. M. (1988), Passage from 
India: Asian Indian immigrants in North America, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; and, Takaki, R. 
(1989), Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asians in America, Boston: Little Brown. 
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Ghadr, the Komagata Maru Incident and the “Hindu Conspiracy” 
 
In addition to organizing for greater economic, social and political rights in the 
United States, some Indian immigrants soon took on more active, urgent interest in the 
broader movement for independence of their homeland.  Though the mainstream of Indians 
(both the in-country and overseas émigré populations) primarily backed the more gradualist 
approaches of the Indian National Congress or various Home Rule arrangements within the 
British Empire, a number of emigres were increasingly supportive of more direct 
revolutionary action.  In 1908, Taraknath Das launched the publication of Free Hindustan 
from Seattle, Washington, where he had fled to after his expulsion from Canada.  Das was 
one of several early diaspora activists who, by 1910, had immigrated to the United States, 
engaged in public writing and speaking in support of revolutionary action for the 
independence of India from British rule.39  In 1911, along with Ram Chandra and Har Dayal, 
the three began publishing Ghadr, a weekly newspaper that, in addition to advocating for 
Indian independence, also urged Indians to return home to engage in revolutionary activity.  
Dayal launched a speaking tour across California in 1913.  After one scheduled engagement 
involved Dayal speaking before anarchists in San Francisco, he was arrested and deported, 
embarking first for Switzerland, and then Germany.  The onset of the Great War coincided 
with Dayal’s recent arrival in Germany, and was a potential inflection point in the trajectory 
of the Ghadr movement.  Hess writes: 
                                                                                       
39 See Singh, I. (2013), “Gadar Movement and the Role of Irish Americans,” in Interpreting Ghadar: Echoes of 
Voices Past, pp. 48-52.  For Indians who had arrived in Canada prior to their adoption of restrictive entry 
policies, Canada’s status as an Imperial dominion eventually meant that British restrictions on speech, 
assembly and other forms of expression related to sedition in the form of independence or Home rule 
activism could often extend into Canada as well. 
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“After the outbreak of the First World War, Ghadr leaders believed that the 
time was now opportune to launch revolutionary projects in India. At 
meetings in Fresno, Sacramento, and Stockton, several hundred East Indian 
immigrants pledged to take part in revolutionary expeditions to India. In the 
fall of 1914, some four hundred East Indians left the United States in several 
Ghadr-organized revolutionary missions.”40 
 
The initial descent into the cataclysm of the War also coincided with an ambitious, but 
poorly planned, attempt by elements of the diaspora to provoke agitation for Indian 
independence in 1914—a scheme in which the West Coast Indian émigré community played 
a significant role in attempting to influence home country politics through persuasive written 
media and communication targeted at political goals.   
Since 1911, when the Ghadr publication was first launched, Dyal had emphasized the 
need for armed revolution in India against the British.  But in his view, such actions were 
suited for the distant future, possibly a decade ahead.  Prior to arrival at such a juncture, 
Dyal and others in the Ghadr movement focused their efforts on what they felt was a 
necessary volume of preparatory education and propaganda work.41  However, the combined 
fallout of the Komagata Maru incident and German backing for Ghadr activities galvanized 
the attention of both British and American authorities.   
Even prior to American entry into the Great War, Ghadr activists were subject to 
scrutiny and surveillance related to the Neutrality Acts.42  Early in 1917, 105 people were 
indicted for violating the Neutrality Acts.  While the defendants (of whom only 35 were 
ultimately tried) were a mix of American, German and Indian nationals, the ensuing trial 
became popularly known as the “Hindu Conspiracy.”  None of the Indian defendants 
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received a sentence longer than 2 years—though Ram Chandra was assassinated by a fellow 
defendant.   
Interestingly, as Hess notes, support for Ghadr activity across the Indian community 
had already collapsed by the time of the trial, despite is moniker.  He explains: 
“With the United States at war by the time of the trial, the ‘Hindus’ were thus 
cast as traitors. It appears, however, that by the time of American 
intervention most East Indian workers had lost interest in the Ghadr party. 
The failure of the Ghadr leadership to sustain its following resulted from 
several factors. First, the party had virtually ignored the economic and social 
problems of the East Indian workers. Second, the majority of the East 
Indians were committed to remaining in the United States and found little 
appeal in the Ghadr's schemes. Once the United States had become a 
belligerent, the preponderance of the East Indians were loyal to the Allied 
cause. In this sense, the East Indian immigrants reflected the sentiment of 
the Indian people at home; the Indian National Congress, the Muslim 
League, and other political groups supported the British war effort. Finally, 
communalism and personal rivalries hindered efforts at cooperation in the 
Ghadr movement. By 1916, suspicions among the Sikhs, Muslims, and 
Hindus substantially weakened the Ghadr party. The ‘Hindu conspiracy’ trial 
was marked by incessant bickering and disagreement among the East Indian 
defendants, culminating in the murder of Chandra.”43 
 
It is interesting to note that the balance of goals and outlooks on the part of Indian 
immigrants shifted after American entry into the War.  It suggests that the objective of 
Indian independence was situated in a more complex, nuanced field of diasporic 
considerations, among which their identity with respect to American society was one. 
The Exclusionary Era and the Legal Battle for Citizenship 
 
 In the 15-year span from 1907 to 1922, it is estimated that only 67 Indian immigrants 
were granted U.S. citizenship.44  While the Justice Department routinely opposed the 
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extension of citizenship to Indians, two Federal District Court decisions provided support to 
override the objections of the Government.  The rulings in United States v. Balsara (1910) and 
United States v. Mozumdar (1913) held that Indians were Caucasians eligible for citizenship 
under the naturalization provisions of 1790 and 1875.45  Multiple conflicting decisions across 
different Federal Circuits (and different Asian racial classification questions) eventually 
propelled citizenship cases to the Supreme Court in the 1920s.  In the 1922 matter of Ozawa 
v. United States, the Court ruled “that the words 'white person' were meant to indicate only a 
person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race…. With the conclusion reached in 
these several decisions we see no reason to differ.”46  At first glance, the Ozawa opinion 
affirms the rulings provided in Balsara and Mozumdar, the latter even being cited as 
substantive precedent.  However, the Ozawa decision also stated that future matters would 
arise as part of “the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.”47  This “gradual 
process” of trial and exclusion promptly ensnared an Indian immigrant whose naturalization 
had been upheld by lower courts.  United States v. Thind reached the Supreme Court in 1923, 
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45 United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694 (2d Cir., 1910) (“’Free white persons’…includes members of the 
white, or Caucasian race, as distinct from the black, red, yellow, and brown races…”); In re: Akhay 
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47 Ibid.  While the Court clearly ruled out naturalized citizenship for Japanese, it provided considerable 
latitude for future challenges to the status of other Asian groups. (“The determination that the words 
'white person' are synonymous with the words 'a person of the Caucasian race' simplifies the problem, 
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upon the other hand, are those clearly ineligible for citizenship. Individual cases falling within this zone 
must be determined as they arise from time to time…”) 
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and the case rested, once again, on the scope of the definitions of “white” and “Caucasian.”  
Whereas Ozawa had relied on the then-accepted (but comparatively inclusive) scientific 
definitions of white and Caucasian upheld in Balsara and Mozumdar to exclude Japanese 
from naturalization, the Justice Department pursued different tactics against Thind.  First, 
they offered a new definition of race based not on ethnography or any form of science (or 
what qualified as science in that era), but rather on broadly adopted public perceptions.  The 
Court agreed, writing that the original statute on naturalization, enacted in 1790, “does not 
employ the word ‘Caucasian’ but the words ‘white persons,’ and these are words of common 
speech and not of scientific origin. The word ‘Caucasian’ not only was not employed in the 
law but was probably wholly unfamiliar to the original framers of the statute...”48  Moreover, 
despite the confluence of prior race-based law that relied on definitions of “Caucasian” to 
the benefit of Indian applicants, the Court also opted to choose new constructions of 
identity that simply emphasized observable anecdotal differences as key racial differentiators.  
The majority wrote: 
“[T]he words ‘free white persons’ are words of common speech, to be 
interpreted in accordance with the understanding of the common man, 
synonymous with the word ‘Caucasian’ only as that word is popularly 
understood. As so understood and used, whatever may be the speculations of 
the ethnologist, it does not include the body of people to whom the appellee 
belongs. It is a matter of familiar observation and knowledge that the 
physical group characteristics of the Hindus render them readily 
distinguishable from the various groups of persons in this country commonly 
recognized as white. The children of English, French, German, Italian, 
Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into the mass of 
our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. 
On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this 
country of Hindu parents would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their 
ancestry. It is very far from our thought to suggest the slightest question of 
racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is merely racial difference, 
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and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our people 
instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.”49 
 
As K.Y. Joshi argues, “Instead of arguing that Thind was not Aryan, the government argued 
that he could not fit in.”50  He explains that the Government successfully framed an 
argument by arguing for the sheer incompatibility of a group based on cultural identity 
features.  He writes:  
“The Bureau focused its argument ‘on the meaning of caste and the racial 
nature of Hinduism as a religious system.’  The lawyers for the United States 
attacked Thind’s ‘meltability’ by defining caste and Hinduism ‘as an alienating 
and barbaric social and religious system,’ one that rendered Hindus utterly 
unfit for membership in the ‘civilization of white men.”’51 52 
 
Ultimately, two to three decades from the first arrivals, from Bellingham, to Ghadr, to 
multiple successful lower court rulings, Indian immigrants found themselves in the same 
position as the Chinese and Japanese: barred from acquiring U.S. citizenship, owing to 
official determinations that the manifestation of their identity, however assessed, is simply 
incompatible with American society.  Moreover, it is emblematic of a deeper philosophical 
inequality: the immigrant can only self-identify to a certain point—after that point, the 
“common understandings” of the adoptive society has decisive bearing in formulating the 
identity of the immigrant.  The Thind decision was consistent with the prevailing public, 
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legislative and judicial climates of the 1920s, affixed by the National Origins Act of 1924, 
remaining the status quo until the 1940s.   
Gradual Liberalization 
 
 Just as the contours of the First World War and the intrigue of Indo-German 
agitation provided a backdrop against which preexisting stereotypes of the “Hindoo” could 
be anecdotally validated, the Second World War saw the gradual turnaround that would 
ultimately culminate in the adoption of open policies in 1965.  In the decades prior, Chinese 
exclusion paved the way for broader barring of immigration by other groups—but by the 
1940s, it was serving as a template for Indian activists to pursue amending immigration 
statutes.  In particular, the diaspora sought to leverage common objectives of the Allied war 
effort to lobby for broader citizenship eligibility.  This positioning ultimately yielded 
bipartisan support in the form of the Luce-Cellar Bill.  On its surface, the bill was quite 
limited in scope.  While several thousand Indians already in the United States would become 
eligible for naturalization, the number of new arrivals who could enter and become eligible 
would expand from zero to 100.  However, the push for the bill came at a time when U.S. 
engagement with the Indian diaspora (or India generally) could easily stoke the sensitivities 
of the “special relationship” with Britain.  In a 1944 memorandum in support of the Bill, J.J. 
Singh, president of the India League of America, channeled reasoning that appeals to shared 
objectives.  He writes: 
“One of the powerful weapons that Japan possessed in the psychological 
warfare against the United Nations was removed when the American 
Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts.  Another hard blow was 
struck at the Japanese propaganda when the Congress of the United States 
passed an amendment whereby India became a beneficiary of the UNRRA. 
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Passage of the bill making nationals of India eligible to the United States 
citizenship and making them quota immigrants, will strike another staggering 
blow to Japanese propagandists. 
 
People in India will most anxiously watch the progress of these bills in 
Congress.”53 54 
 
The strategy of invoking the Allied War efforts, and internationalist philosophy more 
generally, represented a significant departure from the judicially-focused race-based strategies 
of the 1910s and 20s.  Whereas the Mozumdar, Balsara and Thind cases hinged on precarious, 
highly subjective theories of racial pseudoscience (that were highly vulnerable to equally 
subjective counter-narratives), the activism of the 1940s rested on broadly accepted 
internationalist dimensions that synchronized neatly with American war aims, despite any 
provocation of British sensitivities.  Evidence of the wider reach of diasporic networking in 
the 1940s versus earlier periods is observed in the diverse support that Singh was able to cite 
in his Memorandum.  In addition to Claire Luce and Emmanuel Celler, the legislation was 
also buttressed by many hundreds of prominent supportive citizens:  university presidents, 
publishers, bank executives, union leaders, religious officials, an eclectic coalition of 
otherwise divergent political operatives and an array of luminaries that included Albert 
Einstein, Pearl Buck and W.E.B. DuBois.55  The Luce-Celler Act was signed into law in 
1946, its modest 100-entrant allowance providing the first rollback of the draconian 
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provisions of the National Origins Act.  More significantly, the opening of naturalization to 
permanent residents allowed for a base on which the diaspora community could stabilize for 
future growth. Later legislation, enacted in 1952 in an override of President Truman’s veto, 
affirmed the use of quotas under the 1924 regime.  However, the quotas afforded under the 
Luce-Celler Act remained intact and the 1952 update provided opportunities outside of 
quota limits for skilled labor migration.56 
Post-1965 Era 
 
 By the early 1960s, momentum towards more equitable civil rights policies collided 
with the externalities of the Cold War.  In addition to appealing to liberal sensibilities 
regarding non-discrimination, immigration reform also served more detached realist aims of 
winning “hearts and minds” in the broader context of competitive appeals for Third World 
geopolitical cooperation.   
Table 1-B: Summary of Key Legislation Impacting Indian Immigration to the United States 
 
 
YEAR 
 
LEGISLATION 
 
IMPACT 
 
1913 Alien Land Law (CA) Restricted ownership and prohibited long-term leases 
(longer than 3 years) to Indian tenants 
1917 Asian Exclusion Act 
(Federal) 
Established “Asiatic Barred Zone” of prohibited origin 
regions (which included entire Indian Subcontinent, along 
with most of mainland Asia, Pacific Islands) 
1920 Alien Land Law (CA) Closed 3-year lease loophole 
1924 National Origins Act Quota for Indian immigration capped at 100 entries per 
year 
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1940 Nationality Act Extended the right of naturalized citizenship to “persons 
of races indigenous to India” 
1946 Luce-Cellar Act Pathway to citizenship application allowed 
Allowances for skilled labor entry outside of quota system 
1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act 
Ended the use of quotas based on national origin 
Gave preference to applicants with relatives already in the 
United States 
Placed emphasis on family unification 
 
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the 1965 reforms to U.S. immigration policy.  At the 
outset of World War II, Indian immigrants were the least educated of all ethnic groups 
identified in the 1940 Census.  Only 4% were classified as professionals, as compared to 
69% in 2008.57  On average, the median years of school completed was 3.7 years, a polarized 
contrast with the 80% that had a bachelor’s degree or higher circa 2009.58  Of Indian 
immigrants over age 25, more than one-third had never completed a year of school.59  
Moreover, the community was dwindling and aging.  Of the 2,405 individuals recorded in 
the 1940 Census, more than half were older than 40, and a third were over 50.60  The new 
legal framework allowed for up to 20,000 visas per anum, ushering in a wave of arrivals that 
has continued ever since.  Whereas the early 20th Century immigrants were overwhelmingly 
male, owing to their status as laborers, the new regulations’ emphasis on marriage and family 
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allowances allowed for the movement of couples and families, creating a far more 
sustainable long-term community base.  The Post-1965 influx revitalized nearly the extinct 
communities in California and New York, and established prominent new ones in Chicago, 
Houston and Washington, as well as in college municipalities across the United States.   
Engagement between the Government of India and the Diaspora 
 
Given the research framework of this project, which aims to acknowledge that 
diasporic political communication patterns are embedded in a complex lattice of interactivity 
that includes political leadership, state bureaucracies, private sector economic agents, 
creators and aggregators of news and entertainment content, promulgators of technology 
platforms and all the other features that comprise the diverse fullness of modern 
transnational life, it would be remiss to discuss the background of Indian migration without 
some discussion of the role of the Indian state itself.  After all, India’s transition from colony 
to an emergent economic and geopolitical actor has had profound consequences on its 
relationship with the diaspora.  The perspective of the Government of India towards its 
expatriate population has not been consistent by any means.  This inconsistency derives 
from India’s evolution as a political entity itself as well as its self-casting in the context of 
global affairs.  However, the shifts and changes in the attitudes and practices of the Indian 
state with respect to its diaspora have also been impacted by the diaspora itself—the 
diaspora’s attempts to influence home country politics have impacted public and 
administrative attitudes and have, in different ways, helped steer the trajectory towards the 
current dynamic of a governing regime that is highly interested in the assets, resources, 
expertise and experiences of its emigrant populations, but which is undeniably hesitant to 
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extend fully unencumbered privileges of citizenship and participation to the diaspora. 
Just as the experiences and activities of Indian immigrants to the United States can 
be conceptualized in terms of generational waves and shifts, particularly as shaped by the 
contours of the ever-evolving United States immigration and labor regime discussed above, 
so too can the choices and actions of the Indian government with respect to its own 
diaspora.  Xavier argues that the Government of India’s engagement of its own diaspora can 
be understood across four distinct time periods:  jus sanguinis, jus soli, rapprochement and 
institutionalization.61  Jus sanguinis (“right of blood”) refers to the attitudes of colonized 
Indian leaders, bureaucrats and administrators who, while not representative of an 
independent state, rhetorically embraced the diaspora during the decades prior to 
Independence in 1947.  Nehru visited Malaya in 1937, where his remarks to an audience of 
Indian expatriates and Indo-Malayans reflected the perception of a linked future in which an 
independent India provided leadership for globally dispersed Indian populations.62  In 
contrast with his pre-1947 rhetoric, Nehru’s posture vis-à-vis the diaspora shifted 
considerably after Independence.  Xavier explains: 
“Caught up abruptly within Realpolitik considerations, Nehru shifted from an 
inclusive jus sanguinis policy to an exclusive jus soli definition of the nation. 
This construction was reflected in the Constituent Assembly’s choice to 
explicitly refuse the right of dual citizenship. Nehru frequently urged 
Overseas Indians to forget about India and to integrate as well and fast as 
possible…”63 64 
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The “Realpolitik considerations” spoken of by Xavier refer to Nehru’s goals as a leader of the 
non-aligned movement, his desire to affirm India’s role as a global opponent of colonialism 
and his precarious attempts to navigate the treacherous terrain of Cold War geopolitics.  
Ultimately, these pressures resulted in a nascent Indian republic that abruptly disengaged 
from its diaspora, transitioning towards a jus soli (“right of soil”) operational framework.  
Hannam explains the chain of logic: 
“[W]hen India gained independence in 1947, the Nehru 
government’s foreign policy excluded the issue of expatriate Indians 
from policy formulation and actively encouraged the Indian diaspora 
to integrate into their host societies… 
 
Nehru’s position reflected his idealistic and intellectual sympathies 
rather than realistic and practical interest in foreign affairs.  Under 
Nehru, India had shifted from being a de-territorialized, anti-colonial, 
nationalist movement which included all the Indians from around the 
world.  Rather there was a move towards a territorialized nation-state 
project with internal integration as the central priority.  India was 
thus caught in a dilemma when it came to its diaspora.”65 
 
The specific issue of territoriality is indicative of an additional concern that explains Nehru’s 
disengagement from the diaspora: the very real problems of regional conflict, particularly in 
the wake of the violence of the Partition and the dispute over Kashmir.  Newly independent 
India and Pakistan had freshly (and contentiously) drawn territorial boundaries—but a 
shared greater Indian diaspora had formed prior to the existence of such boundaries.  A 
concern in India, both in the wake of Independence and in the decades following, was the 
possibility that Pakistanis, Partition migrants or Pakistani sympathizers could somehow claim 
political, social or economic rights based on their origins in undivided British India.66  
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Moreover, alongside multiple armed conflicts with Pakistan, India has also faced extensive 
internal insurgencies and attacks from insurgent groups in neighboring states since 
Independence.67 
Separate from the security concerns connected to tensions with Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, elements of the Indian polity and leadership continued to resist the extension of 
accommodations to the diaspora for internal reasons as well, citing the possibility for 
diasporic tainting of civic, political and cultural life in India.68  Remarks made in 1987 in the 
Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of Parliament reflect these concerns.  One Member of 
Parliament warned: 
“[I]f they are given the right of getting elected here and are given the 
citizenship, the culture of this country will be changed.  Everywhere we will 
hear pop music and see peep shows.  God knows what else will be seen here.  
We will be finished and they will dominate.  We will not be able to stop that 
situation.”69 
 
This parliamentarian’s outlook specifically touches on the concept of domination by 
returning members of the diaspora, an anxiety that pervaded much of the resistance to 
engagement.  A common perception was that NRIs and PIOs, with their enhanced financial 
resources, were primarily interested in India’s potential as an exploitable market rather than 
as a personal, cultural or familial destination for investment.70   
These perceptions gradually began to shift towards a rapprochement in the 1980s, 
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continuing through the 1990s and into 2000s due to the confluence of several events.  First, 
on the part of the Indian state, economic liberalization reforms launched under Rajiv Gandhi 
(and continued under the governments of P.V. Narasimha Rao, H.D. Deve Gowda, I.K. 
Gujaral and Atal Bihari Vajpayee) opened India’s economy to previously inaccessible 
opportunities for foreign investment, trade and entrepreneurship.  Equally importantly, 
across the scattered arenas of expatriate populations, members of the diaspora had achieved 
levels of financial gain that enabled them to pursue extensive provision of remittances, 
investment and other forms of economic interactivity.71  The diaspora’s financial resources 
were certainly alluring to the Government of India.  Xavier details the instances when, 
during the Reform period, each new economic or political crisis witnessed the Indian state 
plainly and directly reach out (often through cash appeals) to the diaspora.  He explains:  
“New Delhi’s ‘rediscovery’ also coincided with the emergence of the ‘newer’ 
and more prosperous diaspora in the Western countries, as well as with the 
beginning of the remittance influx from the Middle East. During the 1970s 
oil boom, for example, the [Reserve Bank of India] tailored a set of economic 
and financial mechanisms to attract specifically the inflow of foreign 
exchange deposits originating from that region.  During the brief reformist 
period under the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984–1989), the 
focus changed to the small- and medium-scale Indian businesses and highly 
skilled professionals who had prospered in North America and Europe and 
were thus targeted for their foreign exchange, investments, and expertise, all 
of which played a crucial role in setting the foundations of India’s 
information technologies boom in the 1990s. When foreign investors fled 
following the balance of payments crisis in 1990–1991, the government 
floated India Development Bonds (IDB) to tap NRI funds. From US$290 
million in 1990–1991, NRI inflows surged to almost US$ two billion in 
1992–1993.  And just a few weeks after the nuclear tests of May 1998—
which drew international sanctions, turbulence in the financial markets, and 
decline in the Indian stock markets, the rupee exchange rate, and the 
sovereign credit rating—the government appealed once again 
opportunistically to the diaspora, launching the Resurgent India Bond (RIB). 
Overseas Indians responded en masse and contributed with US$4.2 billion. 
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New Delhi repeated the formula for a third and last time in 2000, with the 
India Millennium Deposit, which fetched another US$5.5 billion in foreign 
exchange.”72 
 
While the transition of the diaspora from simply a dispersed population to a tangible 
financial asset certainly mattered in the recasting of the relationship, the impact of the 
diaspora’s own attitudes in re-shaping the state-expatriate dynamic should not be 
overlooked.  Xavier describes a “profound sense of debt” on the part of Non-Resident 
Indians, owing to their abilities to capitalize on strong educational foundations that were 
provided for them in India, prior to their emigration.73  He posits that many NRIs, fully 
incorporated into their adoptive societies, will use economic collaboration in the form of 
“massive philanthropic investments” as a symbolic substitute for true return to their 
homeland.74  Beyond feelings of indebtedness towards the homeland, or guilt for success 
abroad, Xavier also argues that adoptive societies themselves engender a shift helps NRIs 
and PIOs transition from being defensive of their backgrounds to embracing it as a cultural 
asset and resource.  He explains: 
“Multiculturalism in Western societies encouraged many to shift from private 
invisibility to public visibility strategies, and from the self-perception of a 
precarious and defensive immigrant to one of a permanently settled and 
proactive diasporic.  Dissatisfied with mere recognition, often emboldened by 
their successful experience with positive discrimination, increasingly 
institutionalized and aware of their distinctiveness, Overseas Indians both 
from the ‘older’ and the ‘newer’ diaspora have therefore engaged in 
translating their visibility into active political capital, both in the ‘host 
country’ and India.”75 
 
 
Lastly, all of these simultaneous phenomena were continuously supplemented from the mid-
                                                                                       
72 Xavier (2011), p. 39-40 
73 Ibid., p. 40 
74 Ibid., p. 40 
75 Ibid., p. 41 
  37 
1990s onwards by the emergence of both Hindu nationalism and broader pan-Indian 
aspirations.  In addition to providing a potential antidote to various forms of alienation or 
second-class status in adoptive societies, the notion—and accompanying rhetoric—of India 
as an emerging global power (or even a superpower) provided a new, aspirational narrative 
that attracted the diaspora along personal, cultural, economic and political axes.76 
 Despite the clear, ongoing presence of overlapping interests between the 
Government of India and its diaspora, the survey results obtained in this study show that 
there exist barriers to more robust engagement.  In addition to exploring the limits of 
diasporic interest and engagement, the priorities and activities of the Indian Government will 
be revisited later in Chapter 7. 
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CH 2: THE MEDIASCAPE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR COMPLEX TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
 This chapter discusses the broader framework that ultimately encompasses the 
hypotheses and research questions developed in the study design in Chapter 5, and 
addressed in the discussion of the results in Chapter 6.   
 A rough schematic of the underlying organizational theory instructing this study is 
summarized in Figure 2.1, below.  Expanding on the conceptualization first articulated by 
Appadurai, the individual stands positioned amidst a dynamic, fluctuating competitive 
transnational civic space, mediated by the fields of (personal and group) identity and an 
evolving mediascape.77  These fields of identity and media milieu are, in turn, influenced by a 
host of complimentary factors emanating from the broader environs of both the homeland 
and the adoptive society.  The structural and regulatory environment includes the array of 
factors that enable or limit access to media: public infrastructure (the physical and financial 
prerequisites for a society to provide connection and access), government policies (the legal 
and administrative guidelines that circumscribe access, expression and use) and private 
business (the realm of technical entrepreneurship that enables varied, innovative access and 
options for media engagement).  The domestic polity includes the circumstances that define 
an individual’s access to the national political process such as access to voting, expression, 
collective organization, or other forms of political participation.  The associational 
environment is constituted by an individual’s access to various formal and informal 
associational groups related to work, faith, class, personal interests or family and 
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community—this factor is often critical both in identity formation as well as in filling voids 
due to a lack of structural or domestic polity opportunity spaces.  Lastly, socioeconomic 
status encompasses the personal demographic factors that underlie an individual’s 
background and opportunities for personal or political agency, such as gender, ethnicity, 
income, class/caste or religious affiliation. 
Figure 2.1:  Organizational Schema of the Modern Mediascape 
 
Looking beyond this general framework, some deeper questions arise.  Do differences of 
gender, class, race, religion, education, or affluence, affect transnational civic 
communications?  How do negotiated formulations of hybridized identity impact political 
communication patterns?  Are prior political, economic or cultural differences diminished or 
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magnified upon emigration?  Are certain issues (national security, foreign aid, bilateral 
relations, trade policies, etc.) more prone to concerted transnational civic communication 
than others?  This dissertation research, through a specific, methodical analysis of the Indian 
diaspora, seeks to examine and distill some of the patterns of citizens’ use of new media 
platforms for navigating individual and group identity formation and engaging in political 
participation.   
 New media platforms are now a permanent part of the infrastructure of national and 
international political communication, and this research will offer insight into the complex, 
interwoven dynamics of the intersection of personal identity, community background, 
emerging technology, migration and transnational communication. 
 The literature on transnationalism and media engagement comprises a critically 
important foundation on which this project will proceed.  This project simultaneously 
considers a number of research questions connected to the complex dynamics of the 
modern digital mediascape.  For this reason, review of scholarship examined two broad 
spheres of literature, with additional attention to several subtopics.   
 The first general body of scholarly literature (addressed in Chapter 3) concerns the 
dynamics of new media technologies, which encompass not on the most recent technologies 
of the modern mediascape, but the internet more generally as well, along with intermediate 
iterations of networked technologies and more rudimentary social platforms.  The subtopics 
of relevance, given the research questions of this study, are new media and relationship 
maintenance, new media and deliberative democracy, and new media and mobilization.  The 
first subtopic is relevant because it speaks to the importance of civic life, prior participation 
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and other offline variables connected to identity and migratory dislocation.  The literature on 
deliberative democracy and mobilization represents some of the most critical preceding 
scholarship because it speaks directly to the nexus of mediascape navigation and the 
participation outcomes that are of primary interest in this project. 
 A second field of literature (discussed in Chapter 4) considers the general 
communication patterns and new media adoption practices of diasporic populations.  This is 
of obvious interest due to this project’s focus on a diasporic population, something that is 
reflected in the two subtopics: the migration and communication patterns of diasporas and 
the uptake of new media interfaces by the Indian diaspora.  Whereas the literature addressed 
in Chapter 3 considers important arguments from across the field, this line of review offers a 
sharper look, drilling down from diasporas generally to the Indian diaspora itself. 
In engaging these two broad areas of scholarship, signs emerge that no one cluster of 
scholarhisp has adequately addressed the question of hoe diasporic populations, equipped 
with the contemporary suite of digital communication platforms, might be persuaded into, 
or dissuaded from, political participation in the life of their homeland.  In addition to 
focusing on that question through the survey and experiment tools discussed later, this 
project also attempts to fill some gaps by testing the accuracy of some of the transnational 
communication modeling, by seeking mechanisms that link incorporation and adaption with 
transnational communication (areas traditionally studied in mutual exclusion), and by 
suggesting longer-term impacts that will specifically stem from migration and transnational 
communications development. 
  42 
Diplomacy and the Diaspora: Reaching Across the Mediascape 
 
As discussed earlier, India’s recent foray into more formally engaging its diaspora 
represents a major shift from decades of “missed opportunities.”78  In formulating some 
more specific dynamics of the government-emigrant relationship, Cowan and Arsenault 
(2008) argue that public figures should conceptualize public diplomacy in a tripartite fashion: 
monologue, or unidirectional information flow; dialogue, or flow of information in multiple 
directions; or collaboration based on cooperation and partnership with targeted audiences.79  
Examples of monologic communication in digital media include:  
1. Speeches;  
2. Newspaper articles/Online magazine;  
3. Press releases;  
4. Factsheets and brochures;  
5. Quick Response, or QR, codes;  
6. Videos; and, 
7. Podcasts.   
 
Though largely informational, monologic communication channels serve critical 
dissemination functions and, while unidirectional in nature, may sometimes use a 
combination of digital features.80 
Each layer has its manifest shares of advantageous and lesser desirable features (from 
the perspective of robust engagement), and public officials must be keenly aware of how and 
when different methods should be wielded in order to achieve effective outcomes. 
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Depending on situational context and constraints, monologue in the form of a well-crafted 
speech could evoke strong responsiveness; dialogue in the form of a town hall forum could 
enhance empathetic understanding; and collaboration across a public feedback initiative 
could engender longer term trust.  These three layers of public diplomacy can be enhanced 
by putting them into practice with new digital media, or the so-called Web 2.0.81 
Examples of dialogic communication, according to Cowan and Arsenault, include:  
1. Live chats;  
2. Surveys;  
3. Facebook;  
4. Twitter;  
5. LinkedIn;  
6. Comments/Feedback; and, 
7. Skype, which allows audio, video and instant messaging options.82 
 
According to Cowan and Arsenault, collaboration as part of public diplomacy may refer to 
“joint projects or achievements of common outcomes,” often in cases that cross national 
boundaries.83 The digital media component of collaboration can typically be identified by 
looking for evidence of diaspora participation in homeland-based projects. These projects 
could involve intangible projects such as joint creation of a microfinance model or tangible 
outcomes such as construction of public infrastructure. 
Consistent with the models put forth by Arsenault, Cowan and others, India has 
boosted its public diplomacy efforts and reached out to its overseas community, particularly 
in regards to leveraging the diaspora to achieve certain foreign policy objectives.  In addition 
to the legislative and administrative changes discussed in Chapter 1, other diasporic bonding 
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efforts have been pursued in the realm of soft power projection.  Hall (2012) explains that 
since 1947, India has invested considerable resources to advance its interests through high-
level dialogues and cultural exchanges.  He argues that the India’s renewed attention to 
public diplomacy has been fueled by its views of how China is using its soft power to exert 
its global influence.  Nye posits that soft power draws its strength mainly from three 
resources – culture, political values and foreign policies.84  India, with its long history, has an 
ample body of soft power to draw upon, including its diverse ethnolinguistic and religious 
traditions, as well its modern democratic practices. However, for many years yet it refrained 
from engaging in concerted soft inducement to pursue broader foreign policy objectives. 
Today, however, the Indian government is attempting to make better use of its digital 
technology and soft power to influence to link, engage and leverage its diaspora—and 
specifically, the diaspora’s links to two different political systems. Hall identifies three key 
features that he considers emblematic of India’s “new public diplomacy”.85 First, India is 
actively seeking new transnational audiences, including reception across both the domestic 
native population and the diaspora—the Western diaspora in particular.  Second, India seeks 
to more assertively, and transparently, telegraph its foreign policy-making process. Third, the 
Indian government has made a marked shift towards new media platforms, and away from 
traditional methods of communication.86 
Suri identifies several initiatives that the Indian has undertaken in the public 
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diplomacy arena such.87  In 2010, it projected its soft power by organizing Indian film 
festivals in several countries, including several where diasporic populations coincided with 
specific foreign policy goals connected to energy, security and trade.  More topically germane 
to this study, the Indian government has extended its soft power outreach into the digital 
sphere in recent years.  India opened its “Indiandiplomacy” Twitter account in July 2010, the 
first by any division of Government of India. Subsequently, the division debuted on 
Facebook, YouTube and Blogspot under the same name.  Suri, who formerly served as the 
chief of the Public Diplomacy Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, says when the 
division launched its public diplomacy website on Oct. 20, 2010, it became the first 
government site in the country to use a full suite of digital social tools.88  India’s efforts to 
promote its soft power have been driven by perceptions within domestic policy makers that 
India has not sufficiently pressed its national and geopolitical goals into the public domain.  
To better disseminate the initiatives that it has undertaken, India’s public diplomacy efforts 
target both foreign publics and domestic publics also addresses the damage control 
initiatives of the soft power momentum.  
Though India is a late entrant to public diplomacy and is emphasizing more dialogic 
digital channels, it understands the need to enhance its image through one-way 
communication channels. In 2002, the Government of India launched its most visible 
advertising campaign, “Incredible India,” in a bid to promote the country as a tourist 
destination. Some believe the one-way communication plan has been a success, raising 
India’s visibility and popularity as a tourist destination.  In more recent years, the Public 
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Diplomacy Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs has made some advances, posting 
on its website text and video files of topmost news from India that can be downloaded and 
used freely.  In September 2011, it launched a contest called “India is” global video 
challenge. The government invited people from across the world to create a three-minute 
video about India based on their perceptions and experiences, ultimately collecting hundreds 
of entries from over 40 countries. 
The Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre unveiled the website in the same year it was 
launched, in 2007. The state and non-state joint venture sought to pool the resources of 
both the partners in a bid to expand Indian diaspora’s economic engagement with its 
homeland. The governing council is made up of members drawn from the Indian 
government, Indian industry as well as members of diaspora. The site (http://www.oifc.in/) 
is content-rich, with details about OIFC, investing in India, and links to a variety of 
professional community networking resources. The homepage also links to three other social 
media sites, has Indian stock market information, an exchange rate converter, news updates 
focused on business, finance and immigration and a quick response, or QR, code for reading 
on mobile devices. It has a newsroom with press releases, diaspora news and media kit with 
information that can be downloaded by visitors to the site. The press releases 
(http://www.oifc.in/Newsroom/Press-Releases) cover a range of financial and business 
information that could be of interest to the diaspora.  The diaspora tab also provides details 
of investment opportunities that are available only to persons of Indian origin and certain 
other diaspora members. It outlines which sectors these diaspora members may invest and 
how they can repatriate their earnings (http://www.oifc.in//Diaspora/Facts-on-Indian-
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Diaspora). The site shows evidence of customization of digital information.  
With respect to Twitter in the context of outreach to the diaspora, this topic will be 
revisited in more detail in Chapter 7, where the current Prime Minister’s overtures will be 
considered in light of this study’s hypotheses and findings. 
The Diaspora and the Mediascape: An Answer on the Other End? 
 
It is important to reiterate that the mediascape is a multidirectional communication 
environment, and just as the Government of India and Indian citizens produce, disseminate 
and shape content and its reception, so to do members of the diaspora.  In order to properly 
address questions of what identity, migration or mediascape navigation factors may or may 
not influence political participation by the diaspora, a number of communication behaviors 
should be considered—from the perspectives of both Native and NRI populations.  For this 
reason, the reviewed literature considers more general as well as India and NRI-specific 
studies.  More importantly, however, as detailed in Chapter 5, the study design considers the 
critical research questions on both sides of the transnational equation.  
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CH 3: THE EMERGENT SCHOLARSHIP: NEW MEDIA, ENDURING 
DEBATES 
 
 Digital media platforms are commonly perceived to represent a tectonic shift in the 
broader terrain of mass communication, owing to their enablement of audience response, 
feedback and participation in communication processes.  The horizontal and vertical 
threads enabled by digital platforms, in particular, raise important questions about the 
ability of network participants not only to interact with the traditional creators and 
“gatekeepers” of information, but also with other elements and substrata of the audience 
itself, creating, sharing and critiquing information.  Traditionally top-down communication 
flows associated with news media, for instance, are now embedded with architectural 
features for iterative social experiences.89  The most outwardly visible manifestations of 
this field of recently emerged, but now ubiquitous, participatory options on news media 
portals are features that allow for commentary, simple evaluation, private sharing or public 
posting.  The ramifications of these studies speak directly to forms of participation that 
echo, in at least some respects, the dependent outcome of diasporic participation at the 
heart of this study. 
Turning to the rationale for broad participation in social networking sites, scholars 
have found numerous explanatory factors, all of which ultimately trace to the origins of 
contemporary digital platforms in earlier iterations of new media and the internet more 
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generally.  It is, therefore, appropriate to pay consideration to some of the conceptual 
foundations and functions of social media as an extension of the emergence of the 
internet.  The invention and rapid growth of the internet has unquestionably transformed 
human communication, in ways that were predicted as well as in ways that were 
unexpected.   While the internet has opened up gateways for new forms and patterns of 
interactivity, it has also brought rapid changes in the conventional notions regarding the 
nature, extent and defining parameters of personal, commercial, public and political 
communication.  The experience of digital immersion, from the interpersonal to the 
group-oriented, is continuously subject to redefinition that is dynamic, context-dependent 
and content-dependent.  Addressing the redefinition of influence internet-based media 
forms, Carr et al. (2008), explain that “New interfaces bring into proximity or simultaneity 
information from several types of sources.”90  Studies have been conducted on this issue 
and a number of scholars find that citizens use the internet for reasons that include getting 
information, reducing uncertainty, and taking part in various democratic processes.91  Katz 
et al. argue the internet has changed political, social, and personal interaction among pits 
users, both positively and negatively, from certain civic communication and social capital 
perspectives.92  According to Tillema, Dijst, and Schwanen, face-to-face communication is 
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positively correlated with electronic communication.93  Researchers have found positive 
correlation between internet use and impact on social lives of users.  Hamburger and Hayat 
found significant correlations between the use of the internet and social interactions across 
areas of life among its users, online and offline.94  This is emblematic of important 
concepts of civic life, personal networks and prior participation that are considered 
alongside immersion in, and usage of, digital communication platforms—concepts that are 
incorporated into this project’s research design. 
 Nisbet et al. illustrate a positive correlation between internet use and the level of 
concern for, and belief in, democracy.95  Parker and Plank observe that students use the 
Internet for information-seeking and employment searches.96  Like traditional media, the 
internet also serves as a tool for social interactions, surveillance and relaxation.  Shah, 
Kwak and Holbert find that Internet use is positively related with various measures of 
social capital production.97  Eighmey and McCord argue that personal involvement and 
ongoing relationships represent two factors associated with audience reaction to use the 
websites.98  James, Wotring and Forrest examined the use of online bulletin boards and 
found that bulletin-board users were upscale professionals, and that people use bulletin 
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boards for entertainment, education and business.99  All of these studies speak to various 
factors that were ultimately incorporated into the research design.  The notion of a 
correlation between internet use and a broader belief in democracy speaks to civic 
values and the general ability of such technologies to, at the least, enable precursor 
conditions for later participation.  The multifaceted use of the internet invites 
questions about how frequency of usage, the density of online networks and the types 
of content that provoke certain reactions might ultimately influence participation in the 
future.   
However, the effects of digital media navigation are not straightforward, and other 
factors and issues are involved in this process, including content, levels, patterns of usage 
and use cases, as well as social and political systems and racial differences.100  Unlike the 
traditional mass communication system, the audience can be influenced by the comments 
posted in any new media format or platform.   Shah et al. argue that the informational 
usage of the Internet is positively related to social capital production.  On the other hand, 
they also consider instances where social-recreational usage is negatively related to 
activities related to civic life, arguing that users may not engage with civic life because they 
spend time on the web—an opportunity cost of sorts.101  These studies illustrate that the 
effects of digital platform usage are not necessarily cleanly delineated—there are often 
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mixed effects.  The hypotheses of the study reflect this possibility and the study design 
allows for such disparities to be expressed. 
 Nir explores how differences in political systems in some countries affect the 
political discussion and found a positive correlation between these features and the level 
of supply of political information.102  Based on two European electoral systems, the 
majoritarian (power-concentrating) and proportional (power-sharing), the author 
analyzed the data from the European Social Survey.  These governments are 
representative in power-sharing systems; however, the power-concentrating system gives 
priority to the majority of people. The results showed that a political system can diminish 
or amplify the political discussion.  The study also found that the greater the frequency 
of political discussion the more moderate the contribution of individual differences in 
discussion of political issues will be.  Mesch examines how patterns of uses of CMC 
differ among ethnic minority groups and found that minority groups tend to use CMC 
for business and occupational purposes and majority groups use CMC for maintaining 
the relationships with family and friends.103  These lines of research suggest that 
questions of institutional trust are relevant, both along other point in the larger 
communication superstructure, as well as in their impact on participation outcomes.  
They were accordingly incorporated into the study design. 
 Social media are, ultimately, centered on human interactions of friendship, family, 
community, the workplace and other schema that have tangible offline forms. According to 
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Donath, social media enhance communication and social ties.104  Although definitions of 
social media differ, social interaction in the virtual world is the main focus of scholars.  
According to Kaplan and Haenlin, social media are extensions of Web 2.0 and its resulting 
user-generated content.105  These authors categorize six types of social media: collaborative 
projects, blogs, content communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds and 
virtual social worlds.  They also divide social media, broadly, into three levels of low, 
medium and high iterative interactivity.  For instance, blogs and collaborative projects such 
as Wiki are “low level” forms, whereas social networking sites and content communities 
exist at the medium level.  Virtual social worlds (second life) and virtual game worlds, 
however, are in the highest level.  They explain that “Social networking sites are 
applications that enable users to connect by creating personal information profiles, inviting 
friends and colleagues to have access to those profiles, and sending emails and instant 
messages between each other.”106  Some scholars argue that social media represent personal 
effects or extensions, of sorts.  According to Lüders, personal media are symmetrical and 
non-institutional compared to asymmetrical and institutional mass media—whose every 
model the author considers outdated.107  The personalized nature of social media platforms, 
particularly in more recent years, raises important questions about both frequency of usage 
and the specific contours of content.  How and why users engage, process and react to 
information should be considered in conjunction with how often they interface with devices 
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and online platforms. 
 Scholarship and research on social media generally examine how people use new 
media and what motivations drive social media use. According to Boyd and Ellison 
(2008), Social Networking Sites are web-based services allow users to perform three tasks:  
i. Construct a public or semi-public profile within bounded system; ii. Articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection; and iii.  View and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system.108  People take part in the 
participatory news processing system from information gathering to disseminating news, 
using SNSs and blogs for sharing and swapping news.  Purcell et al. argue that: “the 
advent of social media like social networking sites and blogs has helped the news become 
a social experience in fresh ways for consumers.109  Users deploy their social networks and 
social networking technology to filter, assess, and react to news.”110  The popularity of 
social media has increased in the 21st century with the advent of social networking sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter.  Given the prolific spread of online news and the 
increasingly seamless integration of news content with personal communications and 
entertainment, a crucial axis of inquiry is how different types of information may provoke 
or dissuade both interest in the information itself as well as other behaviors and actions 
down the line, something that is measured and probed in the news sensitivity study design 
of this project. 
However, a number of scholars argue that informal social media have existed for 
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centuries.  Platforms akin to social media such as “open diary” started 20 years earlier.  
The first social networking site SixDegrees.com started in 1997. Historical observations, 
such as those provided through the vignettes in Chapter 1, demonstrate that the internet 
rejuvenated the development of social media, but it did not invent social media.  Most 
scholars defined social media as interactive user-generated content based on virtual 
platforms and places that enable people to maintain interpersonal and social relationships.  
This definition cites several key parameters of social media: 
1. Social media are interactive. 
2. Social media are based on virtual places. 
3. People use social media for various social interactions and relationship 
maintenance.  
 
Social media have different forms including social networking sites (e.g., Facebook), 
microblogging (e.g., tumblr) and social bookmarking (e.g., Pintrest).  Social networking 
sites are the most popular forms of social media, and Facebook (2014) is one of the most 
widely used social networking sites, according to its Website.  The site has 1.23 billion 
monthly active users. Smock, Ellison, Lampe and Wohn examine the motivation for using 
the features of Facebook and found people use these features of the social networking site 
for fulfilling different needs, such as updating status and posting comments.111  Facebook 
users also request information, favors and emotional support.112 Park, Kee and Valenzuela 
observe that college students use Facebook for socializing, entertainment, status-seeking 
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and information.113  Gil de Zuniga, Veenstra, Vraga and Shah investigate the impact and 
reach of social media blogs on the democratic process and found that blogs provide digital 
platforms for political participation and expression.114  That study shows that writing in 
blogs is not an isolated activity; rather, blogging is part of collective activities that 
strengthen the democratic process. 
 Studies demonstrate differences in using social media and how different 
demographic, social, psychological and socio-political factors affect how people use SNSs.  
Lenhart et al. (2010) observe that the patterns of usage of SNSs among young people have 
shifted, explaining that “As the tools and technology embedded in social networking sites 
change, and use of the sites continues to grow, youth may be exchanging ‘macro-blogging’ 
for ‘microblogging with status updates.”115  Here, status updates refer to various iterations 
of microblogging such as tweeting.  Lerman investigates the user participation of social 
news site Digg, noting that user participation exhibits clustered and scattered 
concentrations.116  Several factors influence user participation including competition, social 
factors and internal factors. Social recognition is more powerful than competition.  Lin and 
Lu find that enjoyment and gender both influence how users process and experience their 
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time on social networking sites.117  Moreover, the impacts are disparate—women are more 
influenced by peer group, and men by perceived usefulness and enjoyment.118  Rui and 
Stefanone cite the influence of personal traits on the presentation in SNSs and argue that 
users can be significantly influenced by their own perceptions of the importance of self-
presentation.119  
 As is the case with traditional media, social media have undergone criticism for 
reasons that include consolidation and ownership patterns, perceived elitism, and the 
persistent opportunity gaps of the digital divide.120  The patterns of operations and 
ownership of social media are different compared to those of the traditional mass media. 
Even though there is a world-wide trend of corporatization of mass media, some instances 
of independent mass media remain.  However, social media are mostly owned and 
operated by private companies such as Facebook and Twitter.  As a consequence, the 
question surfaces as to what extent users have freedom to use, control and shape the 
virtual places of the social media universe.  People construct social places in face-to- face 
social interactions.  However, this is not the case in the virtual world of social media. To 
enhance profitability, owners of social media can control the dimensions, characteristics 
and accessibility of the virtual places.  For example, rather than constituting some form of 
“public square” in cyberspace, Mark Zuckerberg and the shareholders of Facebook own 
the virtual place of this SNS.  However, social media have been praised for creating 
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pathways of free, open and robust audience interactivity and providing alternative (and 
increasingly mainstream) platforms for relationship maintenance. 
 Regardless of platform ownership, mediascape navigation is unique along both 
individual parameters.  These parameters should be reflected in any study design that 
attempts to disaggregate the contributions of social media platform usage to political 
participation.  For these reasons, questions concerning socioeconomic status were 
considered as part of the study. 
New Media and Relationship Maintenance 
 
 The traditional notion regarding the process of interpersonal relationship, concept 
and formation of communities are in transition in this era of online media. The virtual 
space, provided by online media, has changed the human interaction range from 
interpersonal communication to community formation. The requirement for a physical 
place in which to build a community is not always a mandatory precursor in the emergent 
age of human communication.  Some scholars argue that people now can maintain 
interpersonal relationship and building communities in the virtual place instead of physical 
place.121  Before the Internet era, the interpersonal communication required 
communicating with another person in a face-to-face setting. Moreover, the process of 
community was required communication between groups of people who live in a 
geographically close location such as the same neighborhood.  This age of online media 
has been changing those traditional requirements for human communication and 
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community building.  Despite all the ways and avenues for online communication, social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter have made the process of virtual relationships more 
accessible.  Users are getting more avenues and platforms to connect individuals and to 
build a community of individuals living far apart.  In this way, physical networking is 
taking place in the virtual networks.  These changing patterns of relationship maintenance 
are catching the attention of scholars in sociology, psychology and communication.  The 
scholars are investigating the patterns, causes and future trends of virtualization of basic 
social components such as human interaction and community building.122 
 According to Wellman, the traditional notion of community has changed because 
people now can connect with like-minded people in cyberspace.  The physical locale does 
not matter in community formation; rather, interpersonal connections define community.  
He explains: “The human use of these technologies is creating and sustaining community 
ties. The ties have transformed cyberspace into cyberplaces, as people connect online with 
kindred spirits, engage in supportive and sociable relationships with them, and imbue their 
activity online with meaning, belonging and identity.”123  He argues that because door-to-
door communication has been replaced by place-to- place communication, there is a rise 
of “network individuals.”  Baym examines online communities -- music fandom -- in 
Sweden and argues that online networking has been taking new shapes as people 
communicate in on- and off-line platforms.  According to his anlaysis, the new types of 
online communities resemble geographically place-based communities, compared to 
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earlier online communities based on people’s interests.124  Baym, discussing an online 
entertainment-focused community, explains that “The Swedish indie fans practice what 
might be called ‘network collectivism’ in which loose collectives of associated individuals 
bind networks together.”125 (p. 10).  Mesch and Levanon examine how internet usage 
affects community formation and observe some positive relationships between online 
networking and offline face-to-face communication.126  According to the authors, the early 
distinction between virtual and non-virtual communities has narrowed.  They also argue 
that even while online social connections do not dramatically alter real-world social 
relationships, they increase the probability of offline social connections materializing 
outside the networked world.127  Phrased alternately, online communication extends the 
reach of social interactivity and strengthens other forms of (otherwise purely offline) 
human communication.  Others find that the use of social media platforms can be 
positively connected to the increased levels of social interactions that collectively 
contribute to the popular conceptualizations of social capital.128  All of these studies point 
to the reality that, when considering political participation outcomes of an extant 
population, no questions of relationship maintenance can properly be understood without 
jointly inquiring as to the nature of identity, geographic dislocation and social media 
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platform usage. 
 Social capital is centered on social interactions and relationships, and it enables 
people to access resources drawn from across their social networks.129  Coleman posits 
social capital as “embodied in relations among person.”130  Others categorize social capital 
into two ties: bridging and bonding, in which bridging relationships constitute 
communicating with weak ties or developing new ties and connecting clusters within a 
network.131  According to Ellison, Vitak, Gray, and Lampe, the “ability to access useful 
information resources, a key component of bridging social capital, is related to composition 
of one’s network, one’s position in this network, and one’s communicative and analytic 
skillset.”132  Bonding ties form one of the essential components of social capital, as well as 
the constituent acts associated with maintaining and continuing relationships with clusters 
in the same networks.  Shpigelman and Gill define bonding social capital as the emotionally 
proximate ties with family members and friends.133  Norris argues that the Internet has 
played both bridging and bonding roles to build and strengthen the communities.134  
Referencing the classical debates of scholars such as Marx, Durkheim on loss of 
communities, she finds some positive impacts in the process of sustainability of 
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communities, and also references Horrigan, Rainie and Fox, who separately observe that 
the internet provides opportunities to communicate with like-minded people (bridging 
relationships).135  On the other hand, the internet also helps people strengthen existing 
relationships with people from the same background (bonding relationships). She said, 
“…online participation has the capacity to deepen linkages among those sharing similar 
beliefs as we as serving as a virtual community that cuts across at least some traditional 
social divisions.”136  Even though she studies the relationship between the internet and 
online communities, her study is relevant to examine the interconnections between usage of 
social media and offline community building.  She also explains that the bridging and 
bonding roles of the network connectivity mechanisms differ across groups. 
 Ellison et al. (2014) find a significant positive relationship between relationship 
maintenance on Facebook (social grooming) and bridging social capital.137  Katz et al. find 
a positive correlation between Internet usage and sociability.138  The authors write, “Clearly, 
long term internet usage is associated with more, not less, frequent sociability.”139  
However, some scholars contend that the online media play a neutral role in community 
ties.140  The scholars argue that the Internet has been transforming the human 
communication network among the people who live close to one another, as in a 
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neighborhood.   Eighmey and McCord also find that users display different visitation 
patterns (with respect to websites) for personal involvement and continuing relationship.141  
Despite the escalating role of the internet in relationship maintenance, social media has 
gotten attention for allowing people virtual places and ways to interact.  Ellison, Lampe 
and Steinfield examine the recent trends and future possibilities of Social Networking Sites, 
arguing that these sites have provided various platforms to facilitate social connections.142 
 According to Ellison et al., the sites have brought changes at both interpersonal 
and social levels, arguing that the use of SNS tools allows for mutual connectivity between 
people who would otherwise only share weak ties, and the authors considered the SNSs as 
a “network of weak ties.” 143  Chung and Austria (2010) also argue that social media are 
types of Websites in which individuals can become part of a “broader virtual 
community.”144  Rettberg discusses how social media help individuals to represent their 
lives and argues that people get platforms to craft the narratives of their lives in different 
social media—using Doppler data, he argues said these media provide a template on which 
to sketch activities of lives through words and pictures.145  He likens these representations 
with mirrors through which people can evaluate their lives.146  In this way, social media 
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help connect with friends, relatives, peer groups and other networks online.  
Understanding the ultimate intent to participate is the most direct method for addressing 
fundamental questions about the deeper nature of social capital, and the notions of 
“strong” or “weak” ties.  In particular, the combined consideration of civic values, prior, 
civic participation, social media usage and content processing would be useful, and is 
something that this project’s study design encompasses. 
 Gruzd, Wellman and Takhteyev (2011) examine the role of Twitter in community 
building and observe that Twitter users can construct networks that are both imagined and 
real.147  Building off of the notions of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities 
(Anderson, 1991),’ Jones’ virtual settlement and Sense of Community (SoC) (1997), the 
authors explore the contours of Barry Wellman’s Twitter network, arguing that platforms 
like Twitter provide shared mechanisms to connect people in ways that speak to their 
preexisting senses of identity, while also permitting the freedom for individuals freely self-
identify as part of any community.148  Gruzd, et al. ultimately argue that the process of 
forming communities in these online avenues happens by making new and maintaining 
existing social connections.  The results of the study showed that belongingness in the 
Twitter network and the sense of community among users are not based only on 
imagination.  Moreover, users are networks of people with close ties in real life.  They 
explain, “In this way, weak ties become strong ties, and both weak and strong ties convey 
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information—and connectivity—to and from other social circles.”149  In this way, Twitter 
links the concepts of imagined communities with the understanding of weak ties akin to 
modes presaged by Durkheim and others. 
Other scholars echo the notion that the process of taking part in the virtual 
communities is becoming easier with the aid of SNSs such as Facebook.150  Kwon and 
McLeod examined how the intensity of the usage of social networking site Facebook is 
related to enhance and maintain social networks and observe a positive correlation between 
the intensity of Facebook usage and bridging social capital.151  However, they also argue 
that face-to-face communication is also necessary to supplement social networking and 
enhance and maintain social capital.  They also find that Facebook users obtain three major 
gratifications from the site: information seeking, entertainment and communication, 
arguing that Facebook helps people strengthen social ties.152  They explain, “In other 
words, one of the most important things [for which] Facebook users use Facebook is to 
stay [in] touch with their acquaintances.  That is, Facebook may play a major role in forging 
new network ties and strengthen existing ties.”153  Raacke and Raccke also find that college 
students use social media for making and maintaining friendships online, presenting 
evidence that the students also understand their role in the society and community.154  Lee, 
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Ma, Zheng, Shi, and Cao find that people use Renren, a Chinese SNS, for socialization—
both online and offline relationships are complimentary, but demographic differences do 
impact how people would interact online.155 
 This discussion shows that the process of maintaining interpersonal relations has 
been shifting in the online media age.  The advent of each new communications technology 
changes the notions of interpersonal relationship, community building and overall human 
communication.  At the same time, some components of human interactions, such as 
physical presence of the person have become arguably less pronounced.  The emergent 
mechanisms of online communication have provided easy accessibility and connectivity at 
the interpersonal and social levels.  Still, some differences remain between online and 
offline communication.  Online media are time dependent whereas offline media are 
focused on space.  Because of their virtual nature, online media do not require the physical 
presence of people to communicate.  This virtual space and open accessibility also facilitate 
networks of interpersonal connections.  With the process of imagination, users are more 
connected with each other to form the “imagined communities.”  This facility of network 
has also created a network of individuals with distinctive, resilient preferences and outlooks 
that are deeply informed by their underlying background circumstances.  Irrespective of the 
facilitation, pertinent questions center on whether such accessibility, connectivity and 
networking amount to enhanced participation or not. 
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New Media and Deliberative Democracy – Deconstructing the Noise 
 
 Concepts of deliberative political community predate the ongoing communications 
revolution, particularly in the form of discourse ethics.  Habermas famously articulates the 
risk of selective marginalization, an entropic degeneration of civil society that can be 
remedied via the creation of formally structured, inclusive opportunities for citizen 
participation in the national discourse on equal terms.156  In recent years, however, new 
theories have emerged to address the specific capabilities of new media platforms, as well as 
to challenge notions of these platforms’ transformative qualities.  Furthermore, the 
emergence of experimental methods and measurement techniques has allowed for more 
qualified empirical analysis.157  A number of scholars point to the unique, user and 
community-centered aspects of new media technology, arguing that its decentralized 
structures offer hope for meaningful deliberative activities.158  However, their arguments 
frequently rest on the constructive support of formal institutions.  Such works are, from 
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many angles, derivatives of Habermasian discourse ethics framed in the context of emerging 
media technologies.  Others offer more nuanced and developed perspectives, arguing that 
new media activity constitutes a new sphere of contested deliberative terrain, subject to the 
actions and influences of competing actors in an increasingly complex operational 
landscape.159  Others lie at the more pessimistic end of the spectrum, stipulating that these 
novel variants of communications technology are overrated commodities, vulnerable to 
inequalities of access, inequalities of skill, reflexive communication, corporate domination or 
increasingly sophisticated state surveillance, monitoring and counterattack.160  This segment 
of the scholarship suggests that hypotheses should prepare for negative participation 
outcomes—something accounted for across the study design 
New Media and Mobilization 
 
 Just as they have introduced new lines of inquiry into deliberative theories, evolving 
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communications technologies have been steadily expanding the study landscape of theories 
concerning individual and collective mobilization.  As with other sociopolitical subfields, 
there is a volume of important precedent forming the basis of social movement inquiry as it 
continues to be actively supplemented by specific analysis of the emergent role of new media 
technologies.161  More recent theorizing attempts to assess the impact of information and 
communications platforms on mobilization and opportunity structures, and debate the 
precise relevance and extent of ICT impact.162   Several scholars point to new media 
technologies as enablers of mobilization due to their basic abilities to either lower the costs 
or increase the quality of communication.163  A number of scholars articulate the possibility 
for communications technologies to help forge collective identity, which can in turn be 
harnessed by social movements.164 
 The actual ability of new media platforms to positively impact mobilization is subject 
to significant theoretical disagreement and contrasting empirical findings.  A number of 
authors point to practical limits on cognition, the retrenchment of elite channels, the decline 
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in information quality, the selectivity of information-seeking or the inevitability of regulatory 
constraints.165 
 Beyond the scholarship concerning new media’s impact on deliberative democracy 
and mobilization, one trajectory consists of general theorizing on questions of the meaning 
of new media as an emergent communication form, its relevance, its impact, its promises 
and its limits.166  Yet another trajectory of research focuses on very specific case studies.  
Such studies tend to focus on individual communities dealing with individual issues vis-á-vis 
a single state’s environment of access, content and privacy challenges.167  Many of these 
studies offer valuable insights into the emerging dynamics of transnational political 
communication, but are often either too broad to help discern the specific inertial moments 
of important event landscapes, or too narrow to offer insights that are applicable outside the 
specific society and problem at issue.  A goal with this project is to strike a balance between 
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depth of content gained, but to do so in a manner that allows for colleagues to extrapolate 
outwards towards the further advancement of theoretical knowledge in this field.  These 
mobilization frameworks are important because non-political engagement and social capital 
may ultimately play a role in eventually motivating participation through more indirect 
forms. 
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CH 4: NEW MEDIA AND DIASPORAS: MIGRATION, IDENTITY 
AND MEDIASCAPE NAVIGATION 
 
Diasporas, Migration and Communication  
 
 The narratives of human migration have always been inherently linked to the 
political history of human institutions and the modernization of technology and society.  
In the contemporary era of globalization and deterritorialization of social identity, national 
identities are being impacted, challenged and shaped in a number of ways as people are 
migrating to countries and also maintaining dual identities.168  Based on these pervasive 
transnational changes, Cohen noted that the world is being organized in two ways: the 
Westphalian nation-state endures vertically, but is increasingly situated horizontally amidst 
overlapping, and often porous, interactions.169  Cohen highlights permeability through 
examples of geographically distant peoples communicating on common issues, such as peace 
or disarmament.   Because of the enormous socio-cultural impacts of the immigrant people, 
many host countries are identified with different terms: the United States as a “country of 
immigrants” or a “melting pot,” and Canada as a “mosaic culture.”  The socio-political, 
economic and cultural aspects of migration are discussed with a broader notion of 
immigration at the earlier period.  However, with the process of developing the era of 
modernity, social scientists started to use the notion “diaspora” to refer to migration and 
immigrant people.  As a result, the notion of diaspora has become subject to renewed 
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importance in the late 20th Century.170 
According to Rahman, the notion of diaspora is related to critical discussions about 
citizenship and cultural identity.171  The development of modernization was influenced by 
factors such the industrial revolution, from late eighteenth to early nineteenth century in 
Europe, and the collapse of colonization.  People started migrating to the developed and 
industrial countries such as the U.K. and the U.S.  People from former colonies mainly 
migrated to the developed countries to have better lives.  As a result of the collapse of the 
era of colonization, former colonizers also needed workforces in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors.  However, the influx of migration was not only an outcome of the socio-
economic forces.  Armstrong argues for a relationship between modernization and diaspora, 
and the notion of diaspora is one of the significant components of multiethnic polity.172  
According to Armstrong, some diasporas are the outcome of recent social and economic 
forces.  However, diasporas, like multiethnic polities, are the norm rather than the exception. 
 Despite the fact the notion of diaspora has been used by social scientists to refer to 
immigrants, scholars defined diaspora in different ways.173  Immigrants are those migrating 
from their own lands to other countries.  Even though the notion of diaspora is related to 
immigration and migrant people, the meaning of diaspora goes beyond the simple issue of 
migration.  The rapid socio-economic, political and cultural development has altered the way 
human migration affects societies.  In an era of transnationalism and with the wave of an 
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ever-changing pattern of media, immigrants have been living in a complex situation.  The 
origin of “Diaspora” derives from a Greek word, meaning “to scatter,” “to spend,” and “to 
disperse.”174  He also opines that the word diaspora has emotionally weighted connotations 
of “uprootedness, precariousness and homesickness.”175  
 The notion of diaspora is used to refer to different types of post-migratory people.  
As immigrants live with a duality and sometimes struggle to be accepted by host societies, 
the influence of their home culture can strongly influence them.  On the other hand, 
immigrant peoples also must be a part of the host culture.  As a consequence, the experience 
of living in a cultural duality, or in a multicultural society, is an integral part of the diaspora 
community definition.  In this age of multiculturalism, the meaning of the notion of diaspora 
might be defined by DuBois’s concept of double consciousness, which requires people to 
look at themselves through the eyes of others.176  According to Dayal, diaspora is “less a 
‘both/and’ and more a ‘neither just this nor just that.’”177  He argues that this definition is a 
figurative, rather than literal, concept of diaspora.  The study conducted by Durham also 
explores the concept of identity crisis among the Indian teenage girls living in the U.S.—the 
author notes that his subjects viewed themselves as living in duality.178  According to his 
analysis, diaspora means that some part of a population lives as a minority, simultaneously 
oriented towards a real and imagined homeland, by maintaining a collective memory and 
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myth about their homeland.179  However, some also observe that many other groups have 
also been referenced by the diaspora term.  According to Karim, non-white and minority 
groups were traditionally referenced by the notion of diaspora.180  Baumann argues that the 
term diaspora, even though originally contextual to the Jews and Christian history, has been 
more generalized in a way that refers to people living outside their homeland.181  He notes 
that sociologists use this term to refer to group-related institutionalizations and evolving 
multicultural society. 
 Brubaker chooses to embrace the term as bounded entity rather than as an idiom, 
stance and claim, based on the assertion that any diaspora results from the migration of 
borders over people rather than the migration of people over borders.  Carter, however, 
examines the interrelationship between the physical place/territory and the formation of 
diaspora, and said the notion of diaspora breaks the relationship between place and 
identity.182  He observes that the notion of diaspora challenges the modern notion of 
territories.  According to Carter, diaspora communities are based on maintaining 
connections, and he argues that diaspora goes beyond the relationship between place and 
identity, arguing that the notion of diaspora creates its own unique third space. 
 Based on the scope and functions of the notion of diaspora, scholars identify several 
specific characteristics of diaspora.  Armstrong schematizes diaspora into two categories: 
proletarian and mobilized.  He argues the proletarian are the disadvantaged products of 
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modernized polities, and the mobilized are ethnic groups without general status 
advantages.183   
 Because of these characteristics, communication has played a vital role among the 
diasporic community.  Usually, immigrant people move from another country for a 
significant period of time.  However, there are some other people who move to another 
country for a shorter time such as students.  These patterns and characteristics of diasporic 
communities indicate that those people lack face-to-face communication with their relatives, 
friends and peer groups back home.  Moreover, diaspora populations sometimes lack face-
to-face contact with their same racial groups in the host countries.  Hence, communication 
has been a central part to the diasporic experience, allowing members to communicate both 
back home and within host societies.   
 For diasporic communities, the crisis of identity is a ubiquitously present issue.  
Because of physical distance, its members find themselves excised from their personal and 
community networks—both back home and in the host societies. Karim considers the role 
of communication links among the diasporic communities and observes that communication 
has played an important role in their cross-border relationships.184  Huan et al. explain that 
immigrants use communication to adapt to the host culture through study of a subject group 
of immigrants living in Singapore—they explain how both interpersonal and mass mediated 
communication play an important role to the immigrants for cultural adaptation in a new 
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society.185  Moon and McLeod examine the role of media in the acculturation process among 
Korean immigrants in Chicago, arguing that they use mass media to get information and 
make friends to adapt with the new cultures, and explain that media interfaces also help 
immigrants to culturally adapt to their host country by instructing them concerning norms 
and values, as well as meeting basic social and psychological needs.186  Thus, media help 
immigrants maintain their cultural identity and adapt to new surroundings simultaneously.  
In terms of traditional media, Albizu observes that diasporic populations interact with media 
from their countries of origin by helping them bridge the gap of physical places.187  
Traditional media such as newspapers and television act as channels of communication 
between immigrants and their home countries.   
 Online media have shifted the paradigm of mode of communication for diasporic 
populations. Because of easy accessibility on the web, people can communicate with their 
relatives, friends and networks from any part of the world.188  Other studies consider the role 
of new media and communication technologies among immigrant groups and find the new 
media technologies provide conduits for more accessible communication among migrant 
populations and represent a newly emerged source for building social capital among the 
immigrant people.  According to Hiller and Franz (2004), users deploy computer-mediated 
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communication to maintain ties both back home and with others in diaspora, a behavior 
observed across three stages of social ties: developing new ties, nourishing old ties and 
rediscovering lost ties.189  In the process of social networking and identity-developing among 
migrants, the authors mentioned four stages of tie assessment: verification, telepresence, 
hyper-reality and attribution.190  Fortunati et al. consider the role of digital communication 
among migrant populations and argue that such technologies can serve important roles, such 
as ameliorating the trauma of separation and incorporation into new communities—in doing 
so, migrants find themselves figuratively transubstantiated into an existence in a new social 
communication ecosystem.191 
 Examining the relationship between parents and children during the period of 
migration, Madianou and Miller find that new media have altered the intra-familial 
communication dynamics of migrant populations.192  By using new media such as text 
messages, mobile phones, webcams and social networking sites, even new family 
relationships have emerged—they describe this new type of interpersonal relationships in the 
families “mediated relationships.”  Parham observes members of the Haitian diaspora uses 
the internet, arguing that they apply its features and reach to sustain identity and maintain 
solidarity with homeland network.193  Based on Habermas’s public sphere theory, Parham 
analyzes the content of an online user forum, the Haitian Global Village, and notes that the 
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subjects use online media to maintain social, cultural and political connections.194  The online 
forum acts as public sphere for the diasporic community, and it provides a platform for new 
types of organizations combining geographic and cyber-place.  Karim (1998) argues that new 
communication technologies and new media have expanded the avenues for diasporic 
communities to connect with each other, noting, “As opposed to the broadcast model of 
communication which, apart from offering little access to minority groups, is linear, 
hierarchical, and capital intensive, on-line media allow easier access and are non-linear, 
largely non-hierarchical, and relatively cheap.”195  By using new communication technologies, 
he explains that diasporas have been fostering “cosmopolitan democracy.”  Thompson 
provides a thoughtful counterpoint, articulating the potential negative impacts of ICTs on 
identity formation, noting, “The exacerbation of differences can lead to a very divisive and 
fragmented image of the diasporic culture.”196  
 Social media are one of the avenues of online communication that are extensively 
used in relationship maintenance.  Social media such as SNSs not only make possible virtual 
relationship for diasporas, but also virtual diasporic communities for all people.  Barker 
considers how vibrant connectivity within social networking site membership might 
influence the attitudes and expectations across racial out-groups.  His study reveals a positive 
correlation between vicarious in-network contacts and positive expectations in interacting 
with racial out-group members.197  He explains:  
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“Social identity and collective self-esteem are related to close 
peer group communication via SNS and to seeking social 
identity gratifications from SNS.  Hence, in terms of acting as 
a catalyst for SNS use, group belonging clearly has a role to 
play in social media use and also likely influences potential 
outcomes of use.”198  
  
With respect to the type of usage of the SNSs, Mesch (2011) argues that the elevated use of 
the internet for communicating with family and friends is consistent with generally higher 
levels of social network site engagement.199  With the wave of new information 
communication technologies and computer mediated communication, many studies 
presaged a paradigm shift from “print capitalism” to “digital capitalism.”  The media 
landscape has been changing rapidly, and the era of print version of media is being 
redefined, challenged and, in many cases, undermined in the present era.   This trend might 
be considered a virtual migration of sorts.  In this respect, it might be reasonable to argue 
whether the notions of immigrant and diaspora communities ought to be correspondingly 
redefined.  If physical absence from country of origins is considered as migration, then 
online and social media have been narrowing the gaps of physical distance.  Cohen addresses 
the issue and argues that migration is not necessary through traditional borders.  However, in 
the cyber world, diaspora can be organized through “the mind, cultural artifacts and shared 
imagination.”200  
 Referring back to Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities,” Karim posits that 
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the necessity of space is less important owing to increasing usage of new media across 
diasporic communities.201  Thompson notes that the South Asians living in the Western 
countries provide a good example of how the deployment of new technologies can enable 
the pursuit of deeper identity and community membership negotiation within hybrid 
cultures.202  Examining the usage of computer mediated communication such as social media 
among diasporic South Asian youth in Toronto, Zaidi, Couture, and Maticka-Tyndale argues 
that they use these platforms to not only initiate and build relationships, but also broach 
otherwise uncomfortable or intimate discussions.203 
New Media and the Indian Diaspora 
 
A number of scholars consider the impact of communication technologies on extant 
Indian communities’ formulations of identity and belonging, presenting a number of 
scenarios in which NRIs, for wide-ranging reasons and through various mechanisms, are 
able to situate themselves in cultural surroundings that shield them from many traditional 
historical patterns of group incorporation in the United States.204  The concept of a 
‘community’ refers to a group of people who share common ideas, opinions, and values, and 
can be propagated based on socio-economic dimensions such as race, religion, and politics. 
It provides a platform for bonding to fulfill the common purposes of its members. 
According to Anderson, a community is a social construction, manifested through the 
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imagination of belonging to a group—by those who consider themselves as part of that 
group.205  Community members share some attributes such as language, religion and beliefs.  
Members share symbols and signs of language to communicate with each other.  Bucholtz 
and Hall argue that the process of identity construction is a semiotic process and language is 
an important component for finding sameness among a group of people.206  Many immigrant 
people who migrate to another country struggle to assimilate into the host culture because 
they lack language skills.207 
The rapid growth of social media has stirred extensive debate on issues related to 
identities. The Internet has been expediting the formation of community because all the 
texts and media that exist within the Internet are cultural products.  The virtual space allows 
people to construct their own identity.208  Electronic media enable people to imagine 
themselves as part of a community. The computer and the Internet provide tools and 
channels of imagination, and people construct their identities with discourse or text.209  In 
this way, communities form on the basis of what Mitra argues as “shared systems of culture, 
language, and beliefs that are spread across large distances.”210  Social media has enabled 
opportunities to engage with others across multiple languages.  English was the medium of 
communication at the early stage of social media, but as these platforms have developed 
and progressed, numerous social media have grown to provide options for using different 
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languages.  For example, according to the homepage of Facebook, the users of this site can 
communicate in 55 languages.  The website of Twitter shows that a group of volunteers 
across the globe translate Twitter so users of this site can communicate in 36 languages.  
Language is an important component of culture, and the influence of language has become 
obvious in India, where each of the more than two dozen major languages offer 
foundations of communication for separate communities. Tubergen and Kalmijn observe 
that the motives and settlement intentions of immigrants are related to their language 
proficiency in the host country.211  In this regard, the members of the South Asian diaspora 
community might take the opportunity to communicate in their native languages among 
their social media friends from the same diaspora community.  However, they might switch 
to their host language to communicate with their local friends. 
Fernandes argues that NRIs frequently exhibit reflexive resistance to both 
incorporation and hybridization with their adoptive lands and media environs, positing that 
transnational deterritorialization is a highly incomplete process because conceptions of a 
globalizing world community are heavily constrained by preexisting notions of cultural 
identity.212  Gillespie and Cheesman corroborate these concerns of NRIs about the erosion 
of their culture and values (as they understand them), likewise suggesting that expatriate 
media consumption patterns reflect a pervasive desire to maintain feelings of cultural 
authenticity.213  Mitra articulates an additional complexity of resilient cultural identity—rather 
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than purity or authenticity as the objective, safety and comfort from sociopolitical prejudice 
are often goals of participation in NRI-specific cybercommunities.214  Thompson argues that 
electronic media help create an opportunity structure in which NRIs are no longer 
compelled to assimilate in the traditional sense (at the expense of their prior cultural 
identities).215  Rather, they are actually more inclined to embrace their “otherness” and resist 
incorporation.  Returning to the theme of superstructural constraints on cultural adaptability, 
Mallapragada explains that even while the Indian and Indian-American web spheres actively 
reach out to NRIs in the framework of a transnational community, the outreach can be 
either constructive or disruptive with respect to collaborative identity formulation, as this 
transnational community is often specifically situated in the context of Indian state 
interests.216 
 Another line of work specifically examines participation by the Indian diaspora in the 
sphere of Indian political activity, largely concentrating on the financial aspect of 
transnational remittance and the cultural aspect of seeking insulated refuge from perceived 
corrosive influences.  Lessinger describes NRIs as an emerging transnational investor class, 
whose activities are closely tied to their pre-migratory socioeconomic status.217  Additionally, 
he argues that NRI is actively courted by the Indian government, and that it is specifically 
promoted as a means through which the diaspora can maintain cultural connection to the 
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homeland.218  Whereas Lessinger considers the ramifications of India’s transition towards 
more market-oriented planning, Gupta places heavy emphasis on the effects of crises with 
Pakistan during the 1990s and on the September 11 attacks.219  He argues that the events of 
September 11th helped catalyze both the Indian government and the Indian diaspora towards 
more concerted efforts to steer Indo-US relations, citing as evidence the proliferation of 
lobbying groups in both countries’ political spheres.220  The economic effects of NRI 
participation are the subject of extensive review.  Zhu explains that the NRI impact on 
India’s skilled labor economy is very real, observable and measurable, but is nevertheless 
constrained by the mediating realities of Indo-US relations and mutual ambivalence.221  Just 
as bilateral relations circumscribe the possibilities for NRI participation, so too do the 
internal politics of India.  Chakravartty argues that NRI activities are rhetorically framed in 
India to further the legitimacy of Indian national policies, also arguing that this has been the 
case in both the socialistic and market-oriented eras.222  Chakravartty also notes that while 
ICTs help create and sustain a narrative of a “transnational family,” they also allow the 
Indian government to trumpet NRI successes as evidence of uniquely India virtues and the 
wisdom of the Indian state.  Kapur describes the vast, and largely untapped, potential for 
NRIs to positively accelerate comprehensive growth India’s economy, but argues that India’s 
government is yet to adopt policies that match the drive and resourcefulness of the 
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diaspora.223  Kumar & Thomas also recognize the enormous potential for NRI participation 
to better the fortunes of the Indian state, but they explain that advancing 
telecommunications must compete with complex social, cultural, economic and political 
limits.224 225   
These investigations, while helpful, largely focus on the dynamics of development, 
remittances or Indo-US relations.  There is little formal study of the specific, complex 
intersection of transnational communication, emerging technology, identity formulation and 
political participation by the Indian diaspora.  The hypotheses discussed in the next chapter 
attempt to incorporate previously disparate elements brought up on individual bases across 
numerous branches of the literature—civic life, civic values, media immersion, 
socioeconomic status, social media platform usage, identity and dislocation, most notably.  
The study design then attempts to build on these hypotheses by deploying questions via 
testable instruments that can more meaningfully predict the dependent diasporic 
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participation outcome of interest. 
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CH 5: STUDY DESIGN AND CONSIDERATIONS: PROBLEM 
STRUCTURING FOR COMPLEX QUESTIONS 
 
Problem Structuring 
 
This research is premised on the desire to test the impact of migration—filtered 
through the dynamics of identity negotiation and mediascape navigation—on political 
participation.  The overall theoretical relationship pathway is summarized below, in Figure 
5.1.  It is possible that identity negotiation and mediascape navigation play either equal or 
unequal roles in the ultimate evaluation of migration’s impact on participation.  It should be 
noted that, in this model, identity negotiation and mediascape navigation do not enjoy 
exclusive relationships with migration—these two processes also influence each other.  It is 
also possible that, together, despite the nuanced depth of their inner workings, this entire 
pathway is non-existent.   
Figure 5.1: Migration, Identity, Media Immersion and Participation 
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Summary of Hypotheses 
 
H0:  Migration, identity negotiation and mediascape navigation have no discernible effect on political 
participation in the home society.  Such patterns may have their origins in pre-migration life, 
owing to the enduring influence of family, community, education or socioeconomic status.  
This hypothesis would be supported by some of the arguments articulated by Atal (1989), 
Fernandes (2000), Gillespie and Cheesman (2002), Sharma (1989) and Thompson (2002). 
H1:   Migration, identity negotiation and mediascape navigation positively impact political participation in 
the home society.  The ability to communicate and share political information about the home 
country regularly may act in concert with outreach from the Indian state, perceptions of 
transnational community, and perceptions of shared national interests.  This hypothesis 
would be supported by some of the arguments articulated by Lessinger (1992), Gupta (2004), 
Chakravartty (2001), Rubinoff (2005) and Kapur (2003). 
H2: Migration, identity negotiation and mediascape navigation negatively impact political participation 
in the home society. The ability to communicate and share political information about the home 
country regularly may either be subsumed by the realities of geographical relocation, or may 
be viewed in contrast  with a new volume of political information in the adoptive state, 
depressing interest in participating in home country politics.  Additionally, interest in the 
politics of the adoptive state may displace interest in the politics of the home country.  Some 
of the dynamics discussed by Gordon (1964), Saran (1985), Mahajani (1960) and Fisher 
(1980) would support this hypothesis. 
  90 
Research Approach  
 
 Research was conducted using two online instruments—a survey and a news 
experiment—that constituted two phases of investigation.  The parameters of the survey 
deployment and the news experiment are summarized below in Table 5-A and Table 5-B, 
respectively. 
Survey Instrument 
In Phase 1 of research, a survey questionnaire was distributed to two sample populations:  
• Phase 1a:  one group, the Native sample, consisted of toughly 1000 respondents 
across India, and gauged pre-migration demographic factors and, more importantly, 
attitudes toward identity negotiation, mediascape navigation and political 
participation.226   
• Phase 1b:  a second group, the NRI sample, consisted of approximately 500 
respondents drawn from across the United States.  This sample responded to 
identical questions, but several other questions as well relating to aspirations for U.S. 
citizenship, understanding of dual citizenship frameworks and the nature of their 
personal and professional networks in the United States.227 
Native participants were recruited through the platform of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk—
surveys were created using Qualtrics and completed online (linked via m-Turk).  
Respondents were provided with small inducements, and results were collected and 
organized for subsequent evaluation.  The questions were organized across 6 clusters: 
                                                                                       
226 For a full text of the Native survey questionnaire, please see Appendix A. 
227 For a full text of the Native survey questionnaire, please see Appendix B. 
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demographic background, socioeconomic status, identity, political status and personal 
perceptions, structural media status and civic and political participation status. Questions 
concerning participation status comprised arguably the most important component of the 
survey.  While the prior segments will help establish baseline differences and similarities 
across the respondent pool, the final cluster of questions probed levels of interest and the 
likelihood of sharing information and acting on information.  By using scalar responses, 
differences in means (within and across populations) helped determine if the hypotheses 
bear out with respect to increased or decreased propensity for participation.   
Table 5-A:  Parameters of Survey Instrument Approach  
Phase 1a 1b 
Analytical 
Tool 
Survey Questionnaire Survey Questionnaire  
Population 
Sample 
Approximately 1000 respondents, drawn 
from across India; ages 18-34 
Approximately 500 NRI 
respondents, drawn from across 
the United States; ages 18-34 
Subject 
Contact
  
Anonymous contact via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk 
Direct and indirect outreach via 
student groups, professional 
organizations, cultural/linguistic 
organizations and religious 
organizations. 
Questions
 
  
Demographic background; socioeconomic 
status; identity; political status and personal 
perceptions; structural media status; 
participation status 
Demographic background; 
socioeconomic status; identity; 
political status and personal 
perceptions; structural media 
status; participation status 
News Sensitivity Experiment 
Phase 2 of investigation consisted of a brief, controlled experiment assessing the variable 
propensity to hold interest in, and, more importantly, share, act on, or otherwise process 
political news information in a meaningful way (according to interactivity patterns of either 
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strong or weak ties).228  As during Phase 1, Native and NRI samples were questioned.  
However, as its primary focus, this research phase tested for variability in responses based 
on their exposure to one of three forms of news story treatment: 
i. whether the story qualifies as “hard news,” “soft news” or content of intermediate 
intensity; 
ii. the event’s proximity or distance, relative to whether the subject is a native or NRI 
respondent (news stories with identical content were randomly presented to 
participants, but the location of the events discussed in the article were varied across 
the United States, India/South Asia, or miscellaneous international locales); and 
iii. the nationality of the story’s primary actor (new stories with identical content were 
randomly presented to participants, but primary actor identity was varied across 
Native Indians, NRIs and “generic” Americans with nationality implied via English 
first and last names) 
After reading the story, respondents were asked a short series of questions concerning their 
interest, and the specific extent of any follow-up action.  Approximately 1000 Native 
respondents and 500 NRI respondents were each split into three primary groups (based on 
treatment condition), were presented with the hypothetical news stories, and responded to a 
series of questions about their perceptions of the event itself and, more importantly, their 
ensuing associational communication and participation patterns in response to the event.229  
As with the survey in Phase 1, the resulting data was retrieved from Qualtrics and organized 
                                                                                       
228 For the full text and imagery of the experimental prompts, please see Appendix C. 
229 For the full text and imagery of the experimental prompts, please see Appendix C. 
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for later analysis.  In order to recruit NRI respondents, snowball sampling procedures were 
conducted following several steps. First, email invitations were sent to NRI acquaintances of 
the present researcher living in the U.S. The acquaintances were asked to spread the word 
regarding the survey among their networks in the U.S.  Second, people were invited to 
participate through email outreach to various NRI organizations. In addition, email 
invitations were sent to South Asian student organizations in universities across the United 
States.230 
Table 5-B: Parameters of News Sensitivity Experiment 
Phase 2a1 2a2 2a3 2b1 2b1 2b1 
Analytical 
Tool 
Situational 
Experiment 
Situational 
Experiment 
Situational 
Experiment 
Situational 
Experiment 
Situational 
Experiment 
Situational 
Experiment 
Population 
Sample 
Approx. 330 
Native 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across India; 
ages 18-34 
Approx. 330 
Native 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across India; 
ages 18-34 
Approx. 330 
Native 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across India; 
ages 18-34 
Approx. 165 
NRI 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across the 
U.S.; ages 18-
34 
Approx. 165 
NRI 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across the 
U.S.; ages 18-
34 
Approx. 165 
NRI 
respondents, 
drawn from 
across the 
U.S.; ages 18-
34 
Subject 
Contact
  
Anonymous 
contact via 
Amazon 
Mechanical 
Turk 
Anonymous 
contact via 
Amazon 
Mechanical 
Turk 
Anonymous 
contact via 
Amazon 
Mechanical 
Turk 
Snowball 
sampling, 
direct and 
indirect 
outreach. 
Snowball 
sampling, 
direct and 
indirect 
outreach. 
Snowball 
sampling, 
direct and 
indirect 
outreach. 
Questions
 
  
Responses to a 
hypothetical 
event (assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general interest 
and likelihood 
of sharing of 
information via 
Responses to 
a hypothetical 
event 
(assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general 
interest and 
likelihood of 
sharing of 
Responses to 
a hypothetical 
event 
(assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general 
interest and 
likelihood of 
sharing of 
Responses to 
a hypothetical 
event 
(assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general 
interest and 
likelihood of 
sharing of 
Responses to 
a hypothetical 
event 
(assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general 
interest and 
likelihood of 
sharing of 
Responses to 
a hypothetical 
event 
(assigned 
randomly 
following 
Phase 1) 
regarding 
general 
interest and 
likelihood of 
sharing of 
                                                                                       
230 Initially, this design aimed to generate a larger NRI sample by also using m-Turk to recruit, screening 
for Indian citizenship among Turk users in the United States.  The yield was extremely low and of suspect 
reliability and, therefore, this approach was abandoned. 
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social media 
platforms  
information 
via social 
media 
platforms  
information 
via social 
media 
platforms  
information 
via social 
media 
platforms  
information 
via social 
media 
platforms  
information 
via social 
media 
platforms  
Experimental 
Treatment 
Variance of 
news story 
intensity 
Variance of 
news story 
location 
Variance of 
primary 
actor’s 
nationality 
Variance of 
news story 
intensity 
Variance of 
news story 
location 
Variance of 
primary 
actor’s 
nationality 
A relevant question is why this phase of the study was even conducted.  There are 
several reasons, each of which ultimately speaks to the core hypotheses of this project.  
First, with respect to the role of mediascape navigation, the survey instrument allows for 
the assessment of whether social media platform usage frequency, network density and 
certain general value propositions play a role.  However, these questions do not address 
respondents’ impressions or processing of the actual content that they engage with.  
Content is embedded in the architecture of the networked experience—as such, these 
experimental questions aim to offer, on a deeper level, some way to assess the role of the 
aspect of mediascape navigation.  Assessing mediascape navigation without any 
consideration of how content informs the platform experience would be, at best, an 
incomplete inquiry into the dynamics of overall navigation of the digital space.  Second, 
with respect to the role of geographic dislocation, the survey instrument allows for the 
assessment of whether the respondent’s dislocation impacts the participatory outcome.  
However, dislocation encapsulates both absolute elements such as physical location and 
proximity to actual personal connections, but also relative features, such as the proximity 
to more distant people and events in the news.  A person, native or migrant, likely does 
not have any personal connection with the elected leader of his or her country—
nevertheless, they are “closer” to that official when at home, immersed in local media, and 
in contact with the personal and professional networks discussing those events.  The 
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extent to which social media platforms might resolve any relative gaps in perceived 
“closeness” in an important aspect of mediascape navigation, and is better assessed 
through the news experiment than through the survey.  Finally, although both the survey 
and news experiment address identity in different ways, once again the role of the 
experiment is to provide a more granular understanding of how relative differences 
manifested via actor identity may explain the impact of identity on the participatory 
outcome with more substance.  Ultimately, the survey tool may help reveal higher levels of 
influence stemming from identity, migration or mediascape navigation, but the news 
experiment offers the prospect of proceeding significantly further towards positing deeper 
explanatory factors and pathways. 
Venue and Population Characteristics 
 
India has proven to be a robust recruitment base for online research as well as a 
long-established venue for a wide variety of survey research.231  Out of its total population of 
                                                                                       
231 See: Banerjee, Abhijit, Green, D., Green, J., and Pande, R. (2010), "Can Voters Be Primed to Choose 
Better Legislators? Experimental Evidence from Rural India," paper presented at the Political Economy 
Seminar series, Stanford University, May 4, 2010; Banerjee, Abhijit, Kumar, S., Pande, R., and Su, F. 
(2011), "Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India," 
unpublished manuscript, available at: http://www. povertyactionlab. org/node/2764; Besley, T., Pande, 
R., Rahman, L., and Rao, V. (2004), "The Politics of Public Good Provision: Evidence from Indian Local 
Governments," Journal of the European Economic Association 2(2- 3): 416-26; 
Bhattacharya, N. (2004), "A ‘Basement’ Cinephilia. Indian Diaspora Women Watch Bollywood," South 
Asian Popular Culture 2(2): 161-83; Chatterjee, N. (1999), “AIDS-Related Information Exposure in the 
Mass Media and Discussion within Social Networks among Married Women in Bombay, India." AIDS 
Care 11(4): 443-46; Chhibber, P., and Nooruddin, I. (2004), “Do Party Systems Count? The Number of 
Parties and Government Performance in the Indian States,” Comparative Political Studies 37(2): 152-87; S 
Desai, S., and Dubey, A. (2012), “Caste in 21st Century India: Competing Narratives,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 46(11): 40; Gupta, P.C. (1996), “Survey of Sociodemographic Characteristics of Tobacco 
Use among 99,598 Individuals in Bombay, India Using Handheld Computers,” Tobacco Control 5(2): 114-
120;  Heller, P., Harilal, K.N., and Chaudhuri, S. (2007), “Building Local Democracy: Evaluating the 
Impact of Decentralization in Kerala, India,” World Development 35(4): 626-48; Jejeebhoy, S.J. (1998), 
"Wife-Beating in Rural India: A Husband's Right? Evidence from Survey Data,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 11: 855-62.; Kapur, D. (2004), “Ideas and Economic Reforms in India: The Role of International 
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approximately 1.2 billion, roughly 137 million enjoy internet access.  While this number 
appears large, it represents a penetration rate of only 11.4%.  Approximately 9.5% of Indians 
have access to a home computer.232  A far larger proportion connects via public terminals 
and, more recently, through mobile devices.  Mobile subscriptions number more than 864 
million, but only 6% enjoy 3G network speeds.  Roughly 69% of mobile devices operate 
with SIM cards, and 95% of mobile users in India use prepaid connections to access an 
infrastructure maintained by 13 providers.233  While raw numbers do mask the major 
deficiencies in penetration rates and the hurdles of digital divide, upward trends in digital 
technology adoption are clear.  As illustrated in Figure 5.2, below, broadband access has 
grown dramatically since 2000. 
Figure 5.2:  Growth in Fixed Broadband Subscriptions (2000-2012) 
 
                                                                                       
Migration and the Indian Diaspora,” India Review 3(4): 364-84; Kapur, D. (2009), “Public Opinion and 
Indian Foreign Policy,” India Review 8(3): 286-305; and, Rudolph, L., and Rudolph, S.H. (1958), “Surveys 
in India: Field Experience in Madras State,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 22(3): 235-44. 
232 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2013.  (URL: <<http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/statistics/2013/Individuals_Internet_2000-2012.xls>>) 
233 Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSMA), 2013.  (URL: << 
https://gsmaintelligence.com/markets/1606/dashboard/>>)  
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However, it should be noted that while broadband growth has been robust, penetration rates 
remain low across a still-developing population.  As shown in Figure 5.3, below, less than 
one-fifth of the population enjoys regular access to the internet. 
Figure 5.3: Internet Penetration in India (2000 – 2012) 
 
The country of India and its non-resident population provide an unmatched 
opportunity to pursue serious analytical depth of such questions—India is a large, 
democratic state with a generally free press and a burgeoning proliferation of new media 
forms.  Furthermore, it is staggeringly diverse in its demographic complexity, subdivisions, 
and nuanced niches of community life. In empirical studies, Indian respondents, barring 
significant language barriers, perform on par with American test subjects and, though the 
financial motivations to participate are more significant, it is not shown that they 
compromise the validity of obtained data.234   
                                                                                       
234 On the validity of Mechanical Turk, see: Berinsky, A.J., Huber, G.A., & Lenz, G.S. (2012), “Evaluating 
Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk,” Political Analysis 
20(3): 351-368; Ipeirotis, P.G. (2010), “Analyzing the Amazon Mechanical Turk Marketplace,” XRDS: 
Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students 17(2), 16-21; Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2014), “Inside the 
Turk: Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 23(3): 
184-188; and, Ross, J., Irani, L., Silberman, M., Zaldivar, A., & Tomlinson, B. (2010), “Who Are the 
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 The choice of Indian nationals and the Nonresident Indian (NRI) population as 
research subjects comprises a unique investigative field that is logistically feasible, large 
enough to yield deeply descriptive research data, but also diverse enough to provide more 
generalizable information that is relevant to longer-term theoretical questions in this field.  
Lastly, the high prevalence of English fluency is an incredible asset to collecting high-quality 
research data. 
Threats to Internal Validity 
 
Noncompliance and Non-Response 
 
 With respect to the both the survey instrument and news experiment, a significant 
threat to internal validity of collected results is noncompliance.  This could occur because of 
complications arising from the textual format of these tools—respondents may not have 
understood the wording of particular questions or may not have fully read particular 
questions.  Also, they may not have chosen to answer particular questions.  While certainly 
not desirable, non-response presents less of a threat to internal validity than does 
noncompliance.  Approaches to minimize noncompliance rest on crafting survey and 
experiment text that hopefully offered the greatest possible clarity of wording, as well as the 
greatest possible clarity of distinct answer choices and ranges.  Additionally, the survey was 
piloted on representative trial respondents in advance to check for flow, clarity and any other 
unanticipated flaws.  Beyond crafting clear and concise questions, answer choices and 
hypothetical descriptions, non-responsiveness is difficult to avoid in a remote format, but 
                                                                                       
Crowdworkers? Shifting Demographics in Mechanical Turk, in Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems,” Chicago: ACM, pp. 2863-2872  
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perhaps the inclusion of adequately broad answer choices helped minimize this problem.  
More importantly, efforts were made to recruit large samples, with the understanding that 
filtration of unacceptable respondents would result in samples that were, overall, significantly 
more reliable. 
Selection Bias 
 The voluntary opt-in nature of the Mechanical Turk platform raises the potential for 
self-selection to compromise the ability to interpret effects on the dependent outcome.  
Consistent with other studies, the Native sample in this study was disproportionately drawn 
from the Southern Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu (followed by Karnataka and 
Andhra Pradesh).235  The most likely explanation for this is that M-Turk is not yet optimized 
for mobile usage—this sample, consistent with others, can overwhelmingly be traced to 
desktop computers.   
Testing Effects 
The architecture of M-Turk presents the possibility for significant testing effects—at 
the time of this study, there was no automatic mechanism though which to prevent repeat 
participation in the survey.  This was, in fact, the leading reason for disqualification from the 
eventual study sample.  Given the lack of an automatic prevention option on the M-Turk 
platform, the minimization of testing effects was pursued through the careful filtration of the 
raw responses by manually examining the user identification numbers of M-Turk Workers 
for repeat occurrences.  While this checking was able to minimize the testing effects caused 
                                                                                       
235 See Dietrich, S., & Winters, M. S. (2015), “Foreign Aid and Government Legitimacy,” Journal of 
Experimental Political Science, 2(2), 164-171. 
  100 
by abusive repeat taking of the survey, there is nevertheless the possibility for testing effects 
for other reasons (see below for more discussion of this).   
Extreme Heterogeneity 
 During the experiment phase of this research, another potential threat to internal 
validity was extreme heterogeneity—this could occur if respondents reacted to the 
situational prompt wildly differently for reasons unrelated to any identified input factors.  In 
such an event, every effort would be made to identify the mystery variable(s)—a process that 
may actually enhance the overall investigative yield of this project.  This does not appear to 
have been a significant problem—while respondents certainly did vary, and the results do 
suggest “noisy” data, the statistical analysis indicated reliable equation modeling.  While the 
modeling may not have accounted for all possible independent variables, the scope and 
complexity of the causal relationship is a more likely explanatory factor than extreme 
respondent heterogeneity.  
Threats to External Validity 
 
Non-representative Samples 
 
 During both phases of this project (survey and situational experiments), Native 
respondents were identified and solicited via Mechanical Turk, which has been established as 
a reliable solicitor of competent research subjects (Supra, Footnote 234).  While it is the case 
that M-Turk samples are not random, their non-random qualities are actually an asset to this 
particular project—only because of the sample (US-based NRIs) who will serve as a 
companion subject group.  This is because the skewed demographics of Indian M-Turk 
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users makes them largely similar to the population of Non-Resident Indians in the United 
States.  A random cross-section of the general Indian population would exhibit 
socioeconomic patterns, particularly in regards to education and income, that would make 
comparison of native and extant populations ineffective for the purposes of this study.   
Testing Effects 
Irrespective of any attempts by Workers to manipulate the platform through 
repetition, it is highly likely that regular workers perform a wide variety of tasks, are familiar 
with survey design flows, and may seek to quickly complete assignments in order to extract 
more frequent payments from the platform.  To rectify this problem, screening questions 
were included, and represented the second most common reason for exclusion from the 
eventual sample.  However, even when workers are entirely forthright in their completion of 
M-Turk tasks, the fact that they complete assignments on the platform frequently may bias 
their associated output due to the “professionalization” of their participation. 
Artificial Treatment Environment 
 Because Phase 2 involves respondents considering hypothetical situations, there was 
a concern that external validity could be threatened by the artificial nature of the situation 
itself as well as a respondent’s environment.  While this is certainly a concern, it should be 
noted that there was no alternate pathway to seek out a natural experiment due to temporal 
and precognitive limits.  Furthermore, it is likely that, in comparison to a natural experiment, 
treatment effects would be diminished but not erased.236 
                                                                                       
236 Barabas, J., and Jerit, J (2010), "Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?" American Political Science 
Review 104(2): 226-42 
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Survey Post-Processing  
 
The essential hypotheses of this project center around the potential impact of three 
broad categories of activity on various levels of political engagement and participation: 
• Core components of personal, family and community identity 
• Social media immersion 
• Geographic migration, both in actuality or intent/preference 
 
On one hand the survey research helps illuminate the potential need for 
differentiation between “engagement” and “participation.”  More importantly, though, the 
questions attempt to understand the impact of these variables on participation behavior. 
The survey was administered to approximately 6400 respondents in India via mTurk 
over the course of approximately 18 months (between September, 2014 and January, 
2016).237  From this original set, screening for completion and attention was conducted and, 
ultimately, 1195 responses were deemed reliable.  A more detailed schematic of the filtering 
that yielded the eventual study sample for the Native population is provided in Figure 5.4, 
below. 
                                                                                       
237 Not included in the initial figure of 6404 submissions were 27 respondents who voiced complaints 
about the compensation.  Compensation exceeded M-Turk tasks of similar scope and detail (based on my 
best ability to benchmark inducements at the time), and these 27 respondents did complete the survey—
however, in the interests of avoiding potential testing effects or other biased outcomes, their responses 
were excluded.  
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Figure 5.4: Response Filtration of Native Sample 
 
The survey was also administered to approximately 450 NRI respondents across the 
United States, who were solicited via direct and indirect methods, including snowball 
sampling, the course of approximately 12 months (between March, 2015 and January, 
2016).238  From this original set, screening for completion and attention was conducted and, 
ultimately, 436 responses were deemed reliable.  A more detailed schematic of the filtering 
that yielded the eventual study sample for the Native population is provided in Figure 5.5, 
below. 
                                                                                       
238 No members of the NRI sample group attempted to take the survey more than once. 
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Figure 5.5: Response Filtration of NRI Sample 
 
Discovery of Key Variables through Survey Questions 
 
A number of questions were asked to provide information about these three areas 
from multiple angles of inquiry.  While select questions were of an open response nature, the 
majority were 5 or 7-point Likert-scaled.  The desire was to strike a balance between 
respondent reliability and usability (from an analytical perspective).  For the details of how 
this indexing linked dependent variables to survey questions, see Table 5-C, below. 
Table 5-C: Operationalization of Survey Questions 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
QUESTION 
 
 
Participation  
 
If the current government stays in power, India's next 
General Election is scheduled to take place in 2019.  
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For details regarding the operationalization of the multiple independent variables, see Table 
5-D, below. 
Table 5-D: Operationalization of Survey Questions 
RELEVANT 
HYPOTHESIS 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
QUESTION(S) 
Impact of Identity 
on Participatory 
Outcome 
Identity 
 
How important is religion in your life? 
How important is caste affiliation in your life? 
Impact of Identity 
on Participatory 
Outcome 
Socioeconomic Status 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
How would you describe your level of wealth? 
Impact of 
Migration on 
Participatory Outcome 
Migration Intent Do you want to stay in India permanently, or would you 
like to leave? 
Impact of 
Mediascape 
Navigation on 
Participatory Outcome 
Social Media/ICT 
Use 
 
How often do you use the internet? 
How often do you use your mobile phone? 
How often do you use your mobile phone to access the 
internet? 
How often do you use Facebook? 
How often do you use Twitter? 
Have you ever used social media to VIEW an article, 
website, video, blog, etc.? 
Have you ever used social media to SHARE an article, 
website, video, blog, etc.? 
Have you ever used social media to CREATE an article, 
website, video, blog, etc.? 
How often do you share or receive information about 
political matters? 
Impact of 
Mediascape 
Navigation on 
Participatory Outcome 
Social Media 
Valuation 
Do you think social media technology is useful? 
What is the impact of social media technology on your 
quality of life? 
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N/A (Offline Input 
outside the proposed 
pathway) 
Civic Communication How often do you discuss politics with your PARENTS? 
How often do you discuss politics with your SIBLINGS 
AND EXTENDED FAMILY? 
How often do you discuss politics with your FRIENDS? 
N/A (Offline Input 
outside the proposed 
pathway) 
Institutional Trust Do you trust the Central government? 
Do you trust your state government? 
How much do you trust your local government? 
How much do you trust labor unions? 
How much do you trust the news media? 
N/A (Offline Input 
outside the proposed 
pathway) 
Civic Values 
 
How important is it to follow laws and regulations? 
How important is it to pay taxes? 
How important is it to vote? 
How important is it to be informed about political events? 
How interested are you in politics? 
N/A (Offline Input 
outside the proposed 
pathway) 
Prior Civic/Political 
Involvement  
 
Have you ever contacted a political party? 
Have you ever contacted an elected official? 
Have you ever contacted a government administrator? 
Have you ever contacted a religious organization? 
Have you ever contacted a non-governmental 
organization (NGO)? 
Have you ever contacted a labor organization/trade 
union? 
Have you ever donated money to a political party or 
candidate? 
Have you ever requested resources from a government 
agency for business or personal reasons? 
Have you ever requested resources from a government 
agency for education or work reasons? 
Impact of 
Mediascape 
Navigation on 
Participatory Outcome 
Future Social Media 
Platform Usage 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to 
major international political events? 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to 
major domestic political events? 
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 Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to 
major non-political events? 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to 
major personal/family events? 
 
Creation of Indexed Variables 
For each independent variable, the responses to each associated question were 
combined into an aggregate scalar range. 
For example, the three indexed questions related to identity were each scored on 1–5 
point scales.  The indexed identity score for the purposes of the regression was scored on a 
scale from 3–15.  The five indexed questions related to institutional trust were scored on a 
scale from 5–25. 
This procedure was repeated across the 10 variables listed earlier. 
Regression Analysis 
 Linear regression analysis was performed across the scaled, indexed variable scores 
generated by the Native survey sample.  In parallel, regression analysis was also performed 
across the scaled, indexed variable scores generated by the NRI survey sample.  This will 
allow for the identification of key drivers of the dependent participation outcome, as well for 
the recognition of any differences in influential factors across the geographically separated 
population groups. 
T-tests 
 T-tests were also performed in order to measure the presence of any statistically 
significant mean differences across key indexed variable scores.  In addition to an initial t-
test across the means associated with the primary dependent indexed outcome, additional t-
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tests were performed to assess the presence of any significant mean differences with respect 
to any significant influential independent variables identified through regression analysis.  
ANOVA Analysis 
 Because the news sensitivity experiments subdivided the two sample populations 
across more than two groups, one-way ANOVA analysis was used to identify the presence 
of any significant mean differences across these groupings.  Based on the results of the 
ANOVA scores, arrays with statistically significant mean differences were subjected to 
follow-on t-tests to better understand the specific contours and directionality of the 
underlying variable relationships. 
Results 
Survey Findings 
 
 As discussed and illustrated throughout Chapter 6 (as well as in Appendix E), the 
results of the survey and news experiment present a mixed picture.  The regression results 
indicate that mediascape navigation does influence future participation, but not but with 
opposite directionality across the two sample populations.  While expectations of future 
social media platform use correlate with higher levels of predicted future participation for 
both groups, current levels of social media platform immersion, while significant, diverge 
across the Native (positive effect) and NRI (negative effect) samples.   
With respect to identity and migration, the regression results, upon first examination, 
do not indicate a largely significant relationship between the related indexed independent 
variables and the participation outcome.  Socioeconomic status was found to be significant 
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for the Native sample, but not the NRI sample.  However, several independent variables 
(civic communication, civic values and civic participation) that could have intervening effects 
on identity or migration, or in turn be impact by identity or migration, did register as 
significant for both samples based on the regression results.  Furthermore, there was 
additional divergence of impact direction across all three of these civic life variables.  Lastly, 
institutional trust (another variable that could have impacted identity or migration) was 
found to be significant for the Native sample, but not the NRI sample. 
News Experiment Findings 
 
The news sensitivity experiment allowed for some consideration of the relevance of 
content in the scope of mediascape navigation.  While mediascape navigation can be partially 
understood based on the questions of usage frequency, platform membership, device usage 
and depth of use, the news sensitivity experiment allowed for some actual measurement of 
the impact of content in the process.  This experiment sought to gauge the relationship 
between story intensity, location and actor nationality on the primary dependent outcome 
(future participation) as well as perceived importance and inclination to share the story with 
others via social media channels.  Across nine different binary comparisons, the Native 
sample showed no effect from the news story treatments.  However, the NRI sample 
appeared to be influenced by eight out of the nine treatments.  Reasons for this divergence, 
as well its impact on the higher level regression results from the survey are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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CH 6: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
Overview of Results 
 
Given that the purpose of this study is to ascertain what, if any, variables connected 
to the core concepts of the hypotheses laid out in the study design may or may not 
ultimately influence future participation, a number of discrete independent variables were 
distilled and measured through the survey questions.  The primary dependent outcome, the 
likelihood of voting in the 2019 General Election, is observed to be more likely for the 
Native population.  In responding to question fields connected to the statistically significant 
independent variables, the Native respondents expressed higher levels of institutional trust, 
prior civic participation, likelihood of using social media platforms to share news 
information and, interestingly, higher self-reported socioeconomic status.  The NRI 
respondents expressed higher perceived importance of civic values, higher levels of both 
current and expected future social media platform usage, as well as higher levels of perceived 
interest and importance in response to various hypothetical news stories. 
The results of these surveys indicate the presence of both commonly and divergently 
significant independent variables across the Native and NRI sample groups.  These 
combined results are illustrated in Table 6-A, below.  Additionally, the directionality of 
influence of significant independent variables, in some cases, differs across the two 
populations.  The relevance of these results, including discussion of the possible causes of 
the observed differences, is addressed later in this chapter. 
Overall, of the three driving factors at the center of this project’s hypotheses, the 
impact of social media platform usage appears significant, but with important points of 
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divergence across the two sample group that warrant additional discussion.  Additionally, 
several factors related to civic participation and communication, which are dispersed across 
the framework of the mediascape, integrated and embedded across online and offline modes 
of agency, appear to be even more significant predictors of future participation.  Again, these 
various multidisciplinary forms of interest, engagement and participation appear, in some 
cases, to engender divergent outcomes across Native and NRI samples.  Factors related to 
identity and the geographic event of migration, however, do not appear to significantly 
impact expressed interest in future electoral participation activity.  Ultimately, Native and 
NRI populations are immersed in, and affected by, largely the same forces and influences—
but they exhibit different perceptions, processing and responsive agency to these inputs.  
Table 6-A: Summary of Variables Impacting Survey Respondents’ Expected Future 
Political Participation 
  
Significant 
in Native 
Participation 
Outcome? 
Directionality 
of Influence 
Significant 
in NRI 
Participation 
Outcome? 
Directionality 
of Influence 
Significant 
Native-NRI 
Means 
Difference 
(Higher Mean 
Sample) 
PRIMARY 
PARTICIPATION 
OUTCOME 
-- -- -- -- YES (Native) 
ABSENTEE VOTE -- -- YES Positive -- 
IDENTITY NO -- NO -- -- 
 
MIGRATION 
IMPETUS 
NO -- NO -- -- 
 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
STATUS 
YES Positive   YES (Native) 
 
CIVIC 
COMMUNICATION 
YES Negative YES Positive NO 
 
INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST 
YES Positive NO -- YES (Native) 
CIVIC VALUES YES Positive YES Negative YES (NRI) 
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SMP USE YES Positive YES Negative YES (NRI) 
SMP VALUE NO -- NO -- -- 
CIVIC PART. 
(INDIA) YES Negative YES Positive YES (Native) 
CIVIC PART. (US) NO -- YES Positive -- 
FUTURE SMP USE YES Positive YES Positive YES (NRI) 
 
STORY RX 
INTEREST 
NO -- YES Positive YES (NRI) 
 
STORY RX 
SHARING 
NO -- YES Positive YES (Native) 
 
The specific details and results of the regression analyses and t-tests that were performed in 
order to assess the factors influencing the dependent variable of participation in the 2019 
General Election are discussed below. 
Testing of the Key Dependent Variable Outcome 
 
An OLS regression was conducted across the Native sample (N = 1195) to predict 
the likelihood of voting in the 2019 Indian General Election (the “participation” outcome of 
the key hypotheses at the center of this project) based on a field of twelve indexed independent variables:  
1) identity (xi); 
2) migration impetus (xmig); 
3) socioeconomic status (xses); 
4) social media platform usage (xsmu); 
5) perceived social media platform value (xsmv);  
6) civic communication activity (xcca); 
7) institutional trust (xitr),  
8) civic values (xcv); 
9) civic participation (xcvp);  
10) projected future social media platform usage (xfut); 
11) expressed interest in, and perceived importance of, hypothetical news story (zrxi); 
and 
12) projected likelihood of sharing hypothetical news story via social media platform 
(zxs).239 
                                                                                       
239 More detailed information on the nature and of the two indexed news-story related variables, zrxi and 
zxs, is provided below in the discussion of the News Sensitivity Analysis 
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Each of these independent variables relates to one of the three key driving factors at 
the core the research hypotheses, namely identity, social media immersion and the event of 
geographic migration.  The results of this regression calculation are presented in Table 6-B, 
below. 
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Table 6-B: OLS Regression Results for Native Survey Responses 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.591        
R Square 0.349        
Adjusted R Square 0.343        
Standard Error 0.741        
Observations 1195.000        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 12.000 348.775 29.065 52.864 0.000****    
Residual 1182.000 649.858 0.550      
Total 1194.000 998.633          
                  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 0.777 0.218 3.562 0.000 0.349 1.205 0.349 1.205 
IDENTITY 0.007 0.010 0.704 0.482 -0.012 0.026 -0.012 0.026 
MIGR. IMPETUS -0.026 0.016 -1.582 0.114 -0.058 0.006 -0.058 0.006 
SES 0.052 0.015 3.570 0.000*** 0.024 0.081 0.024 0.081 
SMS USE 0.012 0.003 3.627 0.000*** 0.006 0.019 0.006 0.019 
SMS VALUE 0.003 0.016 0.167 0.868 -0.028 0.034 -0.028 0.034 
CIVIC COMM. -0.015 0.005 -2.931 0.003** -0.026 -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 
INST. TRUST 0.013 0.007 1.988 0.047* 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.027 
CIVIC VALUES 0.094 0.008 11.794 0.000**** 0.078 0.110 0.078 0.110 
CIVIC PART. -0.012 0.003 -4.079 0.000**** -0.018 -0.006 -0.018 -0.006 
FUTURE SMS USE 0.061 0.008 7.954 0.000**** 0.046 0.077 0.046 0.077 
STORY RX INTEREST 0.008 0.014 0.616 0.538 -0.018 0.035 -0.018 0.035 
STORY RX SMS USE -0.021 0.012 -1.740 0.082 -0.044 0.003 -0.044 0.003 
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A significant regression equation was found (F(12, 1182) = 52.864, p < 0.0001), with 
an R2 of 0.349.  Respondents’ predicted participation in the 2019 Indian General Election 
can be expressed as equal to 0.777 + 0.052xses + 0.012xsmu - 0.015xcca + 0.013xitr 0.094xcv - 
0.012xcvp + 0.061xfut + 0.741, where each of the dependent variables is coded as the indexed 
sum of scaled Likert scores.  While the R2 value suggests the presence of “noisy” data 
stemming from dispersed responses to individual questions, significant p-values indicate the 
presence of five independent variables that positively impact the likelihood of participation 
in the 2019 General Election among Native respondents.  Based on the modeling of these 
regression results, socioeconomic status, institutional trust, social media platform usage, civic 
values, and expectations of future social media platform usage among Native respondents all 
positively increase the likelihood of voting in the 2019 General Election.  Civic 
communication activity and civic participation activity, however, appear to negatively impact 
the likelihood of voting in 2019. 
A similar OLS regression was conducted across the responses from the NRI sample 
(N = 436) to predict the likelihood of voting in the 2019 Indian General Election (the 
“participation” outcome of the key hypotheses discussed earlier) based on a slightly 
expanded field of independent variable inputs.  Eleven of the twelve indexed independent 
variables studied with respect to the Native population sample were also analyzed with 
respect to the NRI population sample: identity (xi), socioeconomic status (xses), social media 
platform usage (xsmu), perceived social media platform value (xsmv), civic communication 
activity (xcca), institutional trust (xitr), civic values (xcv), projected future social media platform 
usage (xfut), impetus to emigrate (xmig), news story interest  (zrxi) and news story sharing (zrxs).  
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Whereas the civic participation variable could only pertain to civic activities in India for the 
Native sample, this variable was examined via two fields of questions for NRI respondents: 
civic participation in India (xcpi) and civic participation in the United States (xcpus).  Lastly, for 
the NRI respondents, an additional dependent variable relating to interest in an absentee 
voting mechanism for NRIs (xabs) was considered.  As with the earlier OLS calculations, each 
of these independent variables is connected to the impact of identity, social media 
immersion and geographic migration as factors that might predict the likelihood of voting in 
the 2019 General Election.  The results of this regression calculation are presented in Table 
6-C, below. 
  
  
117 
Table 6-C: OLS Regression Results for NRI Survey Responses 
 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0.680        
R Square 0.462        
Adjusted R Square 0.444        
Standard Error 0.681        
Observations 436        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 14 167.448 11.961 25.818 0.000****    
Residual 421 195.035 0.463      
Total 435 362.484       
                  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
Intercept 3.844 1.007 3.816 0.000 1.864 5.824 1.864 5.824 
ABSENTEE VOTE 0.279 0.051 5.481 0.000**** 0.179 0.379 0.179 0.379 
IDENTITY -0.010 0.016 -0.597 0.551 -0.042 0.023 -0.042 0.023 
MIGRATION IMPETUS 0.132 0.054 2.462 0.114 0.027 0.238 0.027 0.238 
SES 0.055 0.040 1.393 0.164 -0.023 0.133 -0.023 0.133 
CIVIC 
COMMUNICATION 0.108 0.014 7.558 0.000**** 0.080 0.136 0.080 0.136 
INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST -0.020 0.016 -1.245 0.214 -0.052 0.012 -0.052 0.012 
CIVIC VALUES -0.293 0.033 -8.903 0.000**** -0.358 -0.229 -0.358 -0.229 
SMS USE -0.030 0.010 -3.101 0.002** -0.049 -0.011 -0.049 -0.011 
SMS VALUE 0.059 0.038 1.544 0.123 -0.016 0.133 -0.016 0.133 
CIVIC PART. (INDIA) 0.027 0.010 2.688 0.007** 0.007 0.047 0.007 0.047 
CIVIC PART. (US) 0.102 0.018 5.561 0.000**** 0.066 0.138 0.066 0.138 
FUTURE SMS USE 0.070 0.012 5.953 0.000**** 0.047 0.093 0.047 0.093 
STORY RX INTEREST 0.067 0.027 2.469 0.014* 0.014 0.120 0.014 0.120 
STORY RX SMS USE 0.340 0.028 11.981 0.000**** 0.284 0.396 0.284 0.396 
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A significant regression equation was found (F(14, 421) = 25.818, p < 0.0001), with 
an R2 of 0.462.  Respondents’ predicted participation in the 2019 Indian General Election 
can be expressed as equal to 3.843 + 0.279xabs + 0.055xses + 0.108xcca - 0.293xcv - 0.030xsmu + 
0.027xcpi + 0.102 xcpus + 0.0698xfut + 0.067xrxi + 0.340xrxs + 0.681, where each of the 
dependent variables is coded as the indexed sum of scaled Likert scores.  While the R2 value 
again suggests the presence of “noisy” data stemming from dispersed responses to individual 
questions, significant p-values indicate the presence of seven independent variables that 
positively impact the likelihood of participation in the 2019 General Election among NRI 
respondents, and two that negatively impact it.  Based on the modeling of these regression 
results, interest in absentee voting, civic communication activity, prior civic participation 
activity in India, prior civic participation activity in the United States, expectations of future 
social media platform usage, interest in the hypothetical news treatment and interest in 
sharing the news treatment among NRI respondents all positively increase the likelihood of 
voting in the 2019 General Election.  Civic values and social media platform usage, however, 
appear to negatively impact the dependent participation outcome. 
Follow-Up Testing of Individual Indexed Survey Variables 
 
 In order to better understand the more granular impact of both the dependent 
outcomes and the significant independent variables across the two population samples, a 
two-sample t-test was conducted across the dependent participation variable (likelihood to 
vote in the 2019 General Election), as well as across the 9 independent variables (civic 
communication activity, civic values, civic participation activity, social media platform usage, 
expectations of future social media platform usage, socioeconomic status, institutional trust, 
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news story interest and news story sharing that were: i) tested across both populations; and, 
ii) determined to be significant predictors of future participation in either, or both, of the 
Native and NRI OLS analyses.240  In each case, the mean values of each indexed variable 
field score across the Native and NRI group were compared in order to understand if any 
observed difference was, in fact, significant. 
News Sensitivity Analysis  
  
In addition to batteries of questions designed to measure the impact of key factors 
related to identity, social media usage and geographic migration as they impact political 
participation, a portion of the survey tool was used to gauge respondents’ perceptions, 
reactions, uptake and projected notions of future engagement with the information at hand.  
To this end, two additional indexed variables were created—these variables, as shown below, 
have both independent and dependent characteristics.  One of these variables measured 
respondents’ interest in, and perceived importance of, the hypothetical news treatment 
(“news interest,” znt).  A second indexed variable considered their expectations concerning 
the likelihood of using social media channels to share the story with others (“story sharing,” 
zshr).  The independent inputs into the news interest and story sharing outcomes were: news 
story intensity (xhmf), news story location (xloc) and news actor nationality (xnat).  As illustrated 
earlier, there were significant means differences observed between the Native and NRI 
population samples for both of these variables.  Additionally, while news story interest and 
sharing were both observed as not significant for the Native sample, they were both 
                                                                                       
240 As explained earlier, the civic participation was bifurcated into two geographically dependent segments 
of questioning for NRI respondents.  The significant independent variable in this instance is prior civic 
participation in India. 
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observed to significant for the NRI sample.  In order to confirm the patterns of this 
divergence and, more importantly, to better understand the configuration of how the specific 
intensity, location and actor aspects impacted the NRI group, several stages of analyses 
proceeded to further examine the results of this news sensitivity portion of the survey tool. 
 First, a series of 18 different one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were 
conducted across both the Native and NRI samples to determine if there were significant 
differences within each samples reported news story interest, news story sharing and the 
primary dependent participation outcome (likelihood of voting in the 2019 General Election) 
based on variance across the different variable treatments for news story intensity, location 
and actor nationality.241  After the ANOVA tests were performed, any tests yielding 
significant variance results across the subgroups were subjected to follow-up two-sample t-
tests to determine which treatment conditions were more or less significant in producing the 
significant divergences observed in the ANOVA testing.  A summary of these combined 
results is provided below, in Table 6-D.  A detailed discussion of the individual tests and 
results is provided in the next section.  
  
                                                                                       
241 While the regression results indicated that the news story responses were not significant contributors 
to the primary dependent participation outcome among the Native respondents, these additional steps 
sought to understand if, under certain conditions stemming from intensity, location or actor nationality, 
these story treatment scenarios could have been more significant. 
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Table 6-D: Summary of Variables Impacting Survey Respondents’ Sensitivity to 
Embedded News Story Treatments 
 Variable Treatment 
Significant Differences based 
on Treatment from ANOVA 
Test? 
No. of Significant T-Test 
Pairs Results? 
    Native Sample NRI Sample Native Sample NRI Sample 
NEWS STORY 
INTEREST 
News Story 
Intensity NO YES -- 3 
  
News Story 
Location NO YES -- 3 
  
News Story 
Actor NO YES -- 2 
NEWS STORY 
SHARING 
News Story 
Intensity NO YES -- 3 
  
News Story 
Location NO YES -- 2 
  
News Story 
Actor NO NO -- -- 
PRIMARY 
PARTICIPATION 
OUTCOME 
News Story 
Intensity NO YES -- 1 
  
News Story 
Location NO YES -- 2 
  
News Story 
Actor NO YES -- 2 
 
Discussion 
 
It is useful to return to the hypotheses that framed this project in order to better 
understand the results and any potential insights that can be distilled.  The first hypothesis 
(H0) held that migration, identity negotiation and mediascape navigation have no discernible 
effect on political participation.  The second hypothesis (H1) posited that migration, identity 
negotiation and mediascape navigation would positively influence diasporic participation in 
homeland politics.  Finally, the third hypothesis (H2) predicted a negative impact on the 
emigrant sample of these three processes on participatory behavior with respect to homeland 
politics. 
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The Event of Geographic Migration 
 
 Upon initial review, it could be argued that the event of geographic migration—and 
the ensuing separation—negatively impacts diasporic participation in homeland politics.  The 
survey results produced a significant means difference in likelihood to vote in the 2019 
general election between the Native and NRI groups, with a higher mean for the Native 
sample.242  First, this may simply reflect the practical logistical difficulties of travel, as 
opposed to any form of lesser intent or desire.  Second, the NRI sample population was also 
characterized by a positive relationship between the independent variable for interest in 
absentee voting and likelihood of future participation.243  Third, attitudes about migration 
were included in the survey—and the migration impetus variable did not register as 
significant in predicting future diasporic political participation.   
 Concerning the possibility that the civic life variables mentioned earlier may 
ultimately influence migration in some form, it should be noted that, as illustrated above in 
Table 6-A, there was significant divergence between the Native and NRI samples with 
respect to civic communication (negative for the Native sample; positive for the NRI 
sample), civic values (positive for the Native sample; negative for the NRI sample) and civic 
participation (negative for the Native sample; positive for the NRI sample).  One possibility 
is that that civic communication results in more substantive conversations across NRI’s 
personal and professional social networks in the adoptive society (from the perspective of 
conversations that build propensity for future participatory action).  This logic comports 
with studies by Clifford, Hamburger and Hyatt, Huan, et al., Karim and Tillema, et al., all of 
                                                                                       
242 Native (µ = 4.424), NRI (µ = 4.034), p < 0.0001 
243 P = 7.29 X 10-08 
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whom highlight the connection between online activity, more vibrant social connectivity 
and, ultimately, greater access to social capital.244  It is also possible that the content of civic 
communication among the Native sample (a setting from which NRIs find themselves 
largely excised) is of a suitably discouraging nature that it might inhibit expectations of future 
participation.  This possibly contradicts Wellman’s notion of digital networks offering readily 
accessible connections to like-minded users and the ensuing creation of social ties.245  
Regarding the divergence on civic values, one explanation is that dislocation and exposure to 
an environment that comports with higher reported civic value perceptions casts the 
homeland’s political environment as somehow deficient, and perhaps less worthy of targeted 
participation.  Essentially, migration exposes NRIs to new standards of civic life, and the 
civic environment of India no longer invites the same level of participatory enthusiasm.  
Turning to civic participation, the negative content or tone of such activities might explain 
why it exhibits a negative relationship with the dependent variable across the Native sample.  
This would be consistent with arguments about the dissuading impact of breaches to 
expectations of respect and decorum made by Mallapragada.246  As with the earlier example, 
it is possible that NRIs find themselves in an arguably higher functioning civic environment, 
which fosters greater expectations of participation.  Against the backdrop of these dynamics, 
it is interesting to observe that institutional trust positively influenced participation across 
the Native sample, but not the NRI sample—and the Native sample reported higher levels 
of institutional trust (with a significant mean differential vis-à-vis the NRI respondents).247  
                                                                                       
244 Clifford (1994), Hamburger & Hyatt (2011), Huan et al (2012), Karim (1998), Tillema et al. (2010) 
245 Wellman (2001) 
246 Mallapragada (2006) 
247 The institutional trust questions, for both Native and NRI samples, measured attitudes about 
institutions in India only. 
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Perhaps the comparatively lower levels of institutional trust, made possible through the act 
of migration, are also a function of exposure to newer, and arguably better functioning, 
administrative and civic organs. 
Additionally, the news sensitivity analysis showed that while event location was 
significant in influencing news story interest and propensity to share via social media 
channels, the homeland and US-based conditions elicited higher reported levels of interest 
among the NRI populations than general international events.  This suggests that rather than 
being disconnected by geographic migration, the NRI population is perhaps somehow being 
underserved in terms of meaningful outreach, an argument addressed in Chapter 7. 
Identity Negotiation 
 
The results from this survey suggest that identity-based variables are not significant 
predictors of diasporic participation in homeland politics.  This rationale and the literature 
addressing identity tend to cite the resilience of familial, religious, and other community 
structures, as well as the enduring impact of education and socioeconomic status, frequently 
in the context of difficulties achieving economic, social or political incorporation.  Fernandes 
has discussed natural resistance of NRIs to incorporation, Gillespie and Cheesman cite 
concerns over the erosion of culture, and Mitra and Thompson have each addressed the 
resilience of preexisting constructs and community structures.248  Socioeconomic status 
registered as a significant variable only for the Native sample, but not the NRI sample.  
Curiously, the Native sample reported higher self-reported socioeconomic status, generating 
                                                                                       
248 Fernandes 2000; Gillespie Cheesman (2002); Mitra (2005); Thompson (2002) 
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a significant means differential.249  However, the entirety of the NRI sample was in the 
process of attaining a bachelor’s degree, or had already done so (and in many cases attained 
further education).  The Native sample, though certainly more educated than the general 
Indian population, was significantly more dispersed than the NRI sample.250  This significant 
means differential across the indexed socioeconomic measurement is due to the Native 
samples higher self-reported perception of its own wealth, not educational background.  
Indexed identity (which assessed religion and caste) did not register as a significant 
variable for either sample group.  Also, the news sensitivity analysis revealed that actor 
nationality was the less significant an influence on new story interest, sharing and projected 
participation when compared with intensity or location.  In fact, there was no significant 
impact of news actor nationality on news story sharing.  While an initial reflex might be to 
dismiss identity’s influence outright, it should be noted that identity, while not explicitly 
contributing to the primary dependent participation outcome, may nevertheless may play an 
intermediate role due to other correlations such as access to civic participation avenues, 
social capital or media resources themselves.  Conversely, the civic life variable that were 
significant may impact identity perception, negotiation and processes of incorporation. 
With regards to an intervening role in civic participation, it is again worth noting that 
all three of the civic life variables were found to be significant.  Brubaker and Durham have 
both separately noted that diasporic populations often shift from majority to minority 
status.251  The potential impact of such a shift on civic communication, participation and 
                                                                                       
249 The t-test demonstrating this is provided in Appendix E. 
250 The numerical breakdown of the respondents answers to these questions is provided in Appendix F. 
251 Brubaker (2006); Durham (2004) 
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values is worth consideration—as argued by Armstrong, minority status could directly 
impact the availability and shape of mobilization opportunities.252    
Mediascape Navigation 
 
 While much of the literature takes the link between media access and participation as 
a given (including with respect to diaspora engagement with homeland politics), the results 
of this study suggest a significantly more complex picture.  While expectations surrounding 
future social media platform usage are positively predictive of future political participation 
across both the Native and NRI samples, this is not the case for reported current usage.  
Social media platform usage has a negative effect on NRI’s projected future participation.  
Complicating the analysis even further, the NRI sample reports higher mean levels of usage 
for itself.  Why would greater present use of social media platforms depress expected future 
participation?  This seemingly contradicts findings of a broad swath of literature which 
posits that online networking increases social capital.253  Shah, et al. distinguish between 
informational and social or recreational usage, arguing that social usage is less likely to 
generate social capital, which raises additional questions about the findings from the news 
sensitivity study, where the NRI respondents demonstrated greater interest in harder news 
stories, but nevertheless ultimately displayed a negative relationship between social media 
usage and participation.  Perhaps a necessary line of inquiry is to question the actual strength 
of the links between the existing conceptions of “social capital” and actual participatory 
                                                                                       
252 Armstrong (1976) 
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Lampe (2007, 2011); Nisbet, et al. (2012); Shah, et al. (201l); Steinfield, Ellison, & Lampe (2008); 
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activity.   
Additional mediascape relevant questions perhaps provide some clues.  For the NRI 
population, the independent variables for news story interest and expectations for news story 
sharing were significant contributors to future participation in the regression analysis.  
However, as illustrated in the news sensitivity results, the impact of news intensity and 
location appears to not carry over as robustly from generating interest and sharing to 
generating participation.  However, the news experiment also showed that the NRI sample 
expressed higher mean interest and sharing inclination to higher intensity news stories as 
compared to softer stories.   
Looking at the divergence of news sensitivity at a higher level, the Native sample was 
unaffected in almost all scenarios, whereas the NRI sample exhibited positive sensitivity to 
the treatment parameters with respect to interest, sharing and participation (even if less 
robustly than with interest and sharing).  This may suggest that the general underlying 
content engagement patterns of Native and NRI respondents are different. 
While general usage of social media platforms has a negative effect, the regression 
results suggest that specifically engaging content is more likely to, in turn, have a positive 
effect on future participation.  Once again, this alludes to the notion that rather than being 
disinterested, the Indian diaspora is not being as constructively engaged as it could be.   This 
contention is consistent with the divergent effects of actual current social media engagement 
and expected future social media engagement.  Simply put, present use falls short of 
generalized (and possibly more optimistic) expectations of future engagement that would 
positively impact future participation. 
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Situating Preexisting Civic Ideals and Activities 
 
 One of the biggest challenges in the framing of this study was to adopt a framework 
that allowed for the necessary consideration of multiple civic engagement and participation 
measures, but to do so in a way that did not convolute problem structuring to the point that 
understanding the individual impact of the key geography, identity and mediascape 
navigation factors was not compromised.  This is a vexing task because civic engagement 
and participation are embedded across all planes and strata of the mediascape.  This is ever 
more the case as traditional communication methods are seamlessly integrated into digital 
platforms, and as device convergence blends the functionality of personal, professional and 
political life.  However, in the interests of balancing the desire to examine the main 
hypotheses with an approach that did not neglect undeniably critical inputs into political 
participation, civic communication, values, participation and institutional trust were included 
as independent variables in the regression model.  This proved to be an important choice, as 
three of these four variables were found to be significant to both samples, and institutional 
trust was found to be significant to the Native respondents.  Interestingly, the Native sample 
not only exhibited a positive relationship with the influence of institutional trust, but actually 
exhibited higher, and statistically significant, mean ratings in this area.254  Conversely, while 
expressing less institutional trust, the NRI sample expressed higher support for generic civic 
values and obligations—but this variable was found to have a negative effect on future 
participation.  Once again, this divergence (the gap in institutional trust being a possible 
indicator) suggests that while the NRI samples personal motivations point towards features 
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that ought to correlate with greater participation, some avenue of engagement is lacking.  
This is consistent with arguments made, primarily in the context of remittances and the 
limited nature of property and political rights, by Kapur, Kumar and Thomas and Lessinger, 
all of whom have expressed that while communication may enable active participation on 
the part of the diaspora, it is hampered by imposed limitations and conflicting priorities by 
actors inside India.255 
 With respect to the study hypotheses, the results of this study are mixed.  When 
originally formulated, the schematic framing of the key questions considered whether 
identity, migration and mediascape navigation were acting, in concert, to produce positive, 
negative, or neutral participation outcomes.  Clearly, these three factors do not act in 
concert—they may be linked with one another, particularly as mediated through the complex 
lattice of the various civic life independent variables, but they each exhibit independent 
elements of impact and directionality.  Additionally, the impact of these factors on the 
Native and NRI samples is not consistent.  The regression helped identify some of these 
patterns, but also raised additional, deeper questions about the nature and role of media 
content through both the survey and the news experiment.  In particular, while the 
regression illustrates the significance of mediascape navigation on political participation, any 
initial interpretation of identity and migration as non-factors may be premature.  The 
additional depth of the news experiment yielded an important facet to consider alongside the 
regression results—the mediascape may be replete with enough stimuli to interest, entice and 
engage NRIs, but it may not necessarily be inviting more concrete participation.  
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CH 7: APPLICATIONS AND RECKONING: THE STATE-DIASPORA 
NEXUS, MODI-MANIA AND THE ROAD TO THE 2014 GENERAL 
ELECTION 
 
“[F]ew will deny that given the problems of time, distance, and limited 
technologies for the command of resources across vast spaces, cultural dealings 
between socially and spatially separated groups have, until the past few centuries, 
been bridged at great cost and sustained over time only with great effort.”256 
From the standpoint of economic vitality, geopolitical access and general cultural 
capital, it is arguably in the interests of the Government of India (GOI) to develop and 
maintain strong links with its global diaspora.  For no sub-segment of the global diaspora is 
this more the case than for NRIs and PIOs living in the United States.  As discussed earlier, 
their professional communities, economic resources and social capital offer a host of 
benefits beyond remittances within family community-based networks.  However, as the 
results of this project illustrate, interest and concern is not necessarily aligning with the 
opportunities for broader engagement.  For a deeper understanding of how, why and under 
what circumstances the present situation of incomplete transnational connectivity has 
developed, it is useful to apply some elements of the theoretical framework of this project to 
the Government of India (and its associated structures).  Whereas the historical vignettes 
and survey approaches examined diasporic participation in homeland politics from the 
perspective of émigrés, discussion of the Indian government’s role in the mediascape of its 
diaspora, through official policies and practices, agencies, and digital communication tools, is 
warranted. 
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GOI Policies and Initiatives Concerning Citizenship 
 
As addressed earlier, India’s central government has been historically reticent to 
extend the rights and privileges of citizenship to its Overseas community for a variety of 
security-related and domestic political concerns.257  However, in response to ongoing 
pressure form the NRI community—particularly amidst the backdrop of growing 
remittances and direct cash appeals from the Indian government—the Government 
established the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora in 2000.258 259  Their report, 
drafted throughout 2001 and released in 2002, represented one of the first truly 
comprehensive attempts by the Indian government to assess, measure and understand the 
diaspora, not only in terms of size, scope and dispersion, but also with respect to concerns 
and desired outcomes.  One of the issues raised was the contentious issue of citizenship.  
The Committee noted that members of the diaspora wished for the Indian Government to 
extend dual citizenship privileges.260  Kapur argues that the incentives of engaging the 
diaspora outweigh the risks.  He writes: 
“In the matter of political rights, the diaspora has strongly pressed for dual 
citizenship. India would not be exceptional in this regard and many countries 
have moved to do so in recent years. The experience of other countries 
around the world has shown that there is little downside in this proposal with 
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an important caveat: political rights inherent in dual citizenship must exclude 
the right to vote unless India can extend a form of the Bhagwati tax, i.e., a 
tax on citizens abroad akin to what the United States currently practices. 
First, as a practical matter it is procedurally very difficult in a parliamentary 
system, since voters have to be resident in a specific geographical location. 
More importantly, rights without obligations are deeply problematic. The 
contract of citizenship entails two critical obligations on the part of the 
citizen, namely, taxes and military service. The diaspora is unlikely to look 
kindly on either. However, unless there is a tax obligation, dual citizenship 
should not carry with it the right to vote since it could perversely lead to a 
situation of representation without taxation. NRIs would do well to 
remember that citizenship is a social contract and if it brings with it certain 
rights it also brings with it certain duties and obligations.”261 
 
Kapur’s admonition about the risks of a Baghwati practice is particularly relevant in light of 
the financial focus of prior direct monetary appeals during various crises and emergencies 
referenced earlier.  However, the last portion of his quote rights and mutual obligations 
speaks to the complex balancing act at the heart of GOI policy on the matter of dual 
citizenship.  In principle, the Committee agreed, and the framework was developed for 
amending the strict Citizenship Act of 1955 towards what would ultimately become India’s 
revised Person of Indian Origin (PIO) Scheme and a new Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) 
Scheme.262   
Persons of Indian Origin 
 
The PIO Scheme was introduced in 1999 are made available to former citizens of 
India, up to three generations of direct blood descendants of citizens, and qualifying spouses 
of citizens.263  PIO cards are valid for 15 years and allow for a number of benefits, including: 
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multi-year, multiple entry visas, rights to property purchases and transfers, and the extension 
of educational enrollment and banking rights normally extended to NRI citizens.  However, 
the Ministry of External Affairs, in its 2001 Committee Report, cited a lack of enthusiasm 
for the program.  Interestingly, while they considered the associated fees, timelines and 
procedures, not once does their report reference any potential gaps in disseminating and 
promoting the PIO Scheme.264 
Overseas Citizens of India265 
 
Following the recommendations of the Committee and the perceived lack of “an 
enthusiastic response” of the diaspora, the Government of India began developing a more 
robust Overseas Citizen of India Scheme.  In a number of areas, NRIs, even those 
maintaining their citizenship, are subject to restrictions across a broad span of financial, 
educational, public service, and political rights.  Most notably, NRIs were not eligible to 
vote—even if physically present—until the 2014 General Election.  And again, as noted at 
numerous points herein and elsewhere, there is currently no mechanism for absentee voting 
in place.  A 2006 measure in the Upper House of Indian Parliament to allow NRIs to appear 
physically to cast votes in person collapsed owing to concerns about national security, undue 
influence and general “disturbance in the environment of elections.”266  Indeed the specter 
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of prior diasporic insertion in domestic conflicts presented itself during these proceedings.  
Xavier explains how, not only politicians wary of outside influence, but also segments of the 
public continued to stigmatize the extension of participatory rights decades later.  He 
explains: 
“This intense hostility against the possibility of extending voting rights even 
to Indian citizens who just happen to reside outside India is further reinforced 
by the negative memory of separatist insurgencies, such as the Khalistan 
movement in Punjab during the 1980s, that were supported and financed by 
radical sectors of the diaspora.”267 (emphasis in original) 
 
Further complicating matters is the profound inconsistency of the Government India itself 
with respect to its own policies, rhetoric, interpretation and communication patterns on the 
matter of PIO and OCI protocols and privileges.  In the years between 2002 and 2006, when 
the OCI Scheme was under development, the Prime Minister of India went as far as to 
announce that Government of India had adopted the HLDC’s recommendation to “permit 
dual citizenship” for NRIs in certain countries.268  Whether or not the Prime Minister 
understood or misinterpreted this as such is not the issue—the legislation itself is 
ambiguous.  It did actually include language explaining that the standing Citizenship Act of 
1955 was being amended to “make provisions for the grant of dual citizenship.”269  
However, a closer read of the OCI provisions reveals that it is not truly akin to any form of 
dual citizenship.  First, while an OCI is eligible to apply for Indian citizenship, they must 
surrender their existing foreign passport—this alone fully undermines the very notion of 
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dual citizenship.  The OCI “passport” is, as Xavier describes, “at most, another possible type 
of naturalization.”270  Moreover, this alternate form of naturalization is unilaterally revocable 
by the Indian government.271  Most importantly—and most relevant to the instant matters at 
hand—while the PIO and OCI programs extended a number of personal, economic and 
social benefits to cardholders, from unlimited entry and transit, to adoption rights, to labor 
market participation privileges, to school enrollment access (including the IITs and other 
prominent government institutions), neither addressed two of the most arguably critical 
elements of political participation: voting and holding elected office.   
 
A new Congress government, as part of its slow, ongoing rapprochement with 
respect to the diaspora, established a dedicated Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) 
in 2004.272  The purpose of this body was specifically focused on the diaspora.  However, in 
2016, the successor BJP government, folded the operations of MOIA back into the general 
operations of the Ministry of External Affairs.273  This is a puzzling move for a party that, in 
large part, is widely recognized as a proactive, constructive partner with the diaspora. 
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The BJP and the Diaspora 
 
The currently ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was swept back into control of 
India’s Parliament in 2014, following 10 years of control by the Indian National Congress 
(Congress, or INC).  Since the early 1990s, BJP and Congress have each been at the center 
of leading broad coalition governments, but as parties their historical legacies and 
development pathways differ considerably.  Congress carries the legacy of being the 
vanguard political party of India’s Independence movement, and the home of the Nehru-
Gandhi dynasty.  Congress-led governments led India for almost the entirety of its political 
life from 1947 to the mid-1990s.  While the INC enjoys support across most of India’s 
geography, as well as across many of its minority constituencies, it does not enjoy the 
geographic locks of the BJP (North-Central) or the dominant ethnolinguistic Dravidian 
parties (South).274   The INC still enjoys a broad base of support, and advertises a 
commitment to secular pluralism as one of its core tenets.275  The BJP was officially 
established in 1980, but can trace its origins to the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS), an umbrella 
organization for a number of Hindu nationalist organizations.276  The party emerged as the 
chief opposition to Congress in the early 1990s during the Ayodhya conflict, and has enjoyed 
its greatest electoral strength in the “Hindi Belt” of northern India.  In contrast with 
Congress’ commitment to secularism, the BJP positioned itself as an overtly Hindu 
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nationalist party.277  In recent years certain aspects of its posture have softened in attempts to 
leverage a more broad-based nationalism, but the its organizational history and sustained 
rhetoric of Hindutva continues to foment opposition, particularly given Narendra Modi’s 
controversial tenure as the Chief Minister of Gujarat.278   
India’s 2014 General Election featured the two largest political parties in a new 
competitive scenario—for the first time, both parties were led by de facto chiefs: Modi for 
the BJP, and Rahul Gandhi for Congress.  The campaign was noted, among other things, 
specifically for the extensive rollout of social media strategy and outreach, as well for the 
BJP’s courting of the Indian diaspora.279 
It is not mere coincidence that the BJP finds itself simultaneously at the forefront of 
discussions and coverage regarding digital communication and engagement with the 
diaspora.  Harmonious with opposition to the dynastic entrenchment of the Nehru-Gandhi 
dynasty and the Indian National Congress, which found new openings in the wake of 
Emergency Rule from 1975-1977, advocating for the active embrace of the diaspora (in 
contrast with the Government’s longstanding arms-length policies) became a mechanism 
through which other parties, most notably the Janata Party and the BJP, could raise their 
own profiles.280   
In more recent years, the BJP’s efforts have simultaneously focused on competing 
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against the Indian National Congress’ longstanding prominence in the public mind (and in 
the diaspora’s mind) as well as on softening and legitimizing its image as a hardline 
nationalist party.  Participation by the diaspora has featured prominently in these efforts—
and the emergent sphere of new media technologies have slowly matured into a central 
platform of transnational interactivity.  Moreover, the globalism that is so embedded in the 
digital network ecosystem is similarly concordant with the rise of BJP-style Hindutva.  
According to Biswas, “The growth of Hindu nationalism in the United States has been well 
suited to an era of globalization.”281  In tracing the growth of various Hindu-centric 
organizations across the NRI/PIO community in the United States, Biswas illustrates 
important links between offline civic networks and the broader global framework of 
interconnectivity.  He explains:   
“In mobilizing funds, the Sangh parivar is able to get tremendous support 
from Hindu expatriates because of its market friendly economic policies. It 
has also built upon the model minority status accorded to the successful and 
affluent Indian expatriate community.”282  
 
The integrated framework described by Biswas, in which market-friendly economics 
constitute a common fulcrum, can attract a broad base of involvement due to the diverse 
facets of activities, is also relevant to the hypotheses of the present study, in which concepts 
such as international trade, investment, social capital and transnational communication are 
necessarily connected to evolving digital communication channels and political participation 
                                                                                       
281 Biswas, B. (2004), “Nationalism by proxy: A comparison of social movements among diaspora Sikhs 
and Hindus,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10(2): 276 
282 Biswas (2004), p. 278.  The Sangh Parivar refers to the broader umbrella of the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh 
(RSS), the parent organization of the BJP and other civic, political, trade and cultural groups, both in India 
and around the world.  “Parivar” properly translates as “family,” and is colloquially used to refer to the 
collective body of RSS and BJP-associated organizations worldwide. 
 139 
by the diaspora.  This sentiment is corroborated by Chakravarty and Roy.  They explain: 
“In sum, in the Indian case, we see a coincidence of media and economic 
liberalization (as distinct from both the European and Latin American 
examples of mediated populism).  The privatized commercial media are 
today the enthusiastic champions of a new idea of “aspirational people” 
against “the moribund socialist state,” and politicians seeking to push 
forward this idea thus find a natural ally in this new media formation.”283 
(emphasis in original) 
 
The BJP is specifically representative of certain dynamics that echo the results of the NRI 
survey and news sensitivity analysis conducted earlier, and an examination of their recent 
competitive triumphs and trajectories illustrates that many of their successes provide insights 
that corroborate some of the significant findings of this study.  Additionally, elements of the 
results of this study expose potential vulnerabilities for an organization and movement that 
are, by conventional popular accounts, enjoying a flourish of diaspora-bonded, media-centric 
achievements. 
First, the positioning of the BJP is largely akin to positioning across the various 
layers of the mediascape framework that permeates this study.  Their outreach to, and 
relationship with, the diaspora (either directly or indirectly through other various parivar-
linked organizations) relies on a complex mix of online and offline channels.  As described 
by Biswas, their emergence and legitimization has been helped in large part by the civic 
activities of the diaspora in the United States (and elsewhere).  Additionally, the diaspora is 
believed to be responsible for a disproportionately significant share of the broader BJP 
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digital presence.284  Popular coverage this varied lattice of activities provides many examples 
of a complex relationship network that is embedded across social media platforms.  Figure 
7.1, below, is excerpted from a BJP supporter in the United States, who wrote in detail about 
his experience on a personal blog following the 2014 General Election.   
Figure 7.1: State-Diaspora Coordination Across the Mediascape 
 
As this figure illustrates, platforms such as Whatsapp, Facebook, Twitter and Google 
Hangouts were enmeshed amidst formal organizations such as the Overseas Friends of the 
BJP, the India272+ Campaign (272 being a reference to minimum number of seats necessary 
to attain a Parliamentary majority).  Indraneil Gokhale, the author of the blog, also provides 
rich detail about his experiences, which illustrate the considerable potential of the diaspora 
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to involve themselves in political activity.  Ultimately, this web of niched online faculties was 
deployed for a longstanding tool of campaign outreach: phone calls.  In this case, however, 
the phone calls were transnational, and the volunteers were NRIs.  He describes his role as 
part of a “sleeper cell” that was “ready to strike” when given “marching orders.”  Gokhale 
explains: 
“It started with brainstorming of OFBJP (Overseas Friends of Bhartiya Janta 
Party) members through a series of weekly google hangouts on how to 
effectively contribute towards getting BJP to power.  Then, there were two 
obvious things NRIs could do - One, call back home and convince people to 
register to vote and vote for Narendra Modi.  Two, donate to the NaMo for 
PM fund.”285 
 
 He continues, explaining that an informal online gathering of NRIs led to them 
contemplating more substantive ways that they could contribute to the BJP’s election efforts.  
Gokhale writes: 
“The simple idea of making calls back to family & friends in India was 
modified into a hectic-strategic master plan. They say, a successful project 
has many fathers whereas an unsuccessful one is a bastard child. This plan, 
what we called "India Calling" had many fathers (who not only initiated the 
idea but, worked as the strong back-end support team).  
 
We worked like a makeshift start-up company, only that, all of us were in 
different locations, with real day jobs to go to (except Samar, he had all the 
time in the world - he's a student ;)). It's strange that I really don't recall how this 
team came into existence. One Saturday, when we met on a google hangout to discuss 
elections, we thought of how we could genuinely contribute as NRIs instead of token 
participation (like donation and clicking pictures of group outings showcasing 
NRI unity behind NaMo) and the "India Calling" campaign took shape. 
Typical to BJP style, our campaign was done at many lateral levels. It's very 
difficult to enumerate all of them but some key items were: India Calling, 
Organize NaMo Chai Parties & eventually contribute for the party, 
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'Hangouts' with right-wing Intellectuals & publishing BJP leaning articles in 
the print media. The most effective, even though it was not noticed by media 
in India was – India Calling.”286 (emphasis added) 
 
Several important observations can be distilled from Gokhale’s account that speak directly to 
the results observed in the course of the present study.  On one hand, access to, and 
faculties for, civic engagement with others in the NRI community would have been 
undoubtedly necessary for Gokhale and his colleagues to carry out their plan.  This is 
consistent with the findings that, among the NRI respondents, civic communication and 
civic participation are positively significant with projected participation.  However, it should 
be noted that their India Calling campaign, despite whatever other connectivity they had to 
more formal structures or platforms, appears to be generated based on their own initiative.  
This is consistent with a group that may have developed specific news story interests and 
which shares news information—again, variables that were flagged as significant based on 
the regression results.  While impossible to know for certain, it is interesting to ponder how 
Gokhale and his colleagues would process the possibility of acting on the option to vote via 
absentee ballot.  He specifically references the desire to “genuinely contribute” rather than 
simply offer “token participation.” 
The BJP’s embrace of digital platforms was the specific subject of extensive 
journalistic coverage before, during and after the 2014 General Election campaign.  The 
Mission 272+ Facebook campaign was launched late in 2013, more than 6 months before 
the Election.  Shortly after, an Android App was developed for BJP supporters to enlist 
                                                                                       
286 Ibid. 
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volunteers and solicit donations.287  Narendra Modi’s Twitter account, already established in 
2009, grew to be the most followed in India and one of the most followed in the world (with 
respect to political leaders).288  In the month preceding the May 2014 vote, his campaign 
promoted the #SelfieWithModi hashtag, wherein submitted selfies were amassed into online 
mosaic photos of supporters that were in turn shared publicly.  Online, Modi’s team 
pioneered the repeat use of holographical projections of speeches to multiple venues 
simultaneously.289   
Throughout this period, there was also persistent attention to Modi’s embrace of the 
diaspora.  “Chai fundraisers,” informal gatherings of NRIs across the United States, were 
frequently organized online, building donation activity as well as follow-on volunteerism that 
involved voter outreach to family and friends back in India.290  Form a competitive 
standpoint, the BJP’s lead over Congress in terms of diaspora engagement, both online and 
offline, was also noted.  Additionally, whereas Modi had maintained a Twitter presence since 
2009, Rahul Gandhi the de facto leader of the Indian National Congress, did not join the 
platform until almost a year after the election.  Whereas the Overseas Friends of the BJP 
boasted 18 U.S. chapters, over 5,000 claimed members, and a steady web presence, no 
substantive corresponding online presence can be found for the equivalent diaspora arm of 
                                                                                       
287 Chitrao, P. (2015), “Leadership Communication Strategies for Establishing Social Harmony and 
Sustainable Development–Mr. Narendra Modi as a Case Study,” Indian Journal of Science and Technology, 
8(S6), pp. 21-22. 
288 Pal, J. (2015), “Banalities Turned Viral: Narendra Modi and the Political Tweet,” Television & New 
Media, 16(4), 378-387. 
289 Chitrao, P. (2015), pp. 21-22. 
290 Thacker, Purvi, “US chai fundraisers help finance Modi wave,” Al Jazeera, Apr. 25, 2014, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/us-groups-overseas-funds-modi-
2014417102320868846.html  
 
 144 
Congress.291  Most notably, Modi, who had been denied a visa to visit the United States in 
2002, returned as Prime Minister to address an audience of NRIs at Madison Square Garden 
in September of 2014.292 
Modi-Mania and the Diaspora: A Twitter Tangent  
 
 Given the widely observable gaps between the BJP and Congress with respect to 
online presence and adoption of tools, a brief analysis was conducted to confirm a simple 
hypothesis: given the broad attention to Modi and his digitally astute embrace of the 
diaspora, one should expect a similarly robust embrace of the diaspora through his hugely 
popular Twitter account.  In order to test this proposition, the full Twitter feeds of Narendra 
Modi and Rahul Gandhi were collected for the period from April 1, 2015 to April 1, 2017.293  
The following terms were search for throughout the date-limited volume of both feeds: 
i. “NRI”; 
ii. “PIO”; 
iii. “OCI”; 
iv. “overseas” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); 
v. “abroad” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); 
                                                                                       
291 Ibid. (“The INOC (I) website has scant evidence of up-to-date or coordinated activity, its Facebook 
page has barely 200 likes, and there has been no Twitter activity. Its US members join chapters that 
accord with their Indian state of origin, and sporadic updates suggest this division has made their activities 
and lobbying initiatives more individual.”) 
292 Yee, V., “At Madison Square Garden, Chants, Cheers and Roars for Modi,” New York Times, Sep. 28, 
2014, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/nyregion/at-madison-square-garden-chants-
cheers-and-roars-for-modi.html  
293 Twitter’s Advanced Search feature now allows for the collection of complete, uncapped feed segments 
within specified dates.  However, it does not provide its own export or download protocols—Tweets 
were manually collected and the positive search results (based on the keywords listed above) are provided 
in Appendix G.  Other collection tools (e.g. Tweetdeck) allow for export, but limit collection to 
approximately 3,200 Tweets.  For this reason, manual collection was conducted in order to obtain a 
complete file. 
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vi. “community” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); and/or 
vii. “pardesi” (this word literally translates as “one who is outside of India,” but 
is colloquially used both in the generic sense as well as in specific reference to 
NRIs). 
The results of this exercise are provided in Table 7-A, below. 
Table 7-A: Comparison of Twitter Feed Content Referencing the Diaspora (2015 – 
2017) 
  
NARENDRA MODI 
 
 
RAHUL GANDHI 
 
Total No. Collected Tweets 
 
 
2967 
 
1155 
 
Total No. Tweets Referencing the 
Diaspora (Based on 7 Keywords) 
 
 
27 
 
0 
 
This simple count of keyword-positive corroborates the gap in both digital platform activity 
as well as diasporic engagement observed elsewhere.  Whereas the BJP has built a 
substantive online gap vis-à-vis Congress in recent years, this brief examination raises 
important consideration for additional discussion in light of the survey and news sensitivity 
results.  First, the success of the BJP in courting the diaspora invites questions concerning 
the seemingly insignificant role of identity in fostering participation.  One perspective is that 
the Hindutva message resonates with NRIs, and they are, in fact attracted to the BJP based 
on deeply shared identity markers.  This is difficult to assess because Congress has not made 
real efforts to court the diaspora—at least not in recent years.  Another possibility is that the 
BJP, consistent with its historical outreach through linked organizations, has successfully 
managed to deploy itself as a broader, business-friendly, nationalist enterprise that appeals to 
multiple sensibilities that are both resonant with the fiscal and entrepreneurial leanings of 
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many NRIs and dispersed across modes of social connectivity beyond Hindutva messaging.  
A third possibility is that the BJP’s outreach to the diaspora is benefitting from a significant 
frameshift of NRI attitudes based on migration rather than identity.  As discussed earlier, 
some of the divergences observed with respect to civic life independent variables could be 
influenced by changing contextual frameworks of how NRIs perceive their sociopolitical 
milieu from their positioning inside their adoptive society instead of from their homeland.  
In another geopolitical region, the BJPs qualities as a nationalist organization may eclipse its 
attributes as a religious organization.  Lastly, a fourth possibility is that, irrespective of 
Congress’ non-participation in transnational endeavors, the BJP’s digital communication 
strategy and courting of diaspora is actually effective as envisioned, and represents its 
successful navigation of the mediascape to this end.  Whether the BJP’s success in engaging 
the diaspora speaks more to factors of identity, migration, or mediascape navigation, a 
critical question is whether the momentum of transnational engagement is harnessed and 
converted into more direct participation by the diaspora. 
The Unclear Future of Absentee Voting by NRIs 
 
While the 2010 Representation of the People Act made an allowance for NRIs to 
vote, it also required that they be physically present in India.  In the months preceding the 
2014 General Election, it was estimated that fewer than 12,000 NRIs had even registered to 
vote as Overseas voters.294  Early in 2015, in a major development in the long term political 
life of the Indian electorate, the Indian Election Commission informed the Supreme Court 
                                                                                       
294 Malhotra, A., “Overseas Voting in Indian Elections: What to Know,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 
2015, available at: https://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2015/01/13/overseas-voting-in-indian-elections-
what-to-know/  
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of India that NRIs can indeed vote—from abroad.295  Furthermore, the potential absentee 
provisions include proxy voting and e-ballots.296 
The specific provisions and actual enactment of absentee voting for NRIs are yet to 
materialize.  However, more than any other Indian government to date, the current Prime 
Minister and ruling party are positioned at a unique confluence of their own outlook, broad 
NRI interest, digital acumen and the political capital to act on it.  Based on the BJP’s 
engagement to date, which includes diasporic engagement before, during and after the 
Election cycle, it is reasonable to project that the Modi government would not stand in the 
way of the development of NRI absentee voting protocols, particularly given their existing 
communications and engagement advantage as compared to their political rivals. 
There are, of course, any number of scenarios in which NRI absentee voting could 
be stymied.  Longstanding patterns of opposition to extending citizenship rights could 
resurface, based on concerns over sovereignty, cooption, security or corruption.  
Furthermore, external events such a macroeconomic slowdown, a major political crisis such 
as a corruption scandal or an armed conflict with Pakistan could unseat the uniquely NRI-
friendly Modi government.  Another less dramatic, but very real, possibility is that the BJP 
simply loses its comparative digital and diaspora advantages.  Extensive popular press 
coverage observed the significant digital advantages enjoyed in the United States by the 
                                                                                       
295 Mahapatral, D., “NRIs can now vote in Indian elections without coming here,” Times of India, Jan. 13, 
2015, available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/NRIs-can-now-vote-in-Indian-elections-
without-coming-here/articleshow/45862058.cms  
296 Ibid.  See, also Rajagopal, K., “NRIs can vote from abroad: govt. tells SC,” The Hindu, Jan 12, 2015, 
available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nris-can-vote-through-postal-
ballots/article6780906.ece  
 
 148 
Democratic Party since approximately 2008.297  This advantage, however, did not ultimately 
sustain electoral leads.  The BJP is similarly vulnerable, just as any ruling party is.  The tools 
for diasporic connectivity (and broader digital immersion in general) are neither expensive 
nor rare.  There is no reason to suspect that the Indian National Congress will not eventually 
seek to compete and close these gaps.  Lastly, the BJP benefitted from a decade as an 
“underdog” opposition party, allowing it to develop a variety of alternate mechanism outside 
the entrenched channels of Indian state media and legacy journalism.298 
If the BJP, its rivals, or the Indian state more generally are interested in maximizing 
its gains from the economic and cultural production of the diaspora, it cannot indefinitely 
postpone embracing the political production of the diaspora.  As such, attention to the 
factors that positively and negatively impact participation—those studied in this project—
will be all the more relevant if the Indian government develops the protocols to enable 
absentee voting.  How state-diaspora communications proceed in the future can be informed 
by patterns uncovered in some of the findings of this project.  Opportunities exist for 
leadership, party organizations, and other groups to not only craft resonant messages, but to 
share information that is specifically provocative to the diaspora.  As the regression results 
indicate, news interest and sharing activity should positively impact future participation—
generating such interest could be a strategic angle of state-diaspora communications.  Two 
other positive variables impacting the dependent outcome of NRI participation were civic 
communication and civic participation.  The use of social platforms to enable such civic 
                                                                                       
297 Katz, J., Barris, M., & Jain, A. (2013), The Social Media President: Barack Obama and the Politics of Digital 
Engagement (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 
298 Chakravarty & Roy (2015), p. 5. 
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activities, even in the absence of a strategically honed message, can likewise produce 
productive engagement results.  Lastly, the divergences observed between the Native and 
NRI samples are important to consider moving forward.  In a future where both Native 
residents and NRIs can vote in Indian Elections, the mass dissemination of social media will 
commonly reach both audiences.  However, as the regression results indicate, the impact of 
news stories is not equal, nor are reactions to social media usage more generally.  The digital 
media managers of an absentee-enabled Indian polity will have to carefully consider the 
“two-level game” of how they deploy information, personality and appeals across social 
networking platforms. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the advent of absentee voting would profoundly alter 
India’s relationship with the broader world, beyond its diaspora.  US-India relations could 
significantly alter as NRIs, more invested with the right to vote, use their social and financial 
networks to not only impact Indian elections, but India’s diplomacy with Washington as 
well.  Donations to campaigns in India may move from the realm of obscurity (given India’s 
limits on foreign contributions) to fully open, and on a very large scale.  Outside of US-India 
relations, NRI political activity could also alter India’s perceptions of, and willingness to 
confront, conflicts in the broader region.  Being physically situation at the other end of a 
global mediascape, as well as in their adoptive country’s foreign policy milieu, NRI voters 
may introduce new perspectives to the realm of Indian diplomacy through voting, open 
donation and more accessible organization.  In any of these scenarios, the socially mediated 
digital communication patterns observed herein, including divergences between Native and 
NRI responses to information suggest that navigate a transnational electoral landscape will 
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be highly challenging for any Indian political party.   
2014 may prove to be a unique interim moment in the before and after of a 
dramatically altered Indian polity.  The advent of absentee voting, by presenting a real 
remote option, may see dramatic engagement.  Such engagement among the NRI population 
could be particularly robust given the possibility of e-balloting protocols.  For these reasons 
the results of this study are informative for their predictive insights.  More importantly, the 
methods deployed are replicable and create multiple opportunities for meaningful follow-up. 
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CH 8: RECOMMENDATIONS AND AFTERTHOUGHTS 
 
The relevance of the Indian diaspora to homeland politics is substantiated through 
the historical vignettes discussed earlier in the first chapter.  Furthermore, the survey 
research herein speaks to an emigrant population in the United States that is genuinely 
interested—but not necessarily engaged to the extent possible—in the political affairs, civic 
life and social problems of its homeland.  While some of the discussion should necessarily 
probe questions of the quality, substance and boundaries of what constitutes true 
“engagement,” there is also a deeper need to examine diasporic engagement from the 
perspective of how, when and under what circumstances homeland government makes 
efforts to engage the diaspora.  This will be particularly important in the event that the 
Government of India enacts and enables mechanisms for NRI absentee voting. 
One potential avenue of future research is the study of NRI populations and their 
engagement from abroad in countries beyond the United States.  The diaspora is extremely 
diverse, but there are basic features that differentiate key clusters from one another.  The 
diaspora experiences across OECD nations raises common questions of remittances, 
industrial leadership, entrepreneurship and the potential for impacting India’s relations with 
more prominent nations of the world.  The diaspora experiences in smaller states, with 
more deeply rooted colonial pasts, such as Guyana, Trinidad, Fiji or Mauritius, however, 
present a different set of dynamics to consider.  Whereas PIOs are proportionally small 
minority groups in Canada and the United States, for instance, they represent major 
electoral blocks in the aforementioned smaller multigenerational destinations.   Different 
areas of the diaspora geography represent different balances of wealth, political vote share, 
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social incorporation and connectivity to the homeland.  A comparative study that examines 
samples of the diaspora across the OECD, East Africa, the Gulf and the Caribbean could 
serve as the basis for richly informative research that jointly allows for the study of variables 
beyond one bilateral homeland-host pairing. 
A fascinating line of research would be to understand the potential role of NRIs in 
the Gulf countries as their experiences inform their interest and participation in homeland 
events.  Such research would be profoundly difficult given the restrictions and challenges of 
conducting survey research in the Gulf nations, but any opportunity to study this segment 
of the diaspora would also allow for understanding a cadre of NRIs that exhibits greater 
diversity with respect to socioeconomic background. 
Another direction of potential inquiry would be to study the diaspora’s digitally 
mediated participatory behavior along generational lines.  Would first and second 
generation respondents respond similarly or divergently from each other in similar survey 
settings, or if subjected to similar news treatment scenarios?  Would observed Native-NRI 
divergences accentuate themselves or constrict as second generation respondents more 
closely resemble “Native” respondents in their own settings?  Research along generational 
lines could also help better reveal intervening effects of geographic migration that were less 
observable in this study. 
Perhaps the most relevant form of follow up might be to simply repeat similar 
survey and news treatment formats at regular intervals across samples of Native Indian and 
NRI respondents.  Establishing a longitudinal “Native-NRI Barometer” of some kind 
would have several benefits.  First, it would allow for the confirmation or correction of 
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variable relationships observed in any one study.  It would also provide opportunities to 
consider the impact of exogenous international events such as armed conflicts, attacks, or 
bilateral diplomacy.  In addition, it would help researchers better understand the impact of 
domestic events such as scandals, recessions, or major legislative or legal developments.  
But perhaps most importantly, longitudinal study of this or similar populations would allow 
for the complex tracking of two populations in a stable manner that could also account for 
the constant evolution of social media and other digital platforms.  Any period of time in 
recent history is replete with significant advances in technology.  Moreover, these same 
periods of time are generally marked by expansive access to broader segments of the public.  
A decade prior to this study, the internet was widely present, but social media platforms 
were in their infancy.  Alongside these changes, device convergence and platform-blending 
has further muddled the diversity of the mediascape.  Perhaps identifying as many constants 
as possible with respect to sampling and testing practices is one way to distill the impact of 
media evolution across time, rather simply in instant assessments.  Should absentee voting 
for NRIs emerge as a reality, longitudinal study of their online and offline engagement, as 
well as their reactions and responses to digitally mediated news and information, will 
undoubtedly be of great interest to political parties, government agencies, lobbyists, NGOs 
and a host of other interested entities. 
For any of these potential avenues of future research, the present study, with 
whatever appropriate modifications might be necessary, can serve as a template for 
attempting to understand a number of complex variable relationships in an increasingly 
complex framework that spans individuals, content creation, political entities, digital media 
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platforms and the panoply of personal, professional and political networks that have always 
existed. 
 
 
  
 155 
APPENDIX A: NATIVE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Meta-Data 
 
 
Browser Meta Info 
 
This question will not be displayed to the recipient. 
Browser:  
Version: 
Operating System:  
Screen Resolution:  
Flash Version:  
Java Support:  
User Agent:  
 
OVERVIEW AND DIRECTIONS 
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Purpose of Study 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
This survey attempts to collect information about how people use social media platforms to follow 
news and politics. 
 
Procedures 
 
In the first sections you will be asked a series of questions. In the second section, you will be shown a 
short news article. You will need to read this article and complete a few questions afterwards. This 
questionnaire is being conducted with an online interface created in Qualtrics. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in an 
anonymous format (no last names will be collected). The data collected will be stored in a secure 
database until it has been deleted by the primary investigator. 
 
Compensation 
 
All m-Turk participants, upon completion of this survey, will be paid a one-time amount indicated on 
the mTurk advertisement for this survey. All participants, whether or not they are completing the 
survey via m-Turk, will be entered into a raffle for a free iPad. Odds of winning are contingent on the 
number of participants who successfully complete this survey. 
 
Participation 
 
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime 
or refuse to participate entirely. If you desire to withdraw, simply close your internet browser. 
 
Questions about the Research 
 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact the principal investigator, Anshul Jain, at 
ajain2@bu.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the above consent form and desire of my own free will to 
participate in this study. 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
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SECTION 1: Preliminary Questions 
 
 
What year were you born? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
 
  Male 
 
  Female 
 
What State or Union Territory do you live in? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
What Lok Sabha District do you live in? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the name of your city, town or village? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did you vote in the 2014 General Election? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No
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Which party did you vote for in the Lok Sabha? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
Enter party name here:
 
 
 
Why didn't you vote? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Voting is not important 
 
  Didn't have time 
 
  Politicians are all corrupt 
 
  Parties are all corrupt 
 
  Voting process is fixed 
 
  Don't care 
 
  Politicians can't make a difference 
 
  Didn't know where/when to vote 
 
  No one ever spoke to me about voting 
 
  Other   
 
 
 
If you are reading all the questions completely and following the directions properly, then for 
this question, you should be sure to NOT click on any of the choices below. 
 
What is the biggest problem in India today? 
 
  Economy 
 
  Terrorism 
 
  Corrupt Petrol Clerks 
 
  High Food Prices 
 
  Expensive Education Costs 
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SECTION 2: Personal Background 
 
 
Are you married? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
How many children do you have? 
 
  None 
 
  1  
 
 2 
 
  3 
 
  4  
 
  5+ 
 
 
What is your religion? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Jewish 
 
  Traditional Tribal 
 
  No religion/do not practice 
 
  Parsi (Zoorastrian) 
 
  Hindu 
 
  Christian 
 
  Buddhist 
 
  Sikh 
 
  Jain 
 
  Muslim 
 
  Other  
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How important is religion in your life? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
Are You a member of a specific Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
  Don't Know/Prefer Not to Answer 
 
 
How important is caste affiliation in your life? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
 
What is your native language/mother tongue? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
Please write the name of your native language here: 
 
  
 
 161 
What other languages can you speak? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Assamese 
  Bengali 
  Bodo 
  Chhattisgarhi 
  Divehi  
  Dogri  
  English  
  Garo 
  Gujarati 
  Hindi 
  Kannada  
  Kashmiri  
  Khasi 
  Kokborok  
  Konkan  
  Lotha 
  Malayalam 
  Malwari 
  Manipuri/Meiteilon 
  Marathi 
  Mizo  
  Nepali  
  Oriya 
  Punjabi  
  Santali  
  Sindhi  
  Tamil 
  Telugu 
  Urdu 
  Other  
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Do you want to stay in India permanently, or would you like to leave? 
 
  Strongly Wish to Stay 
 
  Somewhat Interested in Staying 
 
  Not Sure/Indifferent 
 
  Somewhat Interested in Leaving 
 
  Strongly Wish to Leave 
 
 
 
SECTION 3: Work and Education 
 
 
What is your occupation? 
 
  Current Occupation: 
 
  Do Not Work by Choice 
 
  Unemployed/Looking  for Work 
 
 
 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
 
  No formal schooling 
 
  Some Primary School 
 
  Completed Primary School 
 
  Some Secondary School 
 
  Completed Secondary School 
 
  Some University Coursework/Currently Enrolled 
 
  Bachelors Degree 
 
  Some Graduate Coursework/Currently Enrolled 
 
  Masters Degree or Doctorate 
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How would you describe your level of wealth? 
 
  Poor 
 
  Working Class 
 
  Middle Class 
 
  Upper Middle Class 
 
  Wealth 
 
 
What is your desired career field? 
 
  Something different than what I do now 
 
  I already work in my desired career field 
 
 
 
 
Which of the following electronic devices is MOST important to own? If you are reading the 
survey carefully, do NOT click on any of the choices below. 
 
  Mobile Phone 
 
  Broadband Connection 
 
  Tablet 
 
  Desktop Computer 
 
 
 
 
Please rank (by dragging and dropping) in order from 1 to 6, the importance of owning the 
following things: 
 
 
Car Home Land 
Medical Insurance 
 
Monetary Savings (Cash) 
 
Investments (Stocks, Bonds, Mutual Funds, etc.) 
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SECTION 4: Personal Identity 
 
 
What ONE specific term would you use describe yourself? (e.g., Arab, French, European, 
White, Buddhist, Communist, Tunisian, Black, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What one specific term do OTHER people in India use most often to describe you? 
 
 
 
 
Do other people consider you to be part of a specific group or community? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
 
Are you happy that people view you as part of this community? 
 
  Very Unhappy 
 
  Unhappy 
 
  Neither Happy nor Unhappy 
 
  Happy 
 
  Very Happy 
 
 
 
 
How many Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) do you know who are living in the United States? 
 
  0 
  1-10  
  11-25  
  26-50 
  More than 50 NRIs 
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Of the pieces of background information addressed earlier, which one affiliation is MOST 
important to you: 
 
language, caste, religion, home state/city, or level of wealth? 
 
  Language 
 
  Caste 
 
  Religion 
 
  Home State/City 
 
  Level of Wealth 
 
 
 
SECTION 5: Political Perceptions 
 
Which political party (or parties) do YOU support? (Click all that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  I don't support any political parties 
  I don't vote
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Which political party (or parties) do your PARENTS support? (Click all that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  They don't support any political parties 
  They don't vote 
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Which political party (or parties) do most of your FRIENDS support? (Click all that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  They don't support any political parties 
  They don't vote
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How often do you discuss politics with your PARENTS? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
How often do you discuss politics with your SIBLINGS AND EXTENDED FAMILY? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
How often do you discuss politics with your FRIENDS? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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Sometimes respondents do a great job reading the full text of survey questions, and other 
times they try to rush through without reading everything carefully. If you are following the 
directions, do NOT select any 
of the choices in the dropdown menu below. 
 
What is your favorite topic of conversation with your friends? 
 
 
 
 
How much do you trust the Central government? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
How much do you trust your state government? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
How much do you trust your local (city/town/village) government? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
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How much do you trust labor unions? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
 
How much do you trust the news media? (newspapers, TV news, radio news, news 
magazines) 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
 
How important is it to follow laws and regulations? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
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How important is it to pay taxes? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
 
How important is it to vote? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
 
How important is it to be informed about political events? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
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How interested are you in politics? 
 
  Not at all interested 
 
  Somewhat Uninterested 
 
  Neither Interested nor Uninterested 
 
  Somewhat Interested 
 
  Very Interested 
 
 
 
SECTION 6: Media Access 
 
 
How good is your internet access? 
 
  Very Bad 
 
  Bad 
 
  Neither Good nor Bad 
 
  Good 
 
  Very Good 
 
 
 
How affordable is your internet access? 
 
  Very Expensive 
 
  Expensive 
 
  Moderately priced 
 
  Affordable 
 
  Very Affordable/Free 
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How often do you use the internet? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
Do you have a mobile phone? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
 
How good is your mobile phone data reception? 
 
  Very Bad 
 
  Bad 
 
  Neither Good nor Bad 
 
  Good 
 
  Very Good 
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How affordable is your mobile phone plan? 
 
  Very Expensive 
 
  Expensive 
 
  Moderately priced 
 
  Affordable 
 
  Very Affordable/Free 
 
 
 
How often do you use your mobile phone? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
Does your mobile phone have a broadband connection? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
Do you use your mobile phone to access the internet? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
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How often do you use your mobile phone to access the internet? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
SECTION 7: Political Engagement 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a political party? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever contacted an elected official? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
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Have you ever contacted a government administrator? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a religious organization, community organization, linguistic 
organization or other type of social organization? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a non-governmental organization (NGO) or nonprofit organization? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
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Have you ever contacted a labor organization/trade union? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
Have you ever donated money to a political party or candidate? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
Have you ever requested resources from a government agency for business or personal 
reasons? (e.g., taxes, permits, licenses, etc.) 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
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Have you ever requested resources from a government agency for education or career 
purposes? (e.g., scholarships, financial aid, job applications, etc.) 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever rushed through a survey without reading the questions completely? If you are 
reading this question completely, then you will NOT click on any of the answer choices 
below. 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  More than 5 times 
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SECTION 8: Social Media Use 
 
Which social media sites do you use? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Twitter 
 
  bharatstudent 
 
  Vine 
 
  Facebook 
 
  Tumblr 
 
  Orkut 
 
  Pintrest  
 
  MySpace  
 
  Instagram  
 
  Google+  
 
  Other 
 
  I do not use any social media site 
 
 
 
 
How often do you use Facebook? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on Facebook? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use Twitter? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many Followers do you have on Twitter? (How many people follow YOU?) 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
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How many people/accounts do you follow on Twitter? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use Instagram? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on Instagram? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Pinterest? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends follow YOU on Pintrest? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How many friends/Boards do you follow on Pintrest? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Vine? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections follow YOU on Vine? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How many friends/feeds do you follow on Vine? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Tumblr? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections follow YOU on Tumblr? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How many friends/blogs do you follow on Tumblr? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
  
 185 
How often do you use Google+? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on Google+? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use Orkut? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on Orkut? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use MySpace? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on MySpace? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use bharatstudent? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on bharatstudent? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use ${q://QID133/ChoiceTextEntryValue/11}? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on ${q://QID133/ChoiceTextEntryValue/11}? 
 
  1-100 
 
101-250 
 
  251-500 
 
  501-1000 
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
Do you think social media technology is useful? 
 
  Definitely useful 
 
  Probably useful 
 
  Maybe 
 
  Probably not useful 
 
  Definitely not useful 
 
 
 
 
What is the impact of social media technology on your quality of life? 
 
  Very Negative 
 
  Somewhat Negative 
 
  No Impact/Neutral  
 
  Somewhat Positive  
 
  Very Positive 
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Have you ever used social media to VIEW an article, website, video, blog or personal posting 
with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times  
 
  4 or 5 times  
 
 5+ times 
 
 
 
Have you ever used social media to SHARE an article, website, video, blog or personal 
posting with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  5+ times 
 
 
 
Have you ever used social media to CREATE an article, website, video, blog or personal 
posting with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times  
 
  4 or 5 times  
 
 5+ times 
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Have you ever used fast typing fingers to HURRY through a survey, questionnaire, feedback 
page or other form? If you are reading carefully and following all the directions, then do 
NOT click on any of the answer choices below. 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times  
 
  4 or 5 times  
 
 5+ times 
 
 
 
How often do you share or receive information about political matters with NRI friends, 
family members or colleagues in the United States? 
 
  Never 
 
  Rarely 
 
  Sometimes 
 
  Often 
 
  Very Often 
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Why don't you use any social media sites? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Social media is distracting 
 
  Social media is a waste of time 
 
  People are rude 
 
  No interesting content 
 
  Don't know how these sites work 
 
  Slow computer/internet connection 
 
  Too busy/haven't had a chance to set up account 
 
  Not allowed by parents/spouse 
 
  Not allowed to use at work 
 
  Not interested 
 
 
 
SECTION 9A: News Story 
 
 
Please continue to the next section 
 
Please see News Scenario Treatments in Appendix E 
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FINAL SECTION 
 
This is the final section of the survey! In this section, you will be asked about some of your 
plans for the future. 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major international political events 
in the future? 
 
  Definitely will not  
  Probably will not  
  Don't know 
  Probably will 
  Definitely will 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major domestic political events in 
the future? 
 
  Definitely will not  
  Probably will not  
  Don't know 
  Probably will 
  Definitely will 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major non-political events in the 
future? (e.g., film, arts, sports, entertainment, etc.) 
 
  Definitely will not  
  Probably will not  
  Don't know 
  Probably will 
  Definitely will 
 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major personal events in the 
future? (e.g., family events, gatherings with friends, parties, holidays, weddings, births, 
graduations, etc.) 
 
  Definitely will not  
  Probably will not  
  Don't know 
  Probably will 
  Definitely will 
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If the current government stays in power, India's next General Election is scheduled to take 
place in 2019. Will you vote in the 2019 General Election? 
 
  Definitely will not  
  Probably will not  
  Don't know 
  Probably will 
  Definitely will 
 
Which party do you think you will vote for in the Lok Sabha in 2019? 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  I don't support any political parties 
  I don't vote 
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Why won't you vote in 2019? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Voting is not important 
 
  Won't have time 
 
  Politicians are all corrupt 
 
  Parties are all corrupt  
 
  Voting process is fixed  
 
  Won't care 
 
  Politicians can't make a difference 
 
  Dodn't know where/when to vote 
 
  No one ever speaks to me about voting 
 
Other  
 
Could you be persuaded to vote by family, friends or colleagues? 
 
  Definitely not 
  Probably not 
   Maybe 
  Probably yes 
  Definitely yes 
 
 
Please DO NOT use your browser's back button 
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APPENDIX B: NRI SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Meta-Data 
 
Browser Meta Info 
 
This question will not be displayed to the recipient. 
Browser:  
Version:  
Operating System:  
Screen Resolution:  
Flash Version:  
Java Support:  
User Agent: 
 
 
OVERVIEW AND DIRECTIONS 
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Purpose of Study 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
This survey attempts to collect information about how people use social media platforms to follow 
news and politics. 
 
 
Procedures 
 
In the first sections you will be asked a series of questions. In the second section, you will be shown a 
short news article. You will need to read this article and complete a few questions afterwards. This 
questionnaire is being conducted with an online interface created in Qualtrics. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in an 
anonymous format (no last names will be collected). The data collected will be stored in a secure 
database until it has been deleted by the primary investigator. 
 
Compensation 
 
All m-Turk participants, upon completion of this survey, will be paid a one-time amount indicated on 
the mTurk advertisement for this survey. All participants, whether or not they are completing the 
survey via m-Turk, will be entered into a raffle for a free iPad. Odds of winning are contingent on the 
number of participants who successfully complete this survey. 
 
Participation 
 
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to withdraw at anytime 
or refuse to participate entirely. If you desire to withdraw, simply close your internet browser. 
 
Questions about the Research 
 
If you have questions regarding this study, you may contact the principal investigator, Anshul Jain, at 
ajain2@bu.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
I have read and understood the above consent form and desire of my own free will to 
participate in this study. 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
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SECTION 1: Preliminary Questions 
 
 
What year were you born? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your gender? 
 
  Male 
 
  Female 
 
 
In what Indian State or Union Territory did you grow up? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
What Lok Sabha District did you live in? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
What is the name of the city, town or village where you grew up? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did you vote in the 2014 General Election? 
 
  Yes 
 
 No
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Which party did you vote for in the Lok Sabha? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
Enter party name here: 
 
 
 
 
 
Why didn't you vote? (Check all that apply)  
 
  I was not living in India during the 2014 Election  
 
  Voting is not important 
 
  Didn't have time 
 
  Politicians are all corrupt 
 
  Parties are all corrupt  
 
  Voting process is fixed  
 
  Don't care 
 
  Politicians can't make a difference 
 
  Didn't know where/when to vote 
 
  No one ever spoke to me about voting 
 
  Other    
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If you are reading all the questions completely and following the directions properly, then 
for this question, you should be sure to NOT click on any of the choices below. 
 
What is the biggest problem in India today? 
 
  Economy 
 
  Terrorism 
 
  Corrupt Petrol Clerks 
 
  High Food Prices 
 
  Expensive Education Costs 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: Personal Background 
 
 
Are you married? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
How many children do you have? 
 
  None 
  1  
 2  
  3  
  4  
  5+ 
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What is your religion? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Muslim 
 
  Parsi (Zoroastrian)  
 
  Christian 
 
  Sikh 
 
  No religion/do not practice 
 
  Hindu 
 
  Other    
 
  Traditional Tribal 
 
  Jain 
 
  Jewish 
 
  Buddhist 
 
 
 
How important is religion in your life? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
 
Are You a member of a specific Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
  Don't Know/Prefer Not to Answer
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How important is caste affiliation in your life? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
 
What is your native language/mother tongue? 
 
Choose 1: 
 
 
 
 
Please write the name of your native language here: 
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What other languages can you speak? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Assamese 
  Bengali 
  Bodo 
  Chhattisgarhi 
  Divehi  
  Dogri  
  English  
  Garo 
  Gujarati 
  Hindi 
  Kannada  
  Kashmiri  
  Khasi 
  Kokborok  
  Konkan  
  Lotha 
  Malayalam 
  Malwari 
  Manipuri/Meiteilon 
  Marathi 
  Mizo  
  Nepali  
  Oriya 
  Punjabi  
  Santali  
  Sindhi  
  Tamil 
  Telugu  
  Urdu  
  Other 
 
 
 
In what year did you first arrive in the United States? (For the long term, not as a tourist) 
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What is your citizenship? 
 
  Indian citizen ONLY  
  US citizen ONLY 
  Dual Citizen of US & India 
 
 
 
 
Were you aware that the United States and India have a program to make dual citizenship 
available to US citizens of Indian origin? 
 
  I was completely unaware of this 
 
  I had heard of this, but wasn't sure if it was true 
 
  I was already aware of this 
 
 
 
 
Do you want to stay in the United States permanently, or would you like to return to 
India? 
 
  Strongly Wish to Stay in the US 
 
  Somewhat Interested in Staying in the US   Not Sure/Indifferent 
  Somewhat Interested in Returning to India 
 
  Strongly Wish to Leave India 
 
 
 
SECTION 3: Work and Education 
 
 
What is your occupation? 
 
  Current Occupation: 
 
  Do Not Work by Choice 
 
  Unemployed/Looking for Work
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What is your highest level of education? 
 
  No formal schooling 
 
  Some Primary School 
 
  Completed Primary School 
 
  Some Secondary School 
 
  Completed Secondary School 
 
  Some University Coursework/Currently Enrolled 
 
  Bachelors Degree 
 
  Some Graduate Coursework/Currently Enrolled 
 
  Masters Degree or Doctorate 
 
 
 
 
How would you describe your level of wealth? 
 
  Poor 
 
  Working Class 
 
  Middle Class 
 
  Upper Middle Class 
 
  Wealthy 
 
 
 
 
What is your desired career field? 
 
  Something different than what I do now 
 
  I already work in my desired career field 
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Which of the following electronic devices is MOST important to own? If you are reading 
the survey carefully, do NOT click on any of the choices below. 
 
  Mobile Phone 
 
  Broadband Connection 
 
  Tablet 
 
  Desktop Computer 
 
 
 
 
Please rank (by dragging and dropping) in order from 1 to 6, the importance of owning 
the following things: 
 
 
Car  
 
Home  
 
Land 
 
Medical Insurance 
 
Monetary Savings (Cash) 
 
Investments (Stocks, Bonds, Mutual Funds, etc.) 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4: Personal Identity 
 
 
What ONE specific term would you use describe yourself? (e.g., Arab, French, European, 
White, Buddhist, Communist, Tunisian, Black, etc.) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
What one specific term would OTHER people in India use most often to describe you? 
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Would other people in India consider you to be part of a specific group or community? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
 
 
Are you happy that people in India view you as part of this community? 
 
  Very Unhappy 
 
  Unhappy 
 
  Neither Happy nor Unhappy 
 
  Happy 
 
  Very Happy 
 
 
How many Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) do you know who are living in the United 
States? 
 
  0 
  1-10 
  11-25  
  26-50 
  More than 50 NRIs 
 
 
Of the pieces of background information addressed earlier, which one affiliation is MOST 
important to you:  language, caste, religion, home state/city, or level of wealth? 
 
  Language 
 
  Caste 
 
  Religion 
 
  Home State/City 
 
  Level of Wealth 
 
  
 207 
SECTION 5: Political Perceptions 
 
 
Which Indian political party (or parties) do YOU support? (Click all that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  I don't support any political parties 
  I don't vote
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Which Indian political party (or parties) do your PARENTS support? (Click all that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  They don't support any political parties 
  They don't vote
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Which Indian political party (or parties) do most of your FRIENDS support? (Click all 
that apply) 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)  
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP)  
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP)  
  Other 
  They don't support any political parties 
  They don't vote
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How often do you discuss Indian politics with your PARENTS? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
How often do you discuss Indian politics with your SIBLINGS AND EXTENDED 
FAMILY? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
How often do you discuss Indian politics with your FRIENDS? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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Sometimes respondents do a great job reading the full text of survey questions, and other 
times they try to rush through without reading everything carefully. If you are following 
the directions, do NOT select any 
of the choices in the dropdown menu below. 
 
What is your favorite topic of conversation with your friends? 
 
 
 
How much do you trust the Indian Central government? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
How much do you trust Indian state government? (of the state/Union Territory where you 
grew up) 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
How much do you trust local (city/town/village) government? (of the Indian community 
where you grew up) 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
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How much do you trust labor unions? 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
 
How much do you trust the news media? (newspapers, TV news, radio news, news 
magazines) 
 
  Strongly Distrust 
 
  Distrust 
 
  Neither Trust nor Distrust 
 
  Trust 
 
  Strongly Trust 
 
 
How important is it to follow laws and regulations? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
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How important is it to pay taxes? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
How important is it to vote? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
 
 
How important is it to be informed about political events? 
 
  Not at all Important 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Very Important 
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How interested are you in politics? 
 
  Not at all interested 
 
  Somewhat Uninterested 
 
  Neither Interested nor Uninterested 
 
  Somewhat Interested 
 
  Very Interested 
 
 
SECTION 6: Media Access 
 
 
How good is your internet access? 
 
  Very Bad 
 
  Bad 
 
  Neither Good nor Bad 
 
  Good 
 
  Very Good 
 
 
 
How affordable is your internet access? 
 
  Very Expensive 
 
  Expensive 
 
  Moderately priced 
 
  Affordable 
 
  Very Affordable/Free 
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How often do you use the internet? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
Do you have a mobile phone? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
 
How good is your mobile phone data reception? 
 
  Very Bad 
 
  Bad 
 
  Neither Good nor Bad 
 
  Good 
 
  Very Good 
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How affordable is your mobile phone plan? 
 
  Very Expensive 
 
  Expensive 
 
  Moderately priced 
 
  Affordable 
 
  Very Affordable/Free 
 
 
 
How often do you use your mobile phone? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
Does your mobile phone have a broadband connection? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
Do you use your mobile phone to access the internet? 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
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How often do you use your mobile phone to access the internet? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
SECTION 7: Political Engagement 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a political party? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
 
Have you ever contacted an elected official? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a government administrator? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
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Have you ever contacted a religious organization, community organization, linguistic 
organization or other type of social organization? 
 
  In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a non-governmental organization (NGO) or nonprofit 
organization? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
Have you ever contacted a labor organization/trade union? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
 
Have you ever donated money to an Indian political party or candidate? 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
 
 
 
Have you ever requested resources from a government agency for business or personal 
reasons? (e.g., taxes, permits, licenses, etc.) 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times More than 5 Times 
  219   
Have you ever requested resources from a government agency for education or career 
purposes? (e.g., scholarships, financial aid, job applications, etc.) 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times  More than 5 Times 
 
 
Have you ever rushed through a survey without reading the questions completely? If you 
are reading this question completely, then you will NOT click on any of the answer 
choices below. 
 
In India 
 
In the US 
 
 Never                     Once                2 or 3 Times           4 or 5 Times  More than 5 Times 
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SECTION 8: Social Media Use 
 
 
Which social media sites do you use? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Tumblr  
 
  Google+  
 
  MySpace  
 
  Twitter  
 
  Pintrest  
 
  Vine 
 
  Facebook 
 
  Instagram 
 
  bharatstudent 
 
  Orkut 
 
  Other   
 
  I do not use any social media site 
 
 
 
 
How often do you use Facebook? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on Facebook? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use Twitter? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
 
How many Followers do you have on Twitter? (How many people follow YOU?) 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
 
  222   
How many people/accounts do you follow on Twitter? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
How often do you use Instagram? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on Instagram? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Pinterest? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
 
How many friends follow YOU on Pintrest? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
How many friends/Boards do you follow on Pintrest? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Vine? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections follow YOU on Vine? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How many friends/feeds do you follow on Vine? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Tumblr? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections follow YOU on Tumblr? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How many friends/blogs do you follow on Tumblr? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use Google+? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on Google+? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use Orkut? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on Orkut? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use MySpace? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on MySpace? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
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How often do you use bharatstudent? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
 
 
 
How many friends/connections do you have on bharatstudent? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
How often do you use ${q://QID133/ChoiceTextEntryValue/11}? 
 
  Never 
 
  Less than Once a Month 
 
  Once a Month 
 
  2-3 Times a Month 
 
  Once a Week 
 
  2-3 Times a Week 
 
  Daily 
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How many friends/connections do you have on 
${q://QID133/ChoiceTextEntryValue/11}? 
 
  1-100 
 
  101-250  
 
  251-500  
 
  501-1000  
 
  1000+ 
 
 
 
Do you think social media technology is useful? 
 
  Definitely useful  
 
  Probably useful  
 
  Maybe 
 
  Probably not useful 
 
  Definitely not useful 
 
 
 
What is the impact of social media technology on your quality of life? 
 
  Very Negative 
 
  Somewhat Negative  
 
  No Impact/Neutral  
 
  Somewhat Positive  
 
  Very Positive 
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Have you ever used social media to VIEW an article, website, video, blog or personal 
posting with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  5+ times 
 
 
Have you ever used social media to SHARE an article, website, video, blog or personal 
posting with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  5+ times 
 
 
Have you ever used social media to CREATE an article, website, video, blog or personal 
posting with political content? 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  5+ times 
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Have you ever used fast typing fingers to HURRY through a survey, questionnaire, 
feedback page or other form? If you are reading carefully and following all the directions, 
then do NOT click on any of the answer choices below. 
 
  Never 
 
  Once 
 
  2 or 3 times 
 
  4 or 5 times 
 
  5+ times 
 
How often do you share or receive information about political matters with NRI friends, 
family members or colleagues in the United States? 
 
  Never 
 
  Rarely 
 
  Sometimes 
 
  Often 
 
  Very Often 
 
Why don't you use any social media sites? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Social media is distracting 
 
  Social media is a waste of time 
 
  People are rude 
 
  No interesting content 
 
  Don't know how these sites work 
 
  Slow computer/internet connection 
 
  Too busy/haven't had a chance to set up account 
 
  Not allowed by parents/spouse 
 
  Not allowed to use at work 
 
  Not interested 
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SECTION 9A: News Story 
 
 
Please continue to the next section. 
 
 
Please see News Scenario Treatments in Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
FINAL SECTION 
 
 
This is the final section of the survey! In this section, you will be asked about some of 
your plans for the future. 
 
 
 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major Indian political events in 
the future? 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major U.S. political events in 
the future? 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
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Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major global (non-Indian) 
political events in the future? 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major non-political events in 
the future? (e.g., film, arts, sports, entertainment, etc.) 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
 
 
Do you think you will use social media to pay attention to major personal events in the 
future? (e.g., family events, gatherings with friends, parties, holidays, weddings, births, 
graduations, etc.) 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
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If the current government stays in power, India's next General Election is scheduled to 
take place in 2019. Will you vote in the 2019 General Election? 
 
  Definitely will not  
 
  Probably will not  
 
  Don't know 
 
 Probably will 
 
 Definitely will 
 
 
Which party do you think you will vote for in the Lok Sabha in 2019? 
 
  Aam Admi Party (AAAP) 
  All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK)  
  All India Trinamool Congress (AATC) 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)  
  Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 
  Communist Party of India (CPI) 
  Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)  
  Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) 
  Independent (IND) 
  Indian National Congress (INC)  
  Janata Dal-Secular (JD-S) 
  Janata Dal-United (JD-U) 
  Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)  
  Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) 
  Samajwadi Party (SP) 
  Shiv Sena (SHS) 
  Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS)  
  Telugu Desam (TDP) 
  Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party (YSRCP) 
 
Other   
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Why won't you vote in 2019? (Check all that apply) 
 
  Won't be living in India  
  Voting is not important  
  Won't have time 
  Politicians are all corrupt 
  Parties are all corrupt  
  Voting process is fixed  
  Won't care 
  Politicians can't make a difference 
  Didn't know where/when to vote 
  No one ever speaks to me about voting 
  Other 
 
 
 
Could you be persuaded to vote by family, friends or colleagues? 
 
  Definitely not  
 
  Probably not  
 
  Maybe 
 
  Probably yes 
 
  Definitely yes 
 
 
 
India does not currently provide absentee ballots for citizens living abroad. If India were 
to develop a system for absentee voting, would you vote in the 2019 General Election? 
 
  Definitely not  
 
  Probably not  
 
  Maybe 
 
  Probably yes 
 
  Definitely yes 
 
 
 
Please DO NOT use your browser's back button 
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APPENDIX C: NEWS SCENARIO TREATMENTS
  237   
 
Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Robert Bentley signs Ebola executive 
order 
 
By JONATHAN TOPAZ | 10/21/14 6:43 AM EDT Updated: 10/21/14 8:35 AM EDT 
 
 
 
Alabama Gov. Robert Bentley has signed an executive order requiring that state officials 
monitor travel to and from the countries most affected by Ebola in West Africa. 
 
The Republican governor, one of first major political figures to call for a travel ban from 
Ebola-stricken countries, issued the order on Monday in response to what he called 
insufficient action from the federal government. 
 
“[T]he federal government, to date, has failed to implement protections at the national level 
to prevent the entry of the Ebola Virus Disease into the United States of America,” Bentley 
said in the order. 
 
In the executive order, the governor called for all state departments and agencies to develop 
mechanisms to monitor travel to all countries identified under the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention Ebola travel guidelines. The CDC currently has listed Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone as Warning Level 3 countries and Nigeria as a Watch Level 1 
country. 
 
The executive order also issues restrictions on certain activities in Alabama — including 
commercial travel and visiting public spaces like grocery stores and restaurants — for 21 
days upon return, the incubation period used by the CDC and World Health Organization. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Bobby Jindal signs Ebola executive order 
 
By JONATHAN TOPAZ | 10/21/14 6:43 AM EDT Updated: 10/21/14 8:35 AM EDT 
 
 
 
Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal has signed an executive order requiring that state officials 
monitor travel to and from the countries most affected by Ebola in West Africa. 
 
The Republican governor, one of first major political figures to call for a travel ban from 
Ebola-stricken countries, issued the order on Monday in response to what he called 
insufficient action from the federal government. 
 
—[T]he federal government, to date, has failed to implement protections at the national 
level to prevent the entry of the Ebola Virus Disease into the United States of America,“ 
Jindal said in the order. 
 
In the executive order, the governor called for all state departments and agencies to 
develop mechanisms to monitor travel to all countries identified under the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention Ebola travel guidelines. The CDC currently has listed 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone as Warning Level 3 countries and Nigeria as a Watch 
Level 1 country. 
 
The executive order also issues restrictions on certain activities in Louisiana –  
including commercial travel and visiting public spaces like grocery stores and 
restaurants –  for 21 days upon return, the incubation period used by the CDC and 
World Health Organization. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will 
be asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about 
the story. 
___________________________________________________________________
___________ 
 
 
 
Orman retains business tie to jailed Wall Street 
inside trader 
 
By Tim Carpenter  | Wednesday, Sept. 17, 2014 | 
 
 
 
U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman maintains a business relationship with a longtime 
colleague convicted of insider trading, sent to federal prison and fined $5 million for 
leaking tips about Ernst & Young to a corrupt hedge fund manager. 
 
Orman, an independent who is leading Republican U.S. Sen. Pat Roberts in the latest 
poll, co-founded with Kyle Robertson the Kansas company Exemplar Wealth 
Management before the 2012 conviction of Robertson as part of a sweeping 
crackdown by federal prosecutors on Wall Street insider traders. During the trial, 
Orman was listed as "Robertson’s financial adviser." 
 
Robertson was among 23 people criminally charged in a seven-year insider trading 
conspiracy allegedly led by former hedge fund manager Martin Koch, who was a 
recipient of leaks from Robertson. 
 
While Robertson appealed his guilty verdict, he appointed Orman in 2013 to serve as 
his representative on the two-member board of New Silk Route, a billion-dollar private 
equity fund that concentrated on markets in South Asia and the Middle East. As 
recently as 2013, Orman and Robertson were listed as principals of Exemplar Wealth 
Management. 
 
Robertson’s appeal was eventually dismissed, and the former Ernst & Young board 
member reported in June to a federal prison camp in Massachusetts to begin serving a 
two-year term. 
 
After a campaign stop Wednesday at Washburn University in Topeka, Orman said he 
still had a “very, very small” investment with Robertson of no more than $50,000. He 
didn't describe details of that association, but said information about his extensive 
business interests would be divulged in reports required of U.S. Senate candidates. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Orman retains business tie to jailed Wall Street inside 
trader 
 
By Tim Carpenter  | Wednesday, Sept. 17, 2014 | 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Senate candidate Greg Orman maintains a business relationship with a longtime 
colleague convicted of insider trading, sent to federal prison and fined $5 million for leaking 
tips about Goldman Sachs to a corrupt hedge fund manager. 
 
Orman, an independent who is leading Republican U.S. Sen. Pat Roberts in the latest poll, 
co-founded with Rajat Gupta the Kansas company Exemplar Wealth Management before 
the 2012 conviction of Gupta as part of a sweeping crackdown by federal prosecutors on 
Wall Street insider traders. During the trial, Orman was listed as "Gupta’s financial adviser." 
 
Gupta was among 23 people criminally charged in a seven-year insider trading conspiracy 
allegedly led by former hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam, who was a recipient of leaks 
from Gupta. 
 
While Gupta appealed his guilty verdict, he appointed Orman in 2013 to serve as his 
representative on the two-member board of New Silk Route, a billion-dollar private equity 
fund that concentrated on markets in South Asia and the Middle East. As recently as 2013, 
Orman and Gupta were listed as principals of Exemplar Wealth Management. 
 
Gupta’s appeal was eventually dismissed, and the former Goldman Sachs board member 
reported in June to a federal prison camp in Massachusetts to begin serving a two-year term. 
 
After a campaign stop Wednesday at Washburn University in Topeka, Orman said he still 
had a “very, very small” investment with Gupta of no more than $50,000. He didn't 
describe details of that association, but said information about his extensive business 
interests would be divulged in reports required of U.S. Senate candidates. 
 
“You know,” Orman said in the news conference, “Rajat Gupta is a friend of mine. 
Ultimately, he made a significant mistake and he's paying the price for it.” 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the story. 
________________________________________________________________________
______ 
 
 
 
Obama hails spelling bee champs  
 
By Justin Sink  | May 30, 2014, 11:02 am | 
 
 
 
President Obama took to Twitter Thursday night to congratulate the co-champions of the 
Scripps National Spelling Bee — the first time two winners were crowned since 1962. 
 
Alex Oliver, 13, of Fort Worth, Texas, and Dominic Zarecki, 14, of Painted Post, N.Y., each 
survived the 25-word championship spelling list. 
 
Oliver had a chance to win after Zarecki misspelled "corpsbruder," referring to a comrade in 
a German student corps. But Oliver whiffed on "antigropelos," meaning waterproof 
leggings, prolonging the bee. 
 
There have been four co-champions in the history of the competition. Each will receive a 
championship trophy and $33,000 in cash and prizes. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Obama hails spelling bee champs  
 
By Justin Sink  | May 30, 2014, 11:02 am | 
 
 
 
President Obama took to Twitter Thursday night to congratulate the co-champions of the 
Scripps National Spelling Bee — the first time two winners were crowned since 1962. 
 
Ansun Sujoe, 13, of Fort Worth, Texas, and Sriram Hathwar, 14, of Painted Post, N.Y., 
each survived the 25-word championship spelling list. 
 
Sujoe had a chance to win after Hathwar misspelled "corpsbruder," referring to a comrade 
in a German student corps. But Sujoe whiffed on "antigropelos," meaning waterproof 
leggings, prolonging the bee. 
 
There have been four co-champions in the history of the competition. Each will receive a 
championship trophy and $33,000 in cash and prizes. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
Women’s Rights: Students at JNU send a 
strong message with photo shoot 
 
| December 25, 2014 5:37 PM |  
 
 
 
It has been talked about a lot and has got a lot of media attention especially after an 
incident, but how safe is a woman walking down a road at any time of the day in India? 
You have a female friend even considering to work in Delhi and the first thing you say is, 
it’s not safe there for a woman be it your friend or sister or someone you know and care 
about. 
 
Delhi is the infamous city known for the lack of safety for women but take any place in 
India and can you be completely peaceful that a woman is safe? No need to think of a place 
because the answer is no. There is no place in India where you can say that a woman can be 
carefree and nothing terrible can happen to her. 
 
The simplest task like getting groceries from a nearby shop and a woman is not really safe 
even in the best of neighborhoods with the most comprehensive security. Why is this so? It 
lies deep-rooted in the psyche of the Indian people. The key word is people and not just 
men because often the safety is flouted by other women too. 
 
To critique the narrow minded thinking of Indians and the resulting lack of security from 
this complex problem, female students from Jawarhalal Nehru University have shot 
pictures with messages to show the people the dark side of the Indian society and send a 
strong message to support women’s rights by respecting her with no exceptions. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
Women’s Rights: Students at Harvard 
send a strong message with photo shoot 
 
| December 25, 2014 5:37 PM |  
 
 
 
It has been talked about a lot and has got a lot of media attention especially after an 
incident, but how safe is a woman walking down a road at any time of the day in India? 
You have a female friend even considering to work in Delhi and the first thing you say is, 
it’s not safe there for a woman be it your friend or sister or someone you know and care 
about. 
 
Delhi is the infamous city known for the lack of safety for women but take any place in 
India and can you be completely peaceful that a woman is safe? No need to think of a place 
because the answer is no. There is no place in India where you can say that a woman can be 
carefree and nothing terrible can happen to her. 
 
The simplest task like getting groceries from a nearby shop and a woman is not really safe 
even in the best of neighborhoods with the most comprehensive security. Why is this so? It 
lies deep-rooted in the psyche of the Indian people. The key word is people and not just 
men because often the safety is flouted by other women too. 
 
To critique the narrow minded thinking of Indians and the resulting lack of security from 
this complex problem, Harvard students from India have shot pictures with messages to 
show the people the dark side of the Indian society and send a strong message to support 
women’s rights by respecting her with no exceptions. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Ahmedabad train station rocked by 
suicide bombing 
 
Conflicting reports over identity of bomber after blast rips through building, leaving at least 
16 people dead 
 
• Guardian Staff, Ahmedebad  
• Sunday, 28 December, 2014  
 
 
 
Sixteen people were killed and another 50 injured after a suicide bombing at a railway 
station in the western Indian city of Ahmedabad.  The blast ripped through an area 
between the station entrance and metal frames that had been installed as a precaution 
against terror attacks. 
 
There were conflicting reports on the identity of the perpetrator: the authorities first 
indicated that a young woman may have been responsible. But later, news agencies reported 
that it was a man wearing a rucksack who was behind the attack, though he may not have 
been acting alone. 
 
CCTV video showed a bright flash of light inside the station as the camera, located several 
hundred metres across the square, shook from the impact. A cloud of smoke emerged 
seconds later. Pictures on social networks show people trying to help the injured lying on 
the dust-covered ground in front of the Colonial-era building, its windows smashed by the 
blast. 
 
Among the fatalities was a 12-year-old boy, whose father survived but lost a leg. Another 
boy, aged 11, was later reported dead. 
 
Witnesses reported seeing many corpses near the entrance. "I heard the blast and ran 
towards it," one witness said. "I saw melted, twisted bits of metal, broken glass and bodies 
lying on the street." 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
Milwaukee train station rocked by suicide 
bombing 
 
Conflicting reports over identity of bomber after blast rips through building, leaving 
at least 16 people dead 
 
• Guardian Staff, Milwaukee  
• Sunday, 28 December, 2014  
 
 
 
Sixteen people were killed and another 50 injured after a suicide bombing at a railway 
station in the midwestern American city of Milwaukee.  The blast ripped through an area 
between the station entrance and metal frames that had been installed as a precaution 
against terror attacks. 
 
There were conflicting reports on the identity of the perpetrator: the authorities first 
indicated that a young woman may have been responsible. But later, news agencies reported 
that it was a man wearing a rucksack who was behind the attack, though he may not have 
been acting alone. 
 
CCTV video showed a bright flash of light inside the station as the camera, located several 
hundred metres across the square, shook from the impact. A cloud of smoke emerged 
seconds later. Pictures on social networks show people trying to help the injured lying on 
the ice-covered ground in front of the Art Deco-era building, its windows smashed by the 
blast. 
 
Among the fatalities was a 12-year-old boy, whose father survived but lost a leg. Another 
boy, aged 11, was later reported dead. 
 
Witnesses reported seeing many corpses near the entrance. "I heard the blast and ran 
towards it," one witness said. "I saw melted, twisted bits of metal, broken glass and bodies 
lying on the street." 
 
According to the latest figures on Sunday night, 37 people were still in hospital, five in a 
very serious condition. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
Syndicate Bank chief  arrested in bribery 
probe 
 
By Victor Mallet in New Delhi  | December 3, 2014 | 
 
 
 
Indian investigators have arrested the head of a state-owned bank and at least five other 
suspects in the first big anti-corruption raids since Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his 
new government were swept to power in the May election.  
 
The Central Bureau of Investigation said it had arrested SK Jain, chairman and managing 
director of state-controlled Syndicate Bank, and accused him of taking a Rs5m ($82,000) 
bribe to increase the credit limits of two companies being probed over a scandal involving 
the allocation of coal mining blocks under the previous government. 
 
 “We are determined to fight corruption at high level and today’s case was one such 
example,” Ranjit Sinha, CBI director, told the Press Trust of India news agency.  
 
CBI officers raided 20 locations in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Bhopal and seized large 
amounts of cash, documents and computer records. Mr Sinha said other banks were 
involved in the conspiracy. A total of 12 people, including Mr Jain, are being investigated. 
 
Neither Mr Jain nor other Syndicate Bank executives could immediately be reached for 
comment.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
Caravel Management chief  arrested in 
bribery probe 
 
By Victor Mallet in New Delhi  | December 3, 2014 | 
 
 
 
Indian investigators have arrested the head of a state-owned bank and at least five other 
suspects in the first big anti-corruption prosecutions since President Barack Obama and his 
Administration were re-elected in 2012.  
 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation said it had arrested Martin Koch, chairman and 
managing director of private equity firm Caravel Management, and accused him of taking a 
$1,500,000 bribe to increase the credit limits of two companies being probed over a scandal 
involving the allocation of coal mining permits during the Bush Administration. 
 
 “We are determined to fight corruption at high level and today’s case was one such 
example,” James Comey, FBI director, told the Associated Press news agency.  
 
FBI officers raided 4 locations in New York, Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles and seized 
large amounts of cash, documents and computer records. Comey said other firms were 
involved in the conspiracy. A total of 12 people, including Mr. Koch, are being investigated. 
 
Neither Mr Koch nor other Caravel Management executives could immediately be reached 
for comment.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Salman Khan thanks fans on Twitter for 
watching “Jai Ho” 
 
 
 
“Jai Ho” may not have created wonders at box office as it was expected but that doesn't stop 
Salman Khan from thanking his fans. 
 
The actor, who is loved and supported by his ardent fans, took to Twitter to thanks his fans for 
their support. 
 
 
 
Salman, who had delivered back-to-back hits with “Ek Tha Tiger” and “Dabangg 2,” failed to work 
his magic this time with “Jai Ho.”  
 
The film had collected Rs.83.28 crore at the domestic box office in six days. Everybody had 
expected that the film would cross Rs.100 crore in three days, but the film did not get the bumper 
opening that was expected. 
 
“Jai Ho” isn't expected to match the records of “Chennai Express” or “Dhoom 3.” 
 
We hope Salman will surely be back with a bang in his next release.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Leonardo DiCaprio thanks fans on 
Twitter for watching “Gatsby” 
 
 
 
“The Great Gatsby” may not have created wonders at box office as it was expected but that doesn't 
stop Leonardo DiCaprio from thanking his fans. 
 
The actor, who is loved and supported by his ardent fans, took to Twitter to thanks his fans for their 
support. 
 
 
 
DiCaprio, who had delivered back-to-back hits with “The Departed” and “Inception,” failed to 
work his magic this time with “Gatsby.”  
 
The film collected $38 million at the domestic box office in six days. Everybody had expected that 
the film would cross $50 million in three days, but the film did not get the bumper opening that was 
expected. 
 
“Gatsby” isn't expected to match the records of “J. Edgar” or “Catch Me If You Can.” 
 
We hope Leo will be back with a bang in his next release.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Former Cricketeer Sidhu Becomes 
Chairman of  Charity  
 
By S.K. Roy  | Sep 23, 2014 8:22 PM ET | 
 
 
 
Former cricketeer Navjoth Singh Sidhu was appointed chairman of the board of directors 
of Wickets for the Cure, a charity that seeks to increase awareness of prostate cancer.  
 
Sidhu, 65, was a 10-time All-Star and is a prostate cancer survivor. The Mumbai-based 
charity was founded by broadcaster P.N. Devesh, also a prostate cancer survivor.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Former MLB All-Star Steve Garvey 
Becomes Chairman of  Charity  
 
By Rob Gloster  | Sep 23, 2014 8:22 PM ET | 
 
 
 
Former Major League Baseball player Steve Garvey was appointed chairman of the board of directors of Fans 
for the Cure, a charity that seeks to increase awareness of prostate cancer.  
 
Garvey, 65, was a 10-time All-Star and is a prostate cancer survivor. The New York-based charity was founded 
by broadcaster Ed Randall, also a prostate cancer survivor.  
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
North Korea is eyeing sea-based and 
short-range nuclear weapons, analysts say 
 
By Tim Craig and Karen DeYoung  | September 21, 2014 | 
 
 
 
Seoul, South Korea — In one of the world’s most volatile regions, North Korea is 
advancing toward a sea-based missile capability and expanding its interest in tactical nuclear 
warheads, according to South Korean and Western analysts. 
 
The development of nuclear missiles that could be fired from a ship or submarine would 
give North Korea “second-strike” capability if a catastrophic nuclear exchange destroyed all 
land-based weapons. But the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is 
renewing international concern about the vulnerability of those weapons in a country that is 
home to a secretive, but potentially volatile, regime. 
 
“The assurances North Korea has given the world about the safety of its nuclear program 
will be severely tested with short-range and sea-based systems, but they are coming,” said 
Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based global security 
think tank. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
Pakistan is eyeing sea-based and short-
range nuclear weapons, analysts say 
 
By Tim Craig and Karen DeYoung September 21 
 
 
 
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — In one of the world’s most volatile regions, Pakistan is 
advancing toward a sea-based missile capability and expanding its interest in tactical nuclear 
warheads, according to Pakistani and Western analysts. 
 
The development of nuclear missiles that could be fired from a ship or submarine would 
give Pakistan “second-strike” capability if a catastrophic nuclear exchange destroyed all 
land-based weapons. But the acceleration of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs is 
renewing international concern about the vulnerability of those weapons in a country that is 
home to more than two dozen Islamist extremist groups. 
 
“The assurances Pakistan has given the world about the safety of its nuclear program will 
be severely tested with short-range and sea-based systems, but they are coming,” said 
Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based global security 
think tank. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
ISIS Flags Unfurled at anti-India Protests 
in Kashmir 
 
by Thomas Rose  | 12 Oct 2014 | 
 
 
 
The Times of India claims eyewitnesses reported at least one anti-India protestor waving 
the ISIS flag from atop the gate of one of Kashmir’s largest mosque’s during an anti-India 
demonstration Friday following Muslim prayers in Srinagar, capital of the majority Muslim 
Indian state. Several other protestors reportedly held Islamic State flags. 
 
The demonstration occurred the day after a leading Indian general publicly condemned any 
Indians who support ISIS. "This is something which merits the highest concern of all 
security agencies," said Lt. General Subrata Saha. “Let me tell you,” he added, “We are 
closely monitoring the situation which merits and is getting the highest concern". 
 
The ISIS terrorist army, estimated to total up to 50,000 fighters, consists of fighters not just 
from the Middle East but from around the world, including several thousands from 
Western Europe and North America. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
ISIS Flags Unfurled at anti-Russia 
Protests in Dagestan 
 
by Thomas Rose  | 12 Oct 2014 | 
 
 
 
The Times of Russia claims eyewitnesses reported at least one anti-Russia protestor waving 
the ISIS flag from atop the gate of one of Dagestan’s largest mosque’s during an anti-Russia 
demonstration Friday following Muslim prayers in Makhachkala, capital of the majority 
Muslim Dagestan oblast. Several other protestors reportedly held Islamic State flags. 
 
The demonstration occurred the day after a leading Russian general publicly condemned 
any Russians who support ISIS. "This is something which merits the highest concern of all 
security agencies," said Lt. General Vasily Dmitryev. “Let me tell you,” he added, “We are 
closely monitoring the situation which merits and is getting the highest concern". 
 
The ISIS terrorist army, estimated to total up to 50,000 fighters, consists of fighters not just 
from the Middle East but from around the world, including several thousands from 
Western Europe and North America. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Strike brings life to a halt in Manipur  
Oct 16, 2014 5:49 pm  
 
 
 
Imphal, Oct 16 (ANI): Life came to a halt in Manipur on Thursday in the wake of an 18- 
hour general strike called by separatists. The strike was called by separatist factions to 
protest the Manipur Merger Agreement which paved the way for the merger of Manipur 
with the Indian Union.  
 
All roads in Imphal including national and state highways as well as public places like 
markets wore a deserted look. Home Minister of Manipur, G Gaikhangam said that such 
strikes only meant loss for the already poor state. Schools, colleges, movie theatres, petrol 
pumps and other private institutions remained shut while attendance in government offices 
was poor. Residents majorly stayed indoors. However, emergency services and flights 
remained unaffected and no untoward incidents were reported. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Strike brings life to a halt in Chechnya  
Oct 16, 2014 5:49 pm  
 
 
 
Grozny, Oct 16 (ANI): Life came to a halt in Chechnya on Thursday in the wake of an 18- 
hour general strike called by separatists. The strike was called by separatist factions to 
protest the Chechnya Merger Agreement which paved the way for the final incorporation 
of Chechnya with the Russian Federation.  
 
All roads in Grozny including national and state highways as well as public places like 
markets wore a deserted look. Regional Governor of Manipur, Ramzan Khadirov said that 
such strikes only meant loss for the already poor state. Schools, colleges, movie theatres, 
petrol pumps and other private institutions remained shut while attendance in government 
offices was poor. Residents mostly stayed indoors. However, emergency services and flights 
remained unaffected and no untoward incidents were reported. 
 
  259   
 
  
Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Gun-wielding teen girls from India 
join ISIS 
 
By Chris Perez  | September 10, 2014 | 12:34pm | 
 
 
 
A pair of gun-wielding teenage girls from India are believed to have answered the call to 
jihad in Syria — and may be inspiring others to do the same. 
 
Aliya Ahmed, 16, and Samina Asif, 15, are the daunting duo feared to be encouraging young 
Indian Muslim girls to flee their country and take up arms in Syria to help ISIS spread 
violence, South Asian News reports. 
India’s Home Ministry has confirmed that two additional girls from Mumbai — ages 16 and 
14 — recently were nabbed trying to sneak out of the country and join the Islamic State 
jihadists. 
 
Ahmed and Asif vanished from India earlier this year and paraded their terror involvement 
on social media, posting images of themselves holding AK47s as they stood among several 
armed men, according to SAN. 
 
Indian media dubbed the girls the new face of jihad in Syria two weeks ago and warned that 
others just like them have started to become galvanized by their actions. 
 
“If we can catch them before they leave, we have the chance to work with their parents and 
other institutions to bring the youngsters out of the sphere of influence that prompted them 
to act in this way in the first place,” said Home Ministry spokesman Tilak Sharma. 
 
He added that the problem with teenagers fleeing the country to commit bloodshed abroad 
is something that’s increased greatly and is difficult to fix. 
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Please read the short news story below.  After you read the news story, you will be 
asked to a few short questions concerning your thoughts and feelings about the 
story. 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______ 
 
 
 
Gun-wielding teen girls from Europe 
join ISIS 
 
By Chris Perez  | September 10, 2014 | 12:34pm | 
 
 
 
A pair of gun-wielding teenage girls from Austria are believed to have answered the call to 
jihad in Syria — and may be inspiring others to do the same. 
 
Samra Kesinovic, 16, and Sabina Selimovic, 15, are the daunting duo feared to be 
encouraging young Austrian girls to flee their country and take up arms in Syria to help ISIS 
spread violence, Central European News reports. 
Austria’s Interior Ministry has confirmed that two additional girls from Vienna — ages 16 
and 14 — recently were nabbed trying to sneak out of the country and join the Islamic State 
jihadists. 
 
Kesinovic and Selimovic vanished from Austria earlier this year and paraded their terror 
involvement on social media, posting images of themselves holding AK47s as they stood 
among several armed men, according to CEN. 
Austrian media dubbed the girls the new face of jihad in Syria two weeks ago and warned 
that others just like them have started to become galvanized by their actions. 
 
“If we can catch them before they leave, we have the chance to work with their parents and 
other institutions to bring the youngsters out of the sphere of influence that prompted 
them to act in this way in the first place,” said Interior Ministry spokesman Alexander 
Marakovits. 
 
He added that the problem with teenagers fleeing the country to commit bloodshed abroad 
is something that’s increased greatly and is difficult to fix. 
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SECTION 9B: News Story Feedback 
 
 
Is this story interesting to you? 
 
  Very interesting 
 
  Slightly Interesting 
 
  Neither interesting nor uninteresting 
 
  Slightly Boring 
 
  Completely Boring 
 
 
 
Are the events/issues discussed in this story important? 
 
  Very Important 
 
  Somewhat Important 
 
  Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 
  Somewhat Unimportant 
 
  Not Important at All 
 
 
 
If you were using Facebook, and you saw this story in your Facebook news feed, would 
you share it with your friends? 
 
  Definitely would   Probably would   Don't know   Probably would not   Definitely would not 
 
 
If you were using Twitter, and you saw this story in your feed, would you re-Tweet it to 
your followers? 
 
  Definitely would   Probably would   Don't know   Probably would not   Definitely would not 
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APPENDIX D: SELECTED SURVEY RESULTS (BASIC 
BACKGROUND AND INDEXED VARIABLES) 
 
 
QUESTION CLUSTER 
 
Native Sample 
 
NRI Sample 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Average Age 
 
32 
 
25 
 
 
Gender Balance 
 
Male (809) 
Female (386) 
 
Male (378) 
Female (58) 
 
 
Home State Distribution 
 
Tamil Nadu (533) 
Kerala (292) 
Karnataka (83) 
Andhra Pradesh (58) 
Maharashtra (47) 
Telangana (36) 
Delhi (National Capital 
Territory) (31) 
Uttar Pradesh (19) 
West Bengal (16) 
Puducherry (Pondicherry) 
(12) 
Haryana (11) 
Orissa (11) 
Goa (8) 
Gujarat (7) 
Madhya Pradesh (7) 
Rajasthan (4) 
Chandigarh (4) 
Jharkhand (2) 
Chhattisgarh (2) 
Punjab (2) 
Jammu & Kashmir (2) 
Assam (1) 
Uttarakhand (1) 
Manipur (1) 
Andaman & Nicobar Islands
 (1) 
 
 
Maharashtra (176) 
Andhra Pradesh (46) 
Telangana (46) 
Tamil Nadu (44) 
Delhi (National Capital 
Territory) (42) 
Karnataka (25) 
Jharkhand (16) 
Gujarat (15) 
Kerala (13) 
Rajasthan (12) 
Lakshadweep (1) 
2014 VOTE 
  
 
Did you vote in the 2014 General 
Election? 
 
Yes (1113) 
No (82) 
 
 
Yes (151) 
No (285) 
 
 
  263   
2019 VOTE 
  
If the current government stays in power, 
India's next General Election is 
scheduled to take place in 2019.  Will you 
vote in the 2019 General Election? 
Definitely will (762) 
Probably will (270) 
Don't know (92) 
Probably will not (55) 
Definitely will not (16) 
Definitely will (178) 
Probably will (105) 
Don't know (144) 
Probably will not (8) 
Definitely will not (1) 
 
ABSENTEE VOTE 
  
India does not currently provide absentee 
ballots for citizens / living abroad. If 
India were to de… 
N/A Definitely yes (360) 
Probably yes (38) 
Maybe (1) 
Probably not (20) 
Definitely not (17) 
 
IDENTITY 
  
How important is religion in your life? Very Important (456) 
Somewhat Important (405) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (135) 
Somewhat Unimportant 
(102) 
Not at all Important (97) 
Very Important (51) 
Somewhat Important (103) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (92) 
Somewhat Unimportant (62) 
Not at all Important (128) 
 
How important is caste affiliation in your 
life? 
Very Important (191) 
Somewhat Important
 (340) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (239) 
Somewhat Unimportant 
(128) 
Not at all Important (297) 
 
Very Important (0) 
Somewhat Important (16) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (44) 
Somewhat Unimportant (15) 
Not at all Important (361) 
How many Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) 
do you know who are living in the 
United States? 
0 (215) 
 1 – 10 (610) 
11 to 25 (170) 
26-50 (72) 
More than 50 (128) 
0 (31) 
1 to 10 (113) 
11 to 25 (54) 
26-50 (48) 
More than 50 (190) 
 
MIGRATION IMPETUS 
  
Do you want to stay in India 
permanently, or would you like to leave? 
Strongly Wish to Leave (79) 
Somewhat Interested in 
Leaving (160) 
Not Sure/Indifferent (136) 
Somewhat Interested in 
Staying (152) 
Strongly Wish to Stay (668) 
 
N/A 
Do you want to stay in the United States 
permanently, or would you / like to 
return to India? 
N/A Strongly Wish to Stay in the 
US (64) 
Somewhat Interested in 
Staying in the US (76) 
Not Sure/Indifferent (97) 
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Somewhat Interested in 
Returning to India (147) 
Strongly Wish to Return to 
India (52) 
 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
  
What is your highest level of education? Masters Degree or 
Doctorate (313) 
Some Graduate 
Coursework/Currently 
Enrolled (59) 
Bachelors Degree (681) 
Some University 
Coursework/Currently 
Enrolled (51) 
Completed Secondary 
School (51) 
Some Secondary School
 (23) 
Completed Primary School
 (9) 
Some Primary School (6) 
No formal schooling (2) 
 
Masters Degree or 
Doctorate (285) 
Some Graduate 
Coursework/Currently 
Enrolled (114) 
Bachelors Degree (36) 
Some University 
Coursework/Currently 
Enrolled (1) 
How would you describe your level of 
wealth? 
Wealthy (16) 
Upper Middle Class (177) 
Middle Class (854) 
Working Class (127) 
Poor (21) 
 
Wealthy (17) 
Upper Middle Class (114) 
Middle Class (231) 
Working Class (74) 
Poor (0) 
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM 
USAGE 
  
How often do you use the internet? Daily (979) 
2-3 Times a Week (55) 
Once a Week (67) 
2-3 Times a Month (39) 
Once a Month (41) 
Less than Once a Month (8) 
Never (6) 
 
Daily (436) 
How often do you use your mobile 
phone? 
Daily (969) 
2-3 Times a Week (44) 
2-3 Times a Week (44) 
Once a Week (61) 
2-3 Times a Month (42) 
Once a Month (33) 
Less than Once a Month 
(17) 
Never (29) 
 
Daily (436) 
How often do you use your mobile 
phone to access the internet? 
Daily (689) 
2-3 Times a Week (104) 
Once a Week (48) 
Daily (436) 
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2-3 Times a Month (70) 
Once a Month (52) 
Less than Once a Month 
(50) 
Never (182) 
 
How often do you use Facebook? Daily (641 
2-3 Times a Week (199 
Once a Week(104) 
2-3 Times a Month (64) 
Once a Month (37) 
Less than Once a Month 
(32) 
Never (118) 
 
Daily (279) 
2-3 Times a Week (83) 
Once a Week (32) 
2-3 Times a Month (17) 
How often do you use Twitter? Daily (99) 
2-3 Times a Week (105) 
Once a Week (93) 
2-3 Times a Month (72) 
Once a Month (78) 
Less than Once a Month 
(85) 
Never (663) 
 
Daily (51) 
2-3 Times a Week (54) 
Once a Week (46) 
2-3 Times a Month (20) 
Once a Month (11) 
Never (254) 
Have you ever used social media to 
VIEW an article, website, video, blog, 
etc.? 
5+ times (291) 
4 or 5 times (169) 
2 or 3 times (415) 
Once (202) 
Never (118) 
5+ times (266) 
4 or 5 times (34) 
2 or 3 times (88) 
Once (0) 
Never (48) 
 
Have you ever used social media to 
SHARE an article, website, video, blog, 
etc.? 
5+ times (245) 
4 or 5 times (147) 
2 or 3 times (369) 
Once (217) 
Never (217) 
 
5+ times (161) 
4 or 5 times (16) 
2 or 3 times (124) 
Once (16) 
Never (119) 
Have you ever used social media to 
CREATE an article, website, video, blog, 
etc.? 
5+ times (95) 
4 or 5 times (114) 
2 or 3 times (257) 
Once (239) 
Never (490) 
5+ times (83) 
4 or 5 times (18) 
2 or 3 times (0) 
Once (0) 
Never (335) 
 
How often do you share or receive 
information about political matters? 
Very Often (54) 
Often (131) 
Sometimes (342) 
Rarely (345) 
Never (323) 
 
Very Often (44) 
Often (102) 
Sometimes (122) 
Rarely (108) 
Never (60) 
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM 
VALUE 
  
Do you think social media technology is 
useful? 
Definitely useful (526) 
Probably useful (338) 
Maybe (239) 
Definitely useful (206) 
Probably useful (148) 
Maybe (82) 
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Probably not useful (66) 
Definitely not useful (26) 
 
What is the impact of social media 
technology on your quality of life? 
Very Positive (226) 
Somewhat Positive (555) 
No Impact/Neutral (281) 
Somewhat Negative (102) 
Very Negative (31) 
 
Very Positive (15) 
Somewhat Positive (236) 
No Impact/Neutral (121) 
Somewhat Negative (64) 
CIVIC COMMUNICATION 
  
How often do you discuss politics with 
your PARENTS? 
Daily (86) 
2-3 Times a Week (109) 
Once a Week (112) 
2-3 Times a Month (195) 
Once a Month (193) 
Less than Once a Month 
(322) 
Never (178) 
Daily (0) 
2-3 Times a Week (49) 
Once a Week (36) 
2-3 Times a Month (133) 
Once a Month (79) 
Less than Once a Month 
(105) 
Never (34) 
 
How often do you discuss politics with 
your SIBLINGS AND EXTENDED 
FAMILY? 
Daily (77) 
2-3 Times a Week (100) 
Once a Week (127) 
2-3 Times a Month (198) 
Once a Month (218) 
Less than Once a Month 
(303) 
Never (172) 
Daily (0) 
2-3 Times a Week (53) 
Once a Week (12) 
2-3 Times a Month (63) 
Once a Month (76) 
Less than Once a Month 
(113) 
Never (119) 
 
How often do you discuss politics with 
your FRIENDS? 
Daily (121) 
2-3 Times a Week (162) 
Once a Week (156) 
2-3 Times a Month (231) 
Once a Month (206) 
Less than Once a Month 
(219) 
Never (100) 
Daily (65) 
2-3 Times a Week (62) 
Once a Week (66) 
2-3 Times a Month (111) 
Once a Month (46) 
Less than Once a Month 
(85) 
Never (1) 
 
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
  
Do you trust the Central government? Strongly Trust (140) 
Trust (531) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(332) 
Distrust (134) 
Strongly Distrust (58) 
 
Strongly Trust (62) 
Trust (77) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(226) 
Distrust (56) 
Strongly Distrust (15) 
Do you trust your state government? Strongly Trust (112) 
Trust (467) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(363) 
Distrust (150) 
Strongly Distrust (103) 
Strongly Trust (0) 
Trust (77) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(238) 
Distrust (55) 
Strongly Distrust (66) 
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How much do you trust your local 
government? 
Strongly Trust (78) 
Trust (488) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(378) 
Distrust (169) 
Strongly Distrust (82) 
 
Strongly Trust (0) 
Trust (31) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(295) 
Distrust (78) 
Strongly Distrust (32) 
How much do you trust labor unions? Strongly Trust (72) 
Trust (420) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(438) 
Distrust (177) 
Strongly Distrust (88) 
Strongly Trust (0) 
Trust (63) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(192) 
Distrust (179) 
Strongly Distrust (2) 
 
How much do you trust the news media? Strongly Trust (129) 
Trust (532) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust 
(338) 
Distrust (148) 
Strongly Distrust (48) 
 
Strongly Trust (16) 
Trust (82) 
Neither Trust nor Distrust
 (185) 
Distrust (94) 
Strongly Distrust (59) 
CIVIC VALUES 
  
How important is it to follow laws and 
regulations? 
Very Important (636) 
Somewhat Important (346) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (145) 
Somewhat Unimportant (52) 
Not at all Important (16) 
 
Very Important (287) 
Somewhat Important (133) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (16) 
How important is it to pay taxes? Very Important (700) 
Somewhat Important (328) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (107) 
Somewhat Unimportant (45) 
Not at all Important (15) 
 
Very Important (408) 
Somewhat Important (28) 
How important is it to vote? Very Important (834) 
Somewhat Important (195) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (101) 
Somewhat Unimportant (46) 
Not at all Important (19) 
 
Very Important (371) 
Somewhat Important (29) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (36) 
How important is it to be informed 
about political events? 
Very Important (387) 
Somewhat Important (486) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (219) 
Somewhat Unimportant (68) 
Not at all Important (35) 
 
Very Important (262) 
Somewhat Important (137) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (37) 
How interested are you in politics? Very Interested (278) 
Somewhat Interested (501) 
Very Interested (190) 
Somewhat Interested (166) 
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Neither Interested nor 
Uninterested (229) 
Somewhat Uninterested 
(122) 
Not at all interested (65) 
 
Neither Interested nor 
Uninterested (63) 
Somewhat Uninterested (15) 
Not at all interested (2) 
 
PRIOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
(INDIA) 
  
Have you ever contacted a political 
party? 
More than 5 times (78) 
4 or 5 times (91) 
2 or 3 times (251) 
Once (225) 
Never (550) 
 
More than 5 times (0) 
4 or 5 times (0) 
2 or 3 times (18) 
Once (65) 
Never (353) 
Have you ever contacted an elected 
official? 
More than 5 times  (70) 
4 or 5 time (82) 
2 or 3 times (236) 
Once (275) 
Never (532) 
 
More than 5 times (16) 
4 or 5 times (0) 
2 or 3 times (2) 
Once (16) 
Never (402) 
Have you ever contacted a government 
administrator? 
More than 5 times (134) 
4 or 5 times (118) 
2 or 3 times (287) 
Once (279) 
Never (377) 
 
More than 5 times  (34) 
4 or 5 times (0) 
2 or 3 times (81) 
Once (70) 
Never (251) 
Have you ever contacted a religious 
organization? 
More than 5 times (148) 
4 or 5 times (114) 
2 or 3 times (303) 
Once (266) 
Never (364) 
 
More than 5 times (65) 
4 or 5 times (16) 
2 or 3 times (34) 
Once (15) 
Never (306) 
Have you ever contacted a non-
governmental organization (NGO)? 
More than 5 times (104) 
4 or 5 times (119) 
2 or 3 times (263) 
Once (289) 
Never (420) 
More than 5 Times (112) 
4 or 5 Times (15) 
2 or 3 Times (90) 
Once (42) 
Never (177) 
 
Have you ever contacted a labor 
organization/trade union? 
More than 5 times (60) 
4 or 5 times (83) 
2 or 3 times (202) 
Once (232) 
Never (618) 
 
More than 5 times (0) 
4 or 5 times (0) 
2 or 3 times (28) 
Once (0) 
Never (408) 
Have you ever donated money to a 
political party or candidate? 
More than 5 times (86) 
4 or 5 times (71) 
2 or 3 times (205) 
Once (206) 
Never (627) 
 
More than 5 times (0) 
4 or 5 times (0) 
2 or 3 times (0) 
Once (62) 
Never (374) 
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Have you ever requested resources from 
a government agency for business or 
personal reasons? 
More than 5 times  (66) 
4 or 5 times (112) 
2 or 3 times (270) 
Once (288) 
Never (459) 
More than 5 Times (31) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (41) 
Once (7) 
Never (357) 
 
Have you ever requested resources from 
a government agency for education or 
work reasons? 
More than 5 times  (64) 
4 or 5 times (108) 
2 or 3 times (299) 
Once (299) 
Never (425) 
More than 5 Times (31) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (89) 
Once (34) 
Never (282) 
 
PRIOR CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
(US) 
  
Have you ever contacted a political 
party? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (16) 
Once (7) 
Never (413) 
 
Have you ever contacted an elected 
official? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (16) 
Once (36) 
Never (384) 
 
Have you ever contacted a government 
administrator? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (16) 
2 or 3 Times (18) 
Once (45) 
Never (357) 
 
Have you ever contacted a religious 
organization? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (53) 
Once (17) 
Never (366) 
 
Have you ever contacted a non-
governmental organization (NGO)? 
N/A More than 5 Times (27) 
4 or 5 Times (19) 
2 or 3 Times (27) 
Once (55) 
Never (308) 
 
Have you ever contacted a labor 
organization/trade union? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (0) 
Once (0) 
Never (436) 
 
Have you ever donated money to a 
political party or candidate? 
N/A More than 5 Times (0) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (1) 
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Once (2) 
Never (433) 
 
Have you ever requested resources from 
a government agency for business or 
personal reasons? 
N/A More than 5 Time (19) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (76) 
Once (17) 
Never (324) 
 
Have you ever requested resources from 
a government agency for education or 
work reasons? 
N/A More than 5 Time (12) 
4 or 5 Times (0) 
2 or 3 Times (76) 
Once (0) 
Never (348) 
 
FUTURE SOCIAL MEDIA 
PLATFORM USAGE 
  
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major international 
political events? 
Definitely will (208) 
Probably will (592) 
Don't know (205) 
Probably will not (142) 
Definitely will not (48) 
 
N/A 
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major domestic political 
events? 
Definitely will (251) 
Probably will (569) 
Don't know (214) 
Probably will not (117) 
Definitely will not (44) 
 
N/A 
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major Indian political 
events? 
N/A Definitely will (143) 
Probably will (184) 
Don't know (51) 
Probably will not (58) 
Definitely will not (0) 
 
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major US political 
events? 
N/A Definitely will (160) 
Probably will (172) 
Don't know (20) 
Probably will not (51) 
Definitely will not (33) 
 
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major global (non-
Indian) political events? 
N/A Definitely will (171) 
Probably will (177) 
Don't know (19) 
Probably will not (36) 
Definitely will not (33) 
 
Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major non-political 
events? 
Definitely will (317) 
Probably will (526) 
Don't know (205) 
Probably will not (112) 
Definitely will not (35) 
Definitely will (191) 
Probably will (166) 
Don't know (55) 
Probably will not (24) 
Definitely will not (0) 
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Do you think you will use social media to 
pay attention to major personal/family 
events? 
Definitely will (347) 
Probably will (497) 
Don't know (192) 
Probably will not (114) 
Definitely will not (45) 
Definitely will (176) 
Probably will (140) 
Don't know (63) 
Probably will not (57) 
Definitely will not (0) 
 
STORY INTEREST 
  
Is this story interesting to you? Very interesting (198) 
Slightly Interesting
 (450) 
Neither interesting nor 
uninteresting (325) 
Slightly Boring (143) 
Completely Boring (35) 
 
Very interesting (41) 
Slightly Interesting (113) 
Neither interesting nor 
uninteresting (47) 
Slightly Boring (22) 
Completely Boring (7) 
Are the events/issues discussed in this 
story important? 
Very Important (295) 
Somewhat Important (468) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (247) 
Somewhat Unimportant 
(112) 
Not Important at All (29) 
 
Very Important (66) 
Somewhat Important (114) 
Neither Important nor 
Unimportant (23) 
Somewhat Unimportant (21) 
Not Important at All (6) 
STORY SHARING 
  
If you were using Facebook, and you saw 
this story in your Facebook news feed, 
would you share it across your network? 
Definitely would (191) 
Probably would (432) 
Don't know (232) 
Probably would not (213) 
Definitely would not (83) 
 
Definitely would (0) 
Probably would (22) 
Don't know (43) 
Probably would not (125) 
Definitely would not (40) 
If you were using Twitter, and you saw 
this story in your feed, would you retweet 
it across your network? 
Definitely would (172) 
Probably would (376) 
Don't know (311) 
Probably would not (185) 
Definitely would not (107) 
 
Definitely would (0) 
Probably would (30) 
Don't know (51) 
Probably would not (90) 
Definitely would not (59) 
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APPENDIX E:  FOLLOW-UP STATISTICAL TESTING OF 
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
The first two-sample t-test considered the primary dependent outcome, and the 
results of this test are shown below, in Table E-A. 
Table E-A: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Likelihood to Vote in 
the 2019 General Election) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 4.428452 4.034404 
Variance 0.836376 0.833296 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 774  
t Stat 7.711439  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646825  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.963034   
 
 With respect to the likelihood to vote in the 2019 General Election, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 4.424, σ2 = 0.836) and 
NRI (µ = 4.034, σ2 = 0.833) samples (t[774] = 7.711, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated 
graphically in Figure E-1, below. 
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Figure E-1: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Likelihood to 
Vote in the 2019 General Election) 
 
 
Independent Variables Significant to Both Sample Populations 
Civic Communication Activity 
A second two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of civic 
communication (xcca), which was found to be significant in the regression modeling for both 
the Native and NRI samples, but with opposing directionality of influence.  The results of 
this test are shown below, in Table E-B. 
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Table E-B: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Civic Communication 
Activity) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 10.60586 10.55046 
Variance 21.97936 14.4917 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 944  
t Stat 0.243808  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.403716  
t Critical one-tail 1.646469  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.807432  
t Critical two-tail 1.96248   
 
With respect to indexed civic communication scores, there was no significant 
difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 10.606, σ2 = 21.979) and NRI (µ = 
10.550, σ2 = 14.492) samples (t[944] = 0.244, , p > 0.05).  This result is illustrated graphically 
in Figure E-2, below. 
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Figure E-2: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Civic 
Communication Activity) 
 
 
Civic Values 
The third two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of the perceived 
importance of civic values (xcv), which was found to be significant in the regression modeling 
for both the Native and NRI samples, but with opposing directionality of influence.  The 
results of this test are shown below, in Table E-C. 
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Table E-C: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Civic Values) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 20.7682 23.05046 
Variance 12.11289 3.257218 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1446  
t Stat -17.1997  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.645908  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.82 X 10-60****  
t Critical two-tail 1.961606   
 
With respect to indexed civic values scores, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 20.768, σ2 = 12.113) and NRI (µ = 23.050, σ2 
= 3.257) sample (t[1446] = -17.2, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated graphically in Figure 
E-3, below. 
Figure E-3: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Civic Values) 
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Prior Civic Participation 
The fourth two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of prior civic 
participation (xcvp in the Native sample; xcpi in the NRI sample) which was found to be 
significant in the regression modeling for both the Native and NRI samples, but with 
opposing directionality of influence.  The results of this test are shown below, in Table E-
D. 
Table E-D: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Prior Civic 
Participation) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 19.8159 14.19266 
Variance 63.22906 32.89613 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1068  
t Stat 15.6953  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646282  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.962188   
 
With respect to indexed civic participation scores, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 19.816, σ2 = 63.229) and NRI (µ = 14.193, σ2 
= 32.896) samples (t[1068] = 15.695, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated graphically in 
Figure E-4, below. 
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Figure E-4: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Prior Civic 
Participation) 
 
 
Social Media Platform Usage 
 
The fifth two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of social media 
platform usage (xsmu) which was found to be significant in the regression modeling for both 
the Native and NRI samples, but with opposing directionality of influence.  The results of 
this test are shown below, in Table E-E. 
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Table E-E: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Social Media Platform 
Usage) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 37.46611 42.20183 
Variance 57.43666 33.33388 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1009  
t Stat -13.4206  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646365  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.962318   
 
With respect to indexed social media platform usage scores, there was a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 37.466, σ2 = 57.437) and NRI (µ = 
42.202, σ2 = 33.334) populations (t[1009] = -13.4206, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated 
graphically in Figure E-5, below. 
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Figure E-5: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Social Media 
Platform Usage) 
 
 
Expected Future Social Media Platform Usage 
 
A sixth two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of expected future 
social media platform usage (xfut) which was found to be significant, and positive, in the 
regression modeling for both the Native and NRI samples.  The results of this test are 
shown below, in Table E-F. 
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Table E-F: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Future Social Media 
Platform Usage) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 15.01339 19.96101 
Variance 10.75861 19.09503 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 623  
t Stat -21.532  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.647303  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.963779 
 
With respect to indexed future social media platform usage scores, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 15.013, σ2 = 10.759) and 
NRI (µ = 19.961, σ2 = 19.095) sample (t[623] = -21.532, p < 0.0001).  This result is 
illustrated graphically in Figure E-6, below. 
Figure E-6: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Future Social 
Media Platform Usage) 
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Independent Variables Significant to the Native Sample Exclusively 
Socioeconomic Status 
 
The seventh two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of 
socioeconomic status (xses), which was found to be significant in the regression modeling for 
both the Native sample only.  The results of this test are shown below, in Table E-G. 
Table E-G: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Socioeconomic 
Status) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 10.35565 7.736239 
Variance 2.318132 1.036017 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1155  
t Stat 39.87131  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646174  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.96202   
 
With respect to indexed socioeconomic status scores, there was a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 10.356, σ2 = 2.318) and NRI (µ = 
7.736, σ2 = 1.036) samples (t[1155] = 39.871, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated 
graphically in Figure E-7, below. 
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Figure E-7: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups 
(Socioeconomic Status) 
 
Institutional Trust 
 
The eighth two-sample t-test considered the independent variable of institutional 
trust (xitr), which was found to be significant in the regression modeling for both the Native 
sample only.  The results of this test are shown below, in Table E-H. 
Table E-H: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (Institutional Trust) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 16.64351464 14.25688 
Variance 12.65505631 6.913171 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1041  
t Stat 14.67596325  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646318694  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.96224543   
 
With respect to indexed institutional trust scores, there was a significant difference between 
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the mean scores for the Native (µ = 16.644, σ2 = 12.655) and NRI (µ = 14.257, σ2 = 6.913) 
samples (t[1041] = 14.676, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated graphically in Figure E-8, 
below. 
Figure E-8: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Institutional 
Trust) 
 
Independent Variables Significant to the NRI Sample Exclusively 
Perceived News Story Interest and Importance 
 
A ninth test was considered the mean index scores connected to news story interest 
(zrxi), which was found to be significant for the NRI population sample only.  The results of 
this test are shown below, in Table E-I. 
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Table E-I: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (News Story Interest) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 7.051883 7.605505 
Variance 4.918579 3.696889 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 884  
t Stat -4.93302  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646579  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.962651   
 
With respect to indexed news story interest scores, there was a significant difference between 
the mean scores for the Native (µ = 7.052, σ2 = 4.919) and NRI (µ = 7.606, σ2 = 3.697) 
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samples (t[884] = -4.933, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated graphically in Figure E-9, 
below. 
Figure E-9: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (News Story 
Interest) 
 
Expectations Concerning News Story Sharing via Social Media Platforms 
 
A tenth t- test was conducted to examine the mean index scores connected to news 
story sharing (zrxs), which was found to be significant for the NRI population sample only.  
The results of this test are shown below, in Table E-J. 
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Table E-J: Two-sample t-Test Assuming Unequal Variances (News Story Sharing) 
  Native NRI 
Mean 6.411715 4.288991 
Variance 6.287635 2.9002 
Observations 1195 436 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 1136  
t Stat 19.44799  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.646196  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.962054   
 
With respect to indexed news story interest scores, there was a significant difference between 
the mean scores for the Native (µ = 6.412, σ2 = 6.288) and NRI (µ = 4.289, σ2 = 2.900) 
samples (t[1136] = 19.448, p < 0.0001).  This result is illustrated graphically in Figure E-10, 
below. 
Figure E-10: Mean Differential Across Native and NRI Sample Groups (Story 
Sharing) 
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APPENDIX F: FOLLOW-UP STATISTICAL TESTING OF NEWS 
SENSITIVITY RESULTS 
Granular Examination of News Story Interest 
Variation based on News Story Intensity 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on news interest across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of 
this test are shown below in Table E-K. 
Table E-K: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Intensity for 
Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
SOFT 282 2059 7.301418 4.488895   
MEDIUM 392 2735 6.977041 4.544229   
HARD 477 3341 7.004193 5.050403   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 20.54975 2 10.27487 2.167438 0.114939 3.003563 
Within Groups 5442.164 1148 4.740561    
       
Total 5462.714 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on news interest was not 
significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 1148] = 2.18, p > 0.05).  Because 
there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were 
performed. 
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 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on news interest across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of this 
test are shown below in Table E-L. 
Table E-L: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Intensity for 
NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
SOFT  59 301 5.101695 3.230859   
MEDIUM 154 1153 7.487013 3.702445   
HARD 222 1862 8.387387 1.306266   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 507.6216 2 253.8108 105.1714 0.00038**** 3.016603 
Within Groups 1042.549 432 2.413307    
       
Total 1550.17 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on news interest was 
significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] = 105.174, p < 0.0001).  Because 
significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-
tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “medium” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Li. 
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Table E-Li: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and 
Medium News Story Intensity) 
  Soft Medium 
Mean 5.101695 7.487013 
Variance 3.230859 3.702445 
Observations 59 154 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 112  
t Stat -8.49723  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.658573  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.981372   
 
With respect to the soft and medium-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 5.102, σ2 = 3.231) and medium (µ = 7.487, σ2 = 
3.702) sub-samples (t[112] = -8.497, p < 0.0001).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of “medium” versus “hard” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Lii. 
Table E-Lii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Medium 
and Hard News Story Intensity) 
  Medium Hard 
Mean 7.487013 8.387387 
Variance 3.702445 1.306266 
Observations 154 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 228  
t Stat -5.20474  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.651564  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.970423   
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With respect to the medium and hard-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 7.487, σ2 = 3.702) and medium (µ = 8.387, σ2 = 
1.306) sub-samples (t[228] = -5.205, p < 0.0001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “hard” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-
Liii. 
Table E-Liii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and 
Hard News Story Intensity 
  Soft Hard 
Mean 5.101695 8.387387 
Variance 3.230859 1.306266 
Observations 59 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 71  
t Stat -13.3423  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.6666  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.993943   
With respect to the soft and hard-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 5.102, σ2 = 3.231) and hard (µ = 8.387, σ2 = 
1.306) sub-samples (t[71] = -13.342, p < 0.0001).   
Variation based on News Story Location 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story location 
on news interest across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of this test 
are shown below in Table E-M. 
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Table E-M: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Location for 
Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 517 3624 7.009671 4.963085   
General Intl. 190 1366 7.189474 4.164968   
India/S. Asia 444 3145 7.083333 4.762792   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 4.666903 2 2.333452 0.490799 0.612266 3.003563 
Within Groups 5458.047 1148 4.754397    
       
Total 5462.714 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on news interest was not 
significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 1148] = 0.491, p > 0.05).  Because 
there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were 
performed. 
 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
location on news interest across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of this 
test are shown below in Table E-N. 
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Table E-N: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Location for 
NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 189 1308 6.920635 2.286221   
General Intl. 120 1051 8.758333 0.722619   
India/S. Asia 126 957 7.595238 6.290857   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 248.0118 2 124.0059 41.13981 0.000**** 3.016603 
Within Groups 1302.158 432 3.014255    
       
Total 1550.17 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on news interest was 
significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] = 41.14, p < 0.0001).  Because 
significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-
tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of the United States versus 
General International news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in  
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Table E-Ni. 
Table E-Ni: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United 
States vs. General International Locale) 
  US Gen. Intl. 
Mean 6.920634921 8.758333333 
Variance 2.286220871 0.722619048 
Observations 189 120 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 303  
t Stat -13.65263031  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.649898073  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000***  
t Critical two-tail 1.967824098   
 
With respect to the United States and General International treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 6.921, σ2 = 2.286) 
and General International (µ = 8.758, σ2 = 0.723) sub-samples (t[303] = -13.653, p < 
0.0001).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of General International versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in  
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Table E-Nii. 
Table E-Nii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (General 
International vs. Indian/South Asian Locale) 
  Gen. Intl. India/S. Asia 
Mean 8.758333333 7.595238095 
Variance 0.722619048 6.290857143 
Observations 120 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 155  
t Stat 4.917202485  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.654743774  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.975387131   
 
With respect to the General International and India/S. Asia treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the General International (µ = 8.758, σ2 = 
0.723) and India/S. Asia (µ = 7.595, σ2 = 6.291) sub-samples (t[155] = 4.917, p < 0.0001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of United States versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in  
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Table E-Niii. 
Table E-Niii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United 
States vs. Indian/South Asian Locale) 
  US India/S. Asia 
Mean 6.920634921 7.595238095 
Variance 2.286220871 6.290857143 
Observations 189 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 186  
t Stat -2.708750721  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003692103  
t Critical one-tail 1.653087138  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.007384205**  
t Critical two-tail 1.972800114   
 
With respect to the United States and India/S. Asia treatments, there was a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 6.921, σ2 = 2.286) and 
India/S. Asia (µ = 7.595, σ2 = 6.291) sub-samples (t[186] = -2.709, p < 0.01).   
Variation based on News Story Actor Nationality 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story location 
on news interest across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of this test 
are shown below in Table E-O. 
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Table E-O: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Actor 
Nationality for Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 243 1734 7.135802 4.217019   
NRI/PIO 183 1278 6.983607 5.038191   
Generic U.S. Natl. 334 2346 7.023952 4.936362   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 2.822279 2 1.411139 0.298282 0.742179 3.007619 
Within Groups 3581.278 757 4.730882    
       
Total 3584.1 759         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on news interest was not 
significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 757] = 0.298, p > 0.05).  Because 
there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were 
performed. 
 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news actor 
nationality on news interest across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of 
this test are shown below in Table E-P. 
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Table E-P: One-Way ANOVA for News Interest based on News Story Actor 
Nationality for NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 95 695 7.315789 7.303471   
NRI/PIO 86 567 6.593023 2.550068   
Generic U.S. Natl. 103 741 7.194175 1.922711   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 26.80911 2 13.40456 3.426128 0.033877* 3.027898 
Within Groups 1099.399 281 3.912451    
       
Total 1126.208 283         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news actor nationality on news interest 
was significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 281] = 3.426, p < 0.05).  Because 
significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-
tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of Native versus NRI/PIO news 
story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Pi. 
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Table E-Pi: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Native vs. 
NRI/PIO) 
  Native NRI/PIO 
Mean 7.315789474 6.593023256 
Variance 7.303471445 2.550068399 
Observations 95 86 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 155  
t Stat 2.214423333  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.014129526  
t Critical one-tail 1.654743774  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.028259053*  
t Critical two-tail 1.975387131   
 
With respect to the Native and NRI/PIO treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 7.316, σ2 = 7.303) and NRI/PIO (µ = 6.593, σ2 
= 2.550) sub-samples (t[155] = 2.214, p < 0.01).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of Native versus Generic U.S. 
National news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Pii. 
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Table E-Pii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Native 
vs. Generic U.S. National) 
  Native Gen. Amer. 
Mean 7.315789474 7.194174757 
Variance 7.303471445 1.922710832 
Observations 95 103 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 138  
t Stat 0.393441767  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.347300207  
t Critical one-tail 1.655970382  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.694600415  
t Critical two-tail 1.977303542   
 
With respect to the Native and Generic U.S. National treatments, there was not a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 7.316, σ2 = 7.303) and Generic U.S. 
National (µ = 7.194, σ2 = 1.922) sub-samples (t[138] = 0.393, p > 0.05).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of NRI/PIO versus Generic 
U.S. National news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table 
E-Piii. 
Table E-Piii: Mean Differential for Interest Across NRI Sample Subgroups 
(NRI/PIO vs. Generic U.S. National) 
  NRI/PIO Gen. Amer. 
Mean 6.593023256 7.194174757 
Variance 2.550068399 1.922710832 
Observations 86 103 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 170  
t Stat -2.734794681  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.003451888  
t Critical one-tail 1.653866317  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.006903776**  
t Critical two-tail 1.974016708   
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With respect to the NRI/PIO and Generic U.S. National treatments, there was a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the NRI/PIO (µ = 6.593, σ2 = 2.550) and Generic 
U.S. National (µ = 7.194, σ2 = 1.922) sub-samples (t[170] = -2.735, p < 0.01).   
Granular Examination of News Story Sharing 
 
Variation based on News Story Intensity 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on news sharing across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of 
this test are shown below in Table E-Q. 
Table E-Q: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Intensity for 
Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Soft 282 1789 6.343972 6.681974   
Medium 392 2548 6.5 5.667519   
Hard 477 3061 6.417191 6.197435   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 4.078654 2 2.039327 0.332379 0.717285 3.003563 
Within Groups 7043.614 1148 6.135552    
       
Total 7047.692 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on news sharing was not 
significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 1148] = 0.332, p > 0.05).  Because 
there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were 
performed. 
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 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on news sharing across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of this 
test are shown below in Table E-R. 
Table E-R: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Intensity for 
NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Soft 59 164 2.779661 0.967855   
Medium 154 747 4.850649 3.944869   
Hard 222 959 4.31982 1.81128   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 183.1561 2 91.57805 37.32261 0.000**** 3.016603 
Within Groups 1059.993 432 2.453688    
       
Total 1243.149 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on news sharing was 
significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] = 37.323, p < 0.0001).  Because 
significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-
tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “medium” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Ri. 
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Table E-Ri: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and 
Medium News Story Intensity) 
  Soft Medium 
Mean 2.779661 4.850649 
Variance 0.967855 3.944869 
Observations 59 154 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 198  
t Stat -10.1029  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.652586  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00019****  
t Critical two-tail 1.972017   
 
With respect to the soft and medium-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 2.78, σ2 = 0.968) and medium (µ = 4.851, σ2 = 
3.945) sub-samples (t[198] = -10.103, p < 0.0001).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of “medium” versus “hard” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Rii. 
Table E-Rii: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Medium 
and Hard News Story Intensity) 
  Medium Hard 
Mean 4.850649 4.31982 
Variance 3.944869 1.81128 
Observations 154 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 249  
t Stat 2.888403  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.002106  
t Critical one-tail 1.650996  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.004213**  
t Critical two-tail 1.969537   
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With respect to the medium and hard-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the medium (µ = 4.851, σ2 = 3.945) and hard (µ = 4.32, σ2 = 
1.811) sub-samples (t[112] = -8.497, p < 0.0001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “hard” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-
Riii. 
Table E-Riii: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and 
Hard News Story Intensity) 
  Soft Hard 
Mean 2.779661 4.31982 
Variance 0.967855 1.81128 
Observations 59 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 122  
t Stat -9.82704  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.657439  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.9796   
 
With respect to the soft and soft-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 2.78, σ2 = 0.968) and hard (µ = 4.32, σ2 = 1.811) 
sub-samples (t[122] = -9.827, p < 0.0001).   
Variation based on News Story Location 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story location 
on news sharing across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of this test 
are shown below in Table E-S. 
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Table E-S: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Location for 
Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 517 3300 6.382979 6.104981   
General Intl. 190 1254 6.6 5.140741   
India/S. Asia 444 2844 6.405405 6.589226   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 6.895202 2 3.447601 0.56213 0.57015 3.003563 
Within Groups 7040.797 1148 6.133099    
       
Total 7047.692 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on news sharing was not 
significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 1148] = 0.562, p > 0.05).  Because 
there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were 
performed. 
 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
location on news sharing across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of this 
test are shown below in Table E-T. 
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Table E-T: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Location for 
NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 189 874 4.624339 2.608128   
General Intl. 120 427 3.558333 1.105812   
India/S. Asia 126 569 4.515873 4.235746   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 91.76146 2 45.88073 17.21442 0.000**** 3.016603 
Within Groups 1151.388 432 2.66525    
       
Total 1243.149 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on news sharing was 
significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] = 17.214, p < 0.0001).  Because 
significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-
tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of the United States versus 
General International news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Ti. 
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Table E-Ti: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United 
States vs. General International Locale) 
  US Gen. Intl. 
Mean 4.624339 3.558333333 
Variance 2.608128 1.105812325 
Observations 189 120 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 307  
t Stat 7.026782  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.649832  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.967721   
 
With respect to the United States and General International treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 4.624, σ2 = 2.608) 
and General International (µ = 3.558, σ2 = 1.106) sub-samples (t[307] = 7.027, p < 0.0001).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of General International versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Tii. 
Table E-Tii: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (General 
International vs. Indian/S. Asian Locale) 
  Gen. Intl. India/S. Asia 
Mean 3.558333 4.515873016 
Variance 1.105812 4.235746032 
Observations 120 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 188  
t Stat -4.62671  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.652999  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.972663   
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With respect to the General International and India/S. Asia treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the General International (µ = 3.558, σ2 = 
1.106) and India/S. Asia (µ = 4.516, σ2 = 4.236) sub-samples (t[188] = -4.627, p < 0.0001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of United States versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Tiii. 
Table E-Tiii: Mean Differential for Sharing Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United 
States vs. Indian/S. Asian Locale) 
  US India/S. Asia 
Mean 4.624339 4.515873016 
Variance 2.608128 4.235746032 
Observations 189 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 224  
t Stat 0.498112  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.309447  
t Critical one-tail 1.651685  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.618894  
t Critical two-tail 1.970611   
 
With respect to the United States and India/S. Asia treatments, there was not a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 4.624, σ2 = 2.608) and 
India/S. Asia (µ = 4.516, σ2 = 4.236) sub-samples (t[224] = 0.498, p > 0.05).   
Variation based on News Story Actor Nationality 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story actor 
nationality on news sharing across sub-segments of the Native sample group.  The results of 
this test are shown below in Table E-U. 
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Table E-U: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Actor 
Nationality for Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 243 1571 6.465021 6.084515   
NRI/PIO 183 1168 6.382514 6.039693   
Generic U.S. Natl. 334 2132 6.383234 6.158997   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 1.1127 2 0.55635 0.091108 0.912929 3.007619 
Within Groups 4622.623 757 6.106503    
       
Total 4623.736 759         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news actor nationality on news sharing 
was not significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 757] = 0.913, p > 0.05).  
Because there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests 
were performed. 
 A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news actor 
nationality on news sharing across sub-segments of the NRI sample group.  The results of 
this test are shown below in Table E-V. 
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Table E-V: One-Way ANOVA for News Sharing based on News Story Actor 
Nationality for NRI Sample Group 
Anova: Single Factor       
       
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 95 443 4.663158 4.225756   
NRI/PIO 86 384 4.465116 3.357592   
Generic U.S. Natl. 103 490 4.757282 1.969922   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 4.095926 2 2.047963 0.651325 0.52214 3.027898 
Within Groups 883.5484 281 3.1443    
       
Total 887.6444 283         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news actor nationality on news sharing 
was not significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 281] = 0.651, p > 0.05).  
Because there were no significant differences across these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests 
were performed. 
Granular Examination of Expected Participation in the 2019 Indian General 
Election 
 
Variation based on News Story Intensity 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on the reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of 
the Native sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-W. 
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Table E-W: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election based on News Story Intensity for Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Soft 282 1257 4.457447 0.832702   
Medium 392 1726 4.403061 0.870374   
Hard 477 2119 4.442348 0.78501   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.561453 2 0.280727 0.339962 0.711869 3.003563 
Within Groups 947.9703 1148 0.825758    
       
Total 948.5317 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on reported likelihood of 
future electoral participation was not significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 
1148] = 0.34, p > 0.05).  Because there were no significant differences across these sub-
groups, no follow-up t-tests were performed. 
A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
intensity on reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of the 
NRI sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-X. 
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Table E-X: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election based on News Story Intensity for NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Soft 59 222 3.762712 1.011689   
Medium 154 621 4.032468 0.842076   
Hard 222 914 4.117117 0.746403   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 5.865049 2 2.932524 3.594202 0.028308* 3.016603 
Within Groups 352.4706 432 0.815904    
       
Total 358.3356 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news intensity on reported likelihood of 
future electoral participation was significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] 
= 3.594, p < 0.05).  Because significant differences were observed across these sub-groups, 
three follow-up two-sample t-tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “medium” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Xi. 
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Table E-Xi: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and Medium News Story Intensity) 
  Soft Medium 
Mean 3.762712 4.032468 
Variance 1.011689 0.842076 
Observations 59 154 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 97  
t Stat -1.79378  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.037982  
t Critical one-tail 1.660715  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.075964  
t Critical two-tail 1.984723   
 
With respect to the soft and medium-intensity treatments, there was not a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 3.763, σ2 = 1.012) and medium (µ = 
4.032, σ2 = 0.842) sub-samples (t[97] = -1.794, p < 0.05).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of “soft” versus “hard” intensity 
news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-Xii. 
Table E-Xii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Soft and Hard News Story Intensity) 
  Soft Hard 
Mean 3.762712 4.117117 
Variance 1.011689 0.746403 
Observations 59 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 82  
t Stat -2.4747  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.007698  
t Critical one-tail 1.663649  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.015396*  
t Critical two-tail 1.989319   
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With respect to the soft and hard-intensity treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the soft (µ = 3.763, σ2 = 1.012) and hard (µ = 4.117, σ2 = 
0.746) sub-samples (t[82] = -2.475, p < 0.05).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of “medium” versus “hard” 
intensity news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-
Xiii. 
Table E-Xiii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Medium and Hard News Story 
Intensity) 
  Medium Hard 
Mean 4.032468 4.117117 
Variance 0.842076 0.746403 
Observations 154 222 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 316  
t Stat -0.90082  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.184184  
t Critical one-tail 1.64969  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.368368  
t Critical two-tail 1.9675   
 
With respect to the medium and hard-intensity treatments, there was not a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the medium (µ = 4.032, σ2 = 0.842) and hard (µ = 
4.117, σ2 = 0.746) sub-samples (t[316] = -2.475, p > 0.05).   
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Variation based on News Story Location 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story location 
on the reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of the Native 
sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-Y. 
Table E-Y: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election based on News Story Location for Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 517 2295 4.439072 0.843664   
General Intl. 190 837 4.405263 0.718491   
India/S. Asia 444 1970 4.436937 0.851545   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.171986 2 0.085993 0.104096 0.901148 3.003563 
Within Groups 948.3597 1148 0.826097    
       
Total 948.5317 1150         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on reported likelihood of 
future electoral participation was not significant across the Native sample sub-segments (F[2, 
1148] = 0.104, p > 0.05).  Because there were no significant differences across these sub-
groups, no follow-up t-tests were performed. 
A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news story 
location on reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of the 
NRI sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-Z. 
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Table E-Z: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election based on News Story Location for NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
United States 189 742 3.925926 0.70725   
General Intl. 120 526 4.383333 0.759384   
India/S. Asia 126 489 3.880952 0.921714   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 19.79172 2 9.895858 12.62764 0.000**** 3.016603 
Within Groups 338.5439 432 0.783666    
       
Total 358.3356 434         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news location on reported likelihood of 
future electoral participation was significant across the NRI sample sub-segments (F[2, 432] 
= 12.628, p < 0.0001).  Because significant differences were observed across these sub-
groups, three follow-up two-sample t-tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of the United States versus 
General International news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Zi. 
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Table E-Zi: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United States vs. General International 
Locale) 
  US Gen. Intl. 
Mean 3.925926 4.383333333 
Variance 0.70725 0.759383754 
Observations 189 120 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 247  
t Stat -4.55809  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.651046  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.969615   
 
With respect to the United States and General International treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 3.926, σ2 = 0.707) 
and General International (µ = 4.383, σ2 = 0.759) sub-samples (t[247] = -4.558, p < 0.0001).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of General International versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Zii. 
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Table E-Zii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian General 
Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (General International vs. Indian/South 
Asian Locale) 
  Gen. Intl. India/S. Asia 
Mean 4.383333 3.880952381 
Variance 0.759384 0.921714286 
Observations 120 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 243  
t Stat 4.301025  
P(T<=t) one-tail p < 0.0001  
t Critical one-tail 1.651148  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000****  
t Critical two-tail 1.969774   
 
With respect to the General International and India/S. Asia treatments, there was a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the General International (µ = 4.383, σ2 = 
0.759) and India/S. Asia (µ = 3.881, σ2 = 0.922) sub-samples (t[243] = 4.301, p < 0.0001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of United States versus 
Indian/South Asian news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in 
Table E-Ziii. 
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Table E-Ziii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (United States vs. Indian/South 
Asian Locale) 
  US India/S. Asia 
Mean 3.925926 3.880952381 
Variance 0.70725 0.921714286 
Observations 189 126 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 243  
t Stat 0.427694  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.334626  
t Critical one-tail 1.651148  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.669252  
t Critical two-tail 1.969774   
 
With respect to the United States and India/S. Asia treatments, there was not a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the United States (µ = 3.926, σ2 = 0.707) and 
India/S. Asia (µ = 3.881, σ2 = 0.922) sub-samples (t[243] = 0.428, p > 0.05).   
Variation based on News Story Actor Nationality 
 
 A one-way ANOVA test was conducted to compare the effect of news story actor 
nationality on the reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of 
the Native sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-AA. 
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Table E-AA: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election based on News Story Actor Nationality for Native Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 243 1086 4.469136 0.729415   
NRI/PIO 183 791 4.322404 1.076803   
Generic U.S. Natl. 334 1504 4.502994 0.707198   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 4.005018 2 2.002509 2.493281 0.083317 3.007619 
Within Groups 607.9937 757 0.803162    
       
Total 611.9987 759         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news actor nationality on reported 
likelihood of future electoral participation was not significant across the Native sample sub-
segments (F[2, 757] = 2.493, p > 0.05).  Because there were no significant differences across 
these sub-groups, no follow-up t-tests were performed. 
A one-way ANOVA test was then conducted to compare the effect of news actor 
nationality on reported likelihood of future electoral participation across sub-segments of the 
NRI sample group.  The results of this test are shown below in Table E-AB. 
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Table E-AB: One-Way ANOVA for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election based on News Story Actor Nationality for NRI Sample Group 
SUMMARY       
Groups Count Sum Average Variance   
Native 95 364 3.831579 0.886226   
NRI/PIO 86 357 4.151163 0.718057   
Generic U.S. Natl. 103 385 3.737864 0.62669   
       
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 8.568509 2 4.284254 5.780568 0.003466** 3.027898 
Within Groups 208.2625 281 0.741148    
       
Total 216.831 283         
 
This analysis of variance showed that the effect of news actor nationality on reported 
likelihood of future electoral participation was significant across the NRI sample sub-
segments (F[2, 281] = 5.781, p < 0.01).  Because significant differences were observed across 
these sub-groups, three follow-up two-sample t-tests were performed. 
The first two-sample t-test considered the impact of Native versus NRI/PIO news 
story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-ABi. 
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Table E-ABi: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Native vs. NRI/PIO) 
  Native NRI/PIO 
Mean 3.831579 4.151162791 
Variance 0.886226 0.718057456 
Observations 95 86 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 179  
t Stat -2.40362  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.008627  
t Critical one-tail 1.653411  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.017255*  
t Critical two-tail 1.973305   
With respect to the Native and NRI/PIO treatments, there was a significant difference 
between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 3.832, σ2 = 0.886) and NRI/PIO (µ = 4.151, σ2 
= 0.718) sub-samples (t[179] = -2.404, p < 0.05).   
A second two-sample t-test considered the impact of Native versus Generic U.S. 
National news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table E-
ABii. 
Table E-ABii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (Native vs. Generic U.S. National) 
  NRI/PIO Gen. Amer. 
Mean 4.151163 3.737864078 
Variance 0.718057 0.626689511 
Observations 86 103 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 176  
t Stat 3.440113  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000363  
t Critical one-tail 1.653557  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000726***  
t Critical two-tail 1.973534   
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With respect to the Native and Generic U.S. National treatments, there was a significant 
difference between the mean scores for the Native (µ = 3.832, σ2 = 0.886) and Generic U.S. 
National (µ = 3.738, σ2 = 0.627) sub-samples (t[176] = 3.44, p < 0.001).   
Finally, a third two-sample t-test considered the impact of NRI/PIO versus Generic 
U.S. National news story treatments, and the results of this test are shown below, in Table 
E-AEiii. 
Table E-AEiii: Mean Differential for Likelihood of Participation in 2019 Indian 
General Election Across NRI Sample Subgroups (NRI/PIO vs. Generic U.S. 
National) 
  Native Gen. Amer. 
Mean 3.831579 3.737864078 
Variance 0.886226 0.626689511 
Observations 95 103 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 184  
t Stat 0.754856  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.22565  
t Critical one-tail 1.653177  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.451301  
t Critical two-tail 1.972941   
 
With respect to the NRI/PIO and Generic U.S. National treatments, there was not a 
significant difference between the mean scores for the NRI/PIO (µ = 4.151, σ2 = 0.718) and 
Generic U.S. National (µ = 3.738, σ2 = 0.627) sub-samples (t[184] = 0.755, p > 0.05).   
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APPENDIX G: COLLECTED TWEETS WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
DIASPORA 
 
Tweets from the verified account of Narendra Modi, collected from Apr. 1, 2015 – Apr 1, 2017 
for the following positive keyword hits: 
i. “NRI”; 
ii. “PIO”; 
iii. “OCI”; 
iv. “overseas” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); 
v. “abroad” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); 
vi. “community” (in the context of Nonresident Indians); and/or 
vii. “pardesi” (this word literally translates as “one who is outside of India,” but 
is colloquially used both in the generic sense as well as in specific reference to 
NRIs) 
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi Jan 7  
Highlighted our commitment to deepen interaction with the Indian diaspora. For every Indian abroad, home 
should never be far away! 
544 replies 2,216 retweets 10,074 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi Jan 7  
Will interact with the Indian diaspora at #PBD2017. Strong links with our diaspora is of vital importance for 
us. @PBDConvention 
417 replies 1,907 retweets 8,525 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi Feb 27  
Narendra Modi Retweeted Bhupendra Kumar 
Download the Narendra Modi App & involve yourself in various discussions & volunteering activities. 
Narendra Modi added, 
Bhupendra Kumar @bhupen_kr 
@narendramodi @BJP4India I do not live in India but I would to contribute to India/BJP. Is there ny way 4 
NRI to become a BJP member.Thnx! 
193 replies 1,156 retweets 4,413 likes  
 
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 11 Nov 2016  
Grateful to the Indian community for the warmth. Delighted to interact with them at the community 
programme. http://nm-4.com/mdly  
729 replies 2,996 retweets 14,851 likes  
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Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 2 Oct 2016  
Inauguration of the Pravasi Bharatiya Kendra will deepen our bond with the Indian diaspora & bring us even 
closer. 
118 replies 993 retweets 3,453 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 7 Jul 2016  
Always a delight to meet and interact with the Indian community. 
203 replies 1,686 retweets 5,044 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 8 Jun 2016  
I thank the Indian community in Mexico City for a very warm welcome. 
669 replies 3,760 retweets 13,194 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 5 Jun 2016  
Delighted to interact with the Indian community in Doha. India's diaspora enhances our pride worldwide. 
145 replies 1,569 retweets 3,590 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 2 Apr 2016  
Interacted with Indian community & spoke to them about how India is developing rapidly across all sectors. 
http://n-m4.in/21Z6HzE  
175 replies 1,251 retweets 3,581 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 30 Mar 2016  
Delighted to interact with the diaspora at the community programme. They are India's true 'Lok Doots'. 
440 replies 2,842 retweets 8,941 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 24 Nov 2015  
My Singapore visit was brief but extremely eventful. Got to meet leaders, investors & diaspora. This visit will 
further cement our ties. 
160 replies 1,126 retweets 3,350 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 22 Nov 2015  
Splendid interaction with Malaysia's Indian community. They are the living bonds of India-Malaysia 
friendship. 
100 replies 1,090 retweets 2,017 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 13 Nov 2015  
My message to the diaspora- India awaits you! Amazing positivity at @wembleystadium. Gratitude to all. 
355 replies 2,374 retweets 4,192 likes  
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Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 12 Nov 2015  
Later today I will join the community programme at @WembleyStadium. Follow news from the UK visit on 
the Mobile App. http://nm4.in/dnldapp  
240 replies 1,277 retweets 2,831 likes  
 
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 12 Nov 2015  
Interacted with the Punjabi community in London. We exchanged thoughts on various issues. 
307 replies 1,939 retweets 4,597 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 27 Sep 2015  
Was an eventful Saturday in San Jose. Met Indian community, @TeslaMotors visit & Digital Dinner. Here 
are highlights. http://n-m4.in/1VgABkB  
209 replies 1,286 retweets 2,350 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 23 Sep 2015  
Simply mesmerising! Great to see these children recite in Sanskrit. 
From the community programme in Ireland. 
1,183 replies 5,517 retweets 6,906 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 23 Sep 2015  
Overwhelmed by the community programme in Dublin. Recital of Shlokas in Sanskrit by children was very 
touching. 
237 replies 2,494 retweets 3,533 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 22 Sep 2015  
Leaving for Ireland, where I will hold delegation level talks with Mr. Enda Kenny, Taoiseach of Ireland & 
interact with Indian community. 
322 replies 1,448 retweets 2,839 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 20 Sep 2015  
Indian diaspora has been a source of immense strength for us. Will interact with Indian community in San 
Jose. http://nm4.in/1iGkqMl  
257 replies 1,330 retweets 2,408 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 20 Sep 2015  
My visit to West Coast will focus on start-ups, innovation & technology and how to further support them in 
India. http://nm4.in/1OnglcF  
177 replies 1,283 retweets 2,016 likes  
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Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 17 Aug 2015  
The UAE visit was pathbreaking. Got the opportunity to engage with UAE's top leadership, meet investors 
& interact with Indian community. 
166 replies 1,695 retweets 2,596 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 12 Aug 2015  
I will interact with the Indian community at a programme in Dubai on 17th August. 
http://www.namoindubai.ae/index.html  
461 replies 1,611 retweets 2,682 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 11 Jun 2015  
From toilet construction to leveraging interest of diaspora towards a Clean India, discussed aspects relating 
to Swachh Bharat Mission. 
156 replies 942 retweets 1,401 likes  
 
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 17 May 2015  
Wonderful being in Seoul. My gratitude to the Indian community here for the very warm welcome. 
194 replies 1,169 retweets 2,130 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 16 Apr 2015  
Here is the video of my speech at the Indian Community Programme in Toronto. 
http://nm4.in/1E4Y6oG  
377 replies 1,274 retweets 2,471 likes  
 
Narendra ModiVerified account @narendramodi 15 Apr 2015  
Thank you Toronto! Thank you @pmharper. Unforgettable experience at the Indian Community 
Programme. 
581 replies 2,223 retweets 3,638 likes  
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